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Koranic Inevitability of Israel's Destruction Described

44040479 Beirut AL-'AHD in Arabic 5 May 89 p 13

[Article: "Light on the Book, 'Israel's Destruction a Koranic Inevitability'"]

[Text] In his book, "Israel's Destruction a Koranic Inevitability," Shaykh As'ad al-Tamimi¹ presents us with firm Koranic evidence for the inevitability of this destruction. The shaykh draws his conclusions from verses in The Night Journey and The Table [Suras 17 and 5]. These verses confirm without doubt that the state of the Jews will be destroyed at the hands of the believers.

The shaykh begins his book by discussing the purpose for which the Prophet (may God bless him) was sent. He says, "The Prophet was sent to perfect noble traits of character. The conflict between him and polytheism concerned the decadence that the latter represented in human thought and behavior. The Prophet (may God bless him) lived a long, and difficult life of holy struggle, during which he, with his companions and his wife Khadijah (on them be peace), struggled against the infidels and polytheists."

In this vicious atmosphere, God was gentle and compassionate with His Prophet. There was the incident of the Night Journey from Mecca to Jerusalem, and there was the Ascension from the ground of al-Aqsa Mosque to the highest heavens. "Glory be to Him, who carried His servant by night from the Holy Mosque to al-Aqsa ['the Further'] Mosque, the precincts of which We have blessed, that We might show him some of Our signs [Koran 17:1]."

This verse makes the relation of Muslims to al-Aqsa Mosque everlasting. To Muslims, this mosque is where God carried their Prophet. Afterwards, the Sura of the Night Journey begins to speak about the Jews' corruption and tyranny and about the destruction this will cause them.

"And We decreed for the Children of Israel in the Book: 'You shall do corruption in the earth twice, and you will become great tyrants.' So, when the time of the first of these came [or, comes] to pass, We sent [or, shall send] against you servants of Ours, men of great might, and they went [or, shall go] through the habitations, and it was [or, shall be] a promise performed [Koran 17:4-5]."

The shaykh who is the author of this book mentions that these verses were revealed at Mecca. They speak about two tyrannies and two corruptions of the Jews. Did these two tyrannies take place before the verse was revealed, or are they still to come? The shaykh adds, "Certainly, the Jews suffered destruction several times before Islam and before the verses were revealed. The Babylonians took

them captive, and the Romans destroyed them, after God became angry with them because of their evil behavior and hatred for God and His prophets.

"Abasement and poverty were pitched upon them, and they were laden with the burden of God's anger; that, because they had disbelieved the signs of God and slain the prophets unrightfully; that, because they disobeyed, and were transgressors [Koran 2:61]."

Thus, it is not unlikely that the Jews became corrupt and tyrannical more than once before Islam; nor is it unlikely that they will become tyrannical and corrupt one or more times after Islam and that they will be—with God's permission—destroyed. The shaykh explains to us that the prefix "la-" of the verb "latufsidunna" [you shall do corruption] is the prefix of futurity and emphasis. The verb "lata'lunna" [you shall be tyrannical] also contains the "la-" of futurity and emphasis. God describes one of the two tyrannies as "great." The word "idha" [when, if] is a temporal particle indicating that the event will occur in the future and that there is no relationship between what follows and what precedes the word. The presence of the word "idha" in the verse indicates that the corruption and tyranny, followed by the first destruction, are yet to come, and not already passed.

God, may He be exalted, then says: "We shall send against you servants of Ours, men of great might, and they shall go through the habitations." In other words, those who will carry out the destruction of the Jews will be from the believers; for, when God, may He be praised, qualifies servants as being His, it is a way of conferring honor upon them, and He is then using the word to designate the believers.

The shaykh who wrote the book adds that the honor and dignity of being believers did not apply to the Babylonians or to the Romans, since they were all idolaters. This description does, however, apply to the Messenger of God and to his companions who came to al-Madinah while the Jews there had political and economic influence.

The Messenger of God (may God bless him) concluded a treaty providing that the Jews were an independent community and the Muslims an independent community. When the Jews acted treacherously and, as was their habit and wont, broke the treaty, God gave the Muslims authority over them, "and they went through the habitations." This is a military term for fighters entering to pursue the enemy's surviving fighters. This is precisely what the Muslims did when God sent them against the Jews in the early days of Islam. The author points out that in the verse's mention of two corruptions and a tyranny, we see that God, may He be praised and exalted, speaks about two corruptions of the Children of Israel and one tyranny accompanying one of the two corruptions. In the first corruption, they were tribes without power over those who were around them; thus they were unable to be tyrannical. In the second time,

which they are now living, they have become great tyrants. They have become rulers of the Holy Land and have killed Muslims—old men, women, and children. Thus, this tyranny, which represents the summit of corruption, applies historically to the tyranny of the Jews in the world in our time. God says the following, describing the state of the Jews:

"We succored you with wealth and children, and We made you a greater host [Koran 17:6]."

This verse does not apply to the Jews who lived before Islam; for they, being few and poor, lived in constant tribulation and suffering at the hands of the Romans and the Babylonians. But we see the scope and truth of this verse. We see its miraculous nature with our own eyes, for we find that the state of the Jews today lives on the sons who come to it from the ends of the earth to supply it with soldiers—from Russia and Europe. We see money from the countries of the West flowing to the Jewish entity, so that it may persist in its aggression and tyranny.

The shaykh asserts authoritatively in his book that this instance of tyranny is the second time. Corruption has arisen for the second time. The Jews have now seized the holy places in Palestine and have polluted the sacred things of the Muslims. God says: "They will not fight against you all together except in fortified cities, or from behind walls. Their adversity is great among themselves; you think of them as a host; but their hearts are scattered; that is because they are a people who have no sense [Koran 59:14]." This verse shows us why the state of the Jews has not succeeded in stabilizing since 1948. Every attempt at stabilization and peace is frustrated by the Jews themselves, because the Jews deal with everything through hatred, conspiracy, and deceit. God confirms that they have no rationality in the words, "they are a people who have no sense."

The fight with the Jews inside and outside Palestine and the victory over them will be an Islamic fight for the sake of God, not rightist or leftist. So it is not surprising that we are not defeating the Jews yet, because we have not been fighting according to Islam. If the Arab organizations had won victory, the Koran would have been lying, since these are infidel organizations that have abolished Holy War from their life and programs.

Today, the West is trying hard to rescue the Jewish state from its inevitable fate, but the conspiracies are failing. The Jews are rebelling against those who created them, for they are a people who have no sense.

Under the rubric, "The Inevitability of Israel's Destruction in Light of Verses from [the Sura of] The Table," the shaykh shows us in his book how the Jews after the first destruction remained scattered on the earth. When they began to sow corruption, the nations began to persecute them, especially the Christian peoples. This hostility is based on doctrine, because the Messiah promised in

Jewish doctrine has not come yet, and because the Jews accused Mary (on her be peace) of adultery with Joseph the Carpenter and slandered Jesus, the son of Mary.

These things caused the Jews to suffer punishment and to be banished from the countries of Europe—Germany, England, France, Austria, Hungary, and Eastern Europe—from the 14th century until the beginning of the 19th century. However, friendship between the Christians and Jews returned again, after the Jews began to stir each other up and play on the emotions of the peoples of the world because of their persecution and suffering. In 1922, the League of Nations granted Christian Britain a mandate over Palestine. The English permitted Jewish immigration to Palestine. Ever since that date, the Jews have worked to strengthen the foundations of their dream state, having loosed their worldwide slogan, "Advance, advance toward Jerusalem!" Have they advanced?

Before answering, let us read the verse: "O believers, take not Jews and Christians as friends; they are friends of each other [Koran 5:51]."

Western support began flowing to the Jews, who started forming their gangs—the Hagana—and began launching attacks on the Arabs and Muslims in Palestine. The Arab organizations abandoned each other, and Palestine was sold to the Jews to do as they pleased.

In 1956, the tripartite aggression against Egypt by the satanic trio (France, Britain, and the army of the Jews) took place—this for the first time in history. In the sixties of this century, the cooperation reached its summit with Pope John Paul XXIII's proclamation that the Jews were innocent of the blood of Christ—according to their claim. Then the comedy of June 1967 took place. In 6 days, the Jewish army, supported by the Christians of the West, destroyed the gates of Sinai, the West Bank, and the Golan. The Jews came to be just as God had described them: "You will become great tyrants." This was the great tyranny and the greatest corruption.

Who will smash this tyranny and eliminate this corruption?

Under the rubric, "Islam Returns," the shaykh mentions how the Islamic revolution broke out in Iran under the leadership of the venerable scholar Khomeyni (may his shadow endure) and smashed the thrones of tyrants and shahs. The shaykh adds that the servants of God whom God will send to smash the corruption of the Jews are those who are rising up in Palestine and the Islamic world against Jewish hatred and injustice. The shaykh says that the Jewish leaders have not entered history with heads held high to supply their generations with moral support, because that is incompatible with the abasement that God has imposed on the Jews.

"Abasement and poverty were pitched upon them, and they were laden with the burden of God's anger [Koran 2:61]."

"And when thy Lord proclaimed He would send forth against them, unto the Day of Resurrection, those who should visit them with evil chastisement [Koran 7:167]." The shaykh says that these verses prove for us the truth of the prophecy and the miracle of the Prophet, when he informed us of the fight against the Jews, saying (may God bless him):

"The Last Hour will not come until the Muslims fight the Jews. The Muslims will slay them until the stones and the trees say, 'O Muslim, O servant of God, here is a Jew behind me; come and slay him!'—except for the (?farqad), for that is a tree of the Jews." Today, the Jews are planting this tree, the (?farqad), throughout Palestine!

Finally, we say that the book, "Israel's Destruction a Koranic Inevitability," deserves our reading and careful examination because of its Koranic and historical

connections. What we have said about the book is only a small amount from its abundance of incontrovertible proofs for the destruction of the state of the Jews, God willing!

Footnote

1. Shaykh As'ad al-Tamimi was born in the city of Hebron in Palestine in 1925. He grew up a house linked to politics by bonds of a historical holy war. He studied at al-Azhar University and obtained an advanced degree from al-Azhar's Faculty of Islamic Law. He held several positions in Palestine and founded the Liberation Party. In 1955, he was arrested and imprisoned for 9 months.

He worked as a teacher at al-Aqsa Mosque until its disaster in 1967, when he was banished to Jordan. He has remained there and is still in Amman under house arrest after he gave a harsh speech before some ministers on the Feast of Sacrifice following the Sabra and Shatila massacres.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Decrease in GCC States Income Reported

44040404c Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 6 Apr 89 p 17

[Text] Public revenues of the GCC [Gulf Corporation Council] states were about \$40.9 billion in 1987, compared to \$55.1 billion 1986, recording a drop of about \$14.3 billion, while total expenditures in 1986 were about \$78.2 billion, compared to \$61.6 billion in 1987, recording a drop of \$13.6 billion. This produced an overall deficit in the budgets of the GCC states of around \$33.7 billion in 1987, compared to \$23.5 billion in 1986.

Public revenues have recorded a noticeable drop of around 26 percent from 1986. That decline was due to fluctuations in oil prices and in amounts produced, something which in turn affected oil income which declined to about \$27.5 billion in 1987, compared to around \$39.3 [billion] in 1986, a drop of around 27 percent. It was also due to a decline in other revenues, which fell from \$17.8 billion in 1986 to around \$13.5 billion in 1987.

Total public expenditures of GCC states fell by about \$13.7 billion in 1987, a drop of 13 percent compared to 1986, that as a result of efforts by the GCC states to spend judiciously and reduce budget deficits. It included a reduction in investment spending by 18 percent compared to 1986, and also in current spending such that in 1987 it fell by about 13 percent compared to 1986.

On local liquidity and its developments in the GCC states, an economic report prepared by the GCC general secretariat said that the volume of local liquidity rose in 1987 over what it had been the previous year; in 1987 it was up to \$83 billion, compared to about \$78.6 billion in 1986. At the same time money in circulation rose from \$13 billion in 1986 to around \$13.9 billion in 1987. Demand deposits also rose to \$18.6 billion, compared to around \$17.3 billion during the same period.

The total capital and reserves of the commercial banks in the GCC states in 1987 was around \$11.9 billion, compared to around \$11.3 billion in 1986. The increase in capital and reserves is due to their rise in Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, while they fell in the Sultanate of Oman and Bahrain. In spite of the rise recorded by the account of capital and reserves in 1987, its relative importance to total deposits remained as it had been in 1986, namely 18 percent. That is due to the growth in total deposits, which was very close to its counterpart recorded in the account of capital and reserves.

The volume of bank accounts rose in the GCC states in 1987 to around \$64.9 billion, compared to around \$61.4 billion in 1986. That is due to the rise in current deposits, government deposits, and (savings) deposits,

and it is obvious that (savings) accounts still represent the greatest portion of total deposits during the same period, for they were up to around \$40.3 billion in 1986, then rose to 65 percent in 1987 after having been 66 percent in the previous year [as published]. They are followed by current accounts at 28 percent, rising to 29 percent in 1987. Government deposits still maintain the same percentage for 1987, which is 6 percent, except that their volume rose to around \$4.3 billion.

As for foreign assets, their volume in GCC states was up to around \$49.95 billion in 1987, compared to around \$46.25 billion in 1986. They recorded the largest rate of increase in Qatar, where they reached 26 percent, followed by Saudi Arabia with about 18 percent, then Kuwait at 9 percent, and the Sultanate of Oman at 2 percent, whereas foreign assets fell in the Emirates from about \$13.5 billion in 1986 to around \$12.1 billion in 1987; likewise in Bahrain, from around \$1.87 billion to around 1.84 billion during the same period.

Total foreign liabilities in GCC states rose in 1987 by 22 percent, inasmuch as they were up to \$16.25 billion, compared to \$16.36 billion [as published] in 1986. The increase was distributed over most of the GCC states in varying amounts. The highest percentage rise was recorded in Qatar, where it reached around 70 percent, followed by Saudi Arabia, and finally Kuwait at 3 percent. But in Bahrain, foreign liabilities fell in 1987 by 3 percent, while in the Sultanate of Oman they fell by 17 percent.

Efforts To Develop Arab Trade Coordinated

44040404f Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 10 Apr 89 p 13

[Text] A Gulf study stressed that coordinating Arab development efforts, working to achieve production integration in agricultural and industrial fields, and overcoming obstacles which hinder the process of commercial exchange are the sound scientific gateway to developing Arab trade. A study by the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry said that the most important elements of strengthening trade are the need to provide marketing services such as advertising and promotion of Arab goods, raising awareness of them, organizing fairs for them, holding collective talks, and making preference agreements.

It is urgent that there be an Arab openness in order to give impetus to development activities, production, and trade. It should then be strengthened with appropriate measures and controls to limit the threat from foreign competition.

The study asked that Arab producers be given direction in developing their production qualitatively and quantitatively, as well as in related issues such as improved methods and forms of canning, packaging, and preserving. They should be encouraged to turn to Arab markets in import operations, and to give them preference over

their competitors when prices are the same or nearly so. Arab substitutes for imported goods should be recommended, and facilitation should be given to goods that have an Arab origin.

The study demanded that an intense national campaign be conducted aimed at transferring some of the activity in capital and foreign Arab investments to the Arab nation so that the effective economic power would have a real and direct interest in encouraging Arab trade, and in fact become a part of it, something for which a better chance for continuity and stability must be prepared.

The obstacles which confronted the development of Arab trade affected the growth of trade, and prevented the formation of an effective Arab common market of a comprehensive nature throughout its range and diversity, especially since the obstacles appear at home and abroad.

The internal obstacles consist of a weak production base at the Arab level; poor integration among the sectors; a backward infrastructure of transport means, communications, finance and insurance services; and exchange of information, as well as monetary, administrative, and financial complexities.

The foreign obstacles are primarily a historical legacy which imposed on the developing nations, including the Arab states, a kind of specialization, division of labor, and inequality. They were given a marginal role in the current international economic system so that they would remain merely a rich source of primary materials and a vast market for manufactured goods.

The efforts of the dominant states and their companies to preserve outstanding positions in developing economies have continued through making agreements and arrangements and creating an economic and political climate favorable to the achievement of their goals. Perhaps this situation is what determined the formulation of rules in the agreement to facilitate and develop Arab trade regarding the importance of taking joint collective measures to confront market flooding and the policies of discrimination, protection, subsidization which the advanced states take towards the developing states.

The agreement has already established a number of basic criteria, including the need to establish a unified Arab customs wall before the outside world, and linking free trade to economic integration and to coordinating the production of Arab goods.

The Arab commodity ought to have in it the benefits of the place of origin which the agreement decides upon, and the requirement that the resulting added value not be less than 40 percent of the product, and the reduction of the commodity when it is produced such that it drops to 20 percent as a minimum for Arab assembly industries. The agreement also empowers the Arab Monetary

Fund to set up an appropriate system to facilitate the settlement of outstanding payments according to its founding agreements. It also urged the Arab investment insurance establishment and the specialized Arab establishments to provide the insurance needed for trade.

The study said that the directions of Arab trade and its components will only lead to more dependence on the advanced industrial nations, for the policy of replacing imports without a minimum level of coordination between the Arab countries has led to the establishment of comparable industries in a number of Arab states, which in turn caused the Arab market to be fragmented and divided, especially since the policy of encouraging exports has been tied to each Arab economy alone incorporating itself with other non-Arab economies.

Contrary to what was expected and aimed for, the unified Arab economic report of 1987 indicates that Arab trade is still recording more of an annual drop compared to the total Arab trade, that after it had realized a slight improvement in 1981, which was the year in which Arab trade reached its zenith. The share of Arab trade in foreign trade reached 7.4 percent in 1985.

GCC States Approach to Foreign Joint Industrial Ventures Discussed

44040404d Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 8 Apr 89 p 17

[Text] The Arab Gulf states in their industrial development plans have tried hard to encourage the national private sector to go into the fields of industrial investment which specialized foreign companies possessing high technology and various organizational capabilities can help to establish.

The Gulf states see joint foreign industrial investment as important, and have supported it and provided it with generous incentives, such as legislation on foreign investment. This gives great flexibility for movement of capital and frees it from obstacles which hinder the transfer of money to and from most of the Arab Gulf states.

Moreover, the following have all had a big impact on establishing many rising industries in the fields of food, petrochemicals, building, etc.: the lack of control of exchange rates or the re-transfer of profits, in addition to readiness of the Gulf States to provide a good climate for joint foreign investments with such measures as applying a simple tax system; exempting joint industrial ventures from taxes for periods ranging from 5 to 10 years; exempting their exports from fees and taxes; and helping foreign and national companies to define and be informed of profitable investment opportunities.

A recent study by the Union of Arab Gulf Chambers of Commerce said that the decline in oil revenues convinced businessmen of the need to invest in incoming production sectors and to increase investment by

continuing to encourage partnership of foreign capital in industrial ventures and taking advantage of modern technology which the foreign investor has.

The GCC [Gulf Corporation Council] states constitute the eighth largest import market in the world, since foreign imports represent about 85 percent of total local needs of the GCC states. In other words, what is manufactured locally does not exceed 15 percent of requirements in demand.

The Arab Gulf states are characterized by political stability and a good economic situation, since they are not in debt to any foreign party. Moreover, the individual income of the ordinary citizen has risen, financial resources with which to finance industrial investment activities are available, and the Gulf market can be viewed as a single common market under the aegis of the unifying economic agreement of the GCC states. In addition the cost of setting up joint ventures in the GCC states has dropped.

The study called upon the Gulf private sector to make known the areas of industrial investment open between the two sides. This would be on the condition that they not conflict with the strategies of the unified industrial development plans in that they give priority to industries that are based on the exploitation and development of local natural resources, new industries that help to increase the chance of success of capital-intensive basic industries, the industry of important strategic commodities, and food and medical industries and those based on mining, etc.

During the past decade in the wake of the rise in oil prices in 1974, the Arab states have tried to increase their cooperation with multinational firms in various fields such as banking, transport, insurance, and conversion industries in order to take advantage of their technical, financial, and marketing capabilities.

There were up to 269 Arab ventures with foreign companies by the end of 1983, with capital of more than 12 billion. The negative aspects of joint Arab ventures can be summarized as follows: the desire of the foreign partner to overestimate or incorrectly estimate the value of his share by raising the price of imported technology, and the excessive price of raw materials and labor that he supplies. In addition, unfair conditions are imposed on acquiring this technology, it is difficult to make a sound selection of the right technology, and it cannot be created or invented.

The study said that there are other problems which arise from the narrow scope of Arab markets, their fragmentation into small markets, the difficulty of penetration by foreign markets, and the lack of coordination among the projects set up on the regional or Arab level, which have led to increased competition among these ventures.

The deficiency of most industrial development plans and strategies has caused the industrial fields in which Arab private and public sectors could participate to be poorly defined. These obstacles must be countered so that there will be no conflict between the wishes of the Arab states and the interests of the multinational companies.

The study called for a reduction in the negative aspects arising from the increasing importance of the role of the industrial ventures. From this remark it was clear that the multinational firms are constantly striving to ensure their interests and expand their profits, while the developing nations are striving to achieve more national economic development and attain a degree of economic cooperation and regional integration.

The Arab Gulf states have asked that multinational companies be forced to select industrial ventures which are consistent with national social and economic development plans within their Arab and Gulf framework; that the necessary level of protection of national economies be determined; and that the activities of multinational companies with respect to technology transfer and the pricing of intermediate products, production requirements, and training the labor force be regulated.

The study recommended considering integrating industrial production steps in various fields, especially the agricultural sectors, in order to reduce dependence on the outside. It also recommended that contract conditions pertaining to the joint ventures be studied, and that they be turned into national Arab companies within an appropriate period of time.

It stressed the need to formulate a collective Arab regulatory framework to deal and negotiate with the multinational companies and to select the most appropriate among them, to ensure that there will be job opportunities for citizens to get technical and administrative skills, and to work towards creating an Arab information bank that would provide information on the kinds of technology available with the international companies.

The study asked that a comprehensive survey of the work of the multinational companies in the Arab nation be made in order to evaluate the social advantages and disadvantages, and to study their targeted markets and whether cooperation with similar third world companies could be increased. It also called for attention to be paid to the area of services in light of constant deficit in the balance of services and in the Arab balances of payments.

Arab Funds for Developing Countries Discussed *44040457a Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 11 May 89 p 8*

[Text] Abu Dhabi (KUNA)—Development aid provided by the Arab states to other Arab states or developing states during 1980-86 totalled about \$40.8 billion. If the

\$39.6 billion in aid provided during 1970-79 is added to this amount, the total amount of Arab assistance over the course of 16 years is \$80.4 billion.

The "Unified Arab Economic Report of 1988" describes Arab development assistance as one of the most important forms of cooperation between the Arab states and between the Arab states and other friendly, developing states.

This important report, which was obtained by the Kuwaiti News Agency (KUNA), stated that Arab development aid gives practical form to a spirit of responsibility, solidarity, and common understanding commensurate with the dimensions of the tasks, burdens, and efforts needed to implement developmental, economic, and social plans and programs.

The report states that oil exports of the main Arab donor states are the primary if not sole source for financing developmental imports and investments and the general expenditures of donor states. It adds that the Arab states have continued to provide development assistance to developing countries at steadily increasing percentages of their oil export revenues despite the substantial reduction in these revenues over the past 6 years.

The report notes that Arab development aid is characterized by easy terms and a preponderance of grants. Also, loans provided in the scope of Arab aid are not constrained by stipulations regarding imports or stipulations requiring that the donor agency's organizations implement the economic, financial and social policies of beneficiary states. However, the most important characteristic of Arab development aid is that it constitutes assistance offered by developing countries to other developing countries. Therefore, the donor countries are not associated with countries which benefitted directly or indirectly from previous colonial or exploitative relations.

The report states that the Arab donor countries have continued to help Arab and non-Arab developing countries carry out their development projects and strengthen their ability to implement corrective economic and financial policies which they are adopting to support efforts to achieve economic balance and reform. It adds that despite the decline in crude oil prices in the world market in 1986, Arab aid increased by 20 percent, compared to 1985, to total \$4.406 billion. Thus, development aid given by the Arab states during the period 1980-86, which witnessed a sharp reduction in the Arab states' financial resources after 1981, totalled about \$40.8 billion. The report stated that this period also coincided with a significant transfer of Arab donor states' wealth to the industrialized states due to the decline in oil prices, which compelled the Arab donor states to reduce development aid. This situation continued until 1986, when development aid given by the Arab states increased due to an increase in Saudi development assistance from about \$2.6 billion in 1985 to about \$3.6

billion in 1986. The report indicates that four GCC [Gulf Corporation Council] member-states, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE [United Arab Emirates] and Qatar, provided about 96 percent of the net total withdraw of Arab development aid.

Bilateral aid constitutes the bulk of the development aid granted by the Arab states, comprising 86.83 percent of the total amount of assistance provided during 1985 and 1986. Therefore, the percentage of aid provided by development organizations in donor states fluctuated between 17 and 14 percent.

Saudi Arabia heads the list of providers of Arab development aid on easy terms; it provided 81 percent of the total of such aid in 1986 and an average of 68 percent during 1980-86.

It is followed by Kuwait, which provided 16 percent of Arab development assistance in 1986 and 17 percent during 1980-86.

These two states provided more than 90 percent of the volume of Arab development aid, and they play a major role in determining the volume and sectoral and geographical distribution of aid.

Saudi and Kuwaiti development aid to OPEC countries also constituted more than 93 percent of the aid of that group in 1986.

Kuwait, Qatar to Prepare Plan for Utilizing Natural Gas

44040457c Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 28 Apr 89 p 6

[Excerpts] Jeddah (Agencies)—The GCC [Gulf Corporation Council] oil ministers late last night concluded the 14th meeting of the Standing Committee for Oil Cooperation after reviewing their countries' oil strategy and efforts to support world oil market stability. The oil ministers of the six GCC member-states began their meeting yesterday under the chairmanship of the Bahraini Minister of Development and Industry, Yusuf al-Shirawi, who stated, after returning to Bahrain yesterday morning, that the ministers discussed a number of topics contained in their agenda, including an examination of the future of energy and the creation of energy alternatives. [passage omitted]

The statement issued at the close of the meeting reported that the ministers approved the recommendations prepared by the technical committees emanating from the ministerial committee after meeting with the heads of national oil companies and marketing directors in the GCC countries.

The ministers authorized these recommendations after studying reports on the results of meetings held by specialized technical committees regarding training and the exchange of information and technical expertise among the GCC countries.

The statement reported that those attending the meeting also approved the recommendations made by a committee of mineral resource officials and experts in the GCC states after reviewing the minutes of its second meeting.

They also made a decision to task Kuwait and Qatar with preparing a plan for the maximum utilization of natural gas after discussing cooperation between their states regarding natural gas transference and distribution.

This decision came within the scope of an examination of the future of energy and the creation of oil alternatives. Kuwait and Qatar were requested to prepare the plan for presentation at the next meeting of the Standing Ministerial Committee for Oil Cooperation, which meets three times a year.

The oil ministers decided to hold their regular meeting on 15 October 1989. [passage omitted]

Qatar's Minister of Finance and Petroleum, Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz Ibn-Khalifah Al Thani, stated that oil prices were "reasonable and balanced." He added that all of the OPEC countries are adhering to what was agreed on regarding prices.

He expressed his hope that everyone will continue to adhere to the latest OPEC agreement, which, he stated, "has realized excellent gains, including an increase in the price of oil to \$18 per barrel."

The Saudi News Agency cited the Qatari petroleum minister as stating, after the meeting, that all OPEC states were adhering to their production quotas. [passage omitted]

Arab Gulf Program Helps Finance Development Projects

44040404e Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 13 Apr 89 p 13

[Text] The Arab Gulf Program for Support of United Nations Development Agencies helped to finance 262 development projects in 109 states at a cost of \$160 million. Among them were 64 projects aimed directly at mothers and children in Third World countries in general, at a total cost of \$70,290,000, as well as 49 projects aimed directly at mothers and children in the Arab world in particular, at a total cost of \$27,867,000.

A report issued by the office of women's and children's affairs in the Arab Gulf Program for Support of United Nations Development Agencies disclosed that the program had earmarked \$1,206,000 for participation in the health project to promote Arab childhood, which is being implemented through the Arab League General Secretariat.

The report explained that precise statistical data on the social and economic health needs of Arab children were clearly lacking, in particular data on the number of infant deaths and the causes of those deaths. These

statistics would be of the utmost importance in planning infant services and setting the priorities of these services, especially by decision makers. In view of all that, the Arab Gulf Program has earmarked \$1,206,000 for participation with the unit of population research and study in the Arab League in implementing the health project to promote Arab childhood.

The program also played a principal role in urging international organizations such as the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund], the WHO [World Health Organization], the UN statistics division and (ASCO) [expansion unknown] to help finance the project and offer the technical advice needed for it.

The report indicates that this project is considered the first of its kind in the Arab region, whether with respect to the field that it will study, the financing allocated to it, the Arab and international parties participating in overseeing its implementation, or the results that it will obtain. The report explained that a supreme steering committee has been formed to keep watch on how it is implemented and to ensure that it achieves its intended goals. The committee is headed by Emir Talal ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz and made up of a group of Arab personalities notable in the Arab development field, as well as the chairmen of the international Arab organizations participating in the project.

The report pointed to the Gulf infant health project which the program helped to finance with one million dollars, and which is overseen by the general secretariat of the council of ministers of health of the Arab Gulf states.

It said that this scientific research project is the largest project in the field of infant health implemented in the Gulf states with the goal of determining the infant mortality rate in the Gulf states and the causes of these deaths, and also of providing health, social, and economic data on Gulf children.

The report explained that this project has strong ties to the Arab project which was an extension of the Gulf project in the framework of trying to draw up a social, economic, and health chart pertaining to Arab children and their mothers. The report revealed that the first part of this pilot project has been completed with the collection of field reports in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Emirates, and work is still continuing in the rest of the states.

It also revealed that the support and backing of the project by many official and private parties played a big role in the success and realization of its first phase. UNICEF, WHO, and the UN fund for population activity helped to support this project.

The report also reveals that the vast majority of Arab children are still deprived of the right to obtain an education at the pre-elementary level, indicating that less than 1 percent of children of the Arab nation are enrolled at this level.

The report reveals that in keeping with its goals to set the stage to make essential educational services available to Arab children, the Arab Gulf Program has allocated a million dollars to finance an important educational project to develop kindergarten programs in Saudi Arabia, and to train the teachers, directors, and counselors who would work in this grade.

The report reveals that this integrated educational program will be submitted to Arab educational establishments so that they may take advantage of it. The project is being financed by \$2,206,000.

The program is contributing a million dollars, the chairmanship of the program a million dollars, and UNICEF \$206,000. The project will be implemented over a period of 3 years.

The report also reveals that the program financed 28 projects belonging to private Arab associations. These were in 14 Arab states and were financed with \$6,417,413. It explained that these projects concentrated in the area of the handicapped, kindergartens, the training and qualification of women, health and educational services, and rural areas services.

The report also reveals that the Arab Gulf Program for Support of United Nations Development Agencies has helped to finance two important projects that the Kuwait Association for the Advancement of Childhood is implementing in cooperation with other parties. One of the projects is a study of how the war affects children in Lebanon, for which the program allocated \$214,000. The second project pertains to producing 50 television messages aimed at the goals and well-being of the Arab child, entitled "Our Children Are Our Hearts." The program has allocated \$250,000 to this project.

Third World Countries' Debts Discussed in Strategic Study

4404404a Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 21 Mar 89 p 13

[Text] James Baker's 1985 plan to reduce Third World debt has been a failure even for its originator. Some of the United States' allies are calling for debts to be written off, but this idea faces strong opposition from the commercial banks.

What will George Bush see when he casts his promised "new look overall" on the debt crisis in the Third World?

First, the new president cannot but see that the debt burden borne by the developing countries today is much greater than it was in 1982, when the alarm was sounded.

At that time the total debt of the southern countries was around \$800 billion, but today the figure is 1.3 trillion, and in 1989 the Third World will pay \$140 billion on interest alone.

This transfer of monies to western governments, commercial banks, and multinational loan agencies will be part of the negative flow of up to \$30 billion this year from the poor countries to the rich ones.

After 7 years of running faster than any ever before just to be able to pay the interest, most debtor nations now suffer from severe economic pressure, causing the standard of living in Africa and Latin America to decline. Moreover, the latest reports of the United Nations and the World Bank show that debt fatigue suffered by the governments of the Third World is more severe than ever before.

Supposedly, Bush and his advisers have at least cast a quick glance at the studies that link drowning in debt to a rise in infant mortality. Perhaps they have also looked at the analyses which show how debt pressure increases the threat to regional environmental systems, and thus to world ones.

Even if the American administration cannot see the human and environmental inducements to alleviating debt, it is conceivable that it will be able to distinguish its own self interest in easing the debt burden on Third world economies. Numerous personalities in Washington for example have warned that the stability of the western hemisphere would be threatened by unrest arising from debts in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru.

Former secretary of state Henry Kissinger said recently that Bush will face unpredictable political situations in each of these countries during his first year in power. Important sectors of the American commercial establishment are also calling for action to reduce the Latin debt burden, and those investors note that American exports to Central and South America in 1988 came nowhere near their 1981 value, and they say that there will be no improvement worth mentioning in the U.S. trade deficit as long as Third World countries cannot pay the increasing costs of its exports.

In his review of the debt crisis, Bush will also see that Baker's 1985 plan has failed in a number of key aspects. The current secretary of state, James Baker, who set up this initiative, did not admit in his recent testimony before Congress that the plan's performance had been disappointing. Baker and his supporters blame this outcome on the resistance of Third World governments to the "free market reforms" which the plan proposed. Supporters of the plan say that many of the debtor governments had not gone far enough in selling state-owned ventures to the private sector, and had not done enough in the way of tax reform to encourage commercial activity.

However, he cast blame on the principal commercial banks. Baker told Congress that the banks had failed to offer enough money in loans to encourage growth in most of the countries drowning in debt.

With the admission that Baker's plan is inadequate, Bush will be urged by various sides to plan a new course for his policy. In Berlin international financiers have agreed in a general way that movement forward must resume after having been bogged down for 3 years in routine measures. However Bush, Baker, and Secretary of State Nicholas Brady cannot but notice that the impetus for a policy to lessen debts comes primarily from Japan with support from France, and for this reason alone perhaps the new administration has hesitated to accept every proposal because it would strengthen the leadership position of the United States' greatest economic rival. It is conceivable that the Republican White House is wary of this source because it has articles in common with those in the program often called for by Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey, the Democratic party's principal observer of Third World debt. Like the Japanese and the French, Bradley believes that some form of debt forgiveness is needed to avoid international economic and political turmoil.

All the proposals to reduce the debt share an idea that they hide behind, namely that the private and official lenders must accept an increase in their losses on the standing loans, and the plan hides this fact to varying degrees. But the Bush administration acknowledges that demands to reduce the debt include the demand that they be written off. One of the current proposals which has enjoyed the support of the creditors stipulates that the value of the remaining debts be reduced to their true market value; thus the \$240 billion owed to commercial banks by the 15 largest debtor countries would be paid at their current value of \$90 billion. This rate of 40 cents on the dollar is all the banks could get if they tried to sell their debts on the open market.

Increase in Poultry Development Projects Reported

44040404b Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 2 Apr 89 p 12

[Text] The big growth in projects to produce chicken meat and eggs in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] is attributable to encouragement of these projects by the governments of the region, their profitability, and consumer acceptance, in addition to the establishment of joint ventures of this production.

Sources involved in the poultry meat industry stress the importance of protecting it against imported goods, and of establishing a center for scientific research to develop and guide this sector and to create local strains adapted to the environment.

Over the past decade, the poultry meat production industry in the United Arab Emirates developed greatly, such that it now has ten farms for raising meat chickens

and five farms for egg production, three of which produce both meat and eggs. The production of chickens for meat has risen from 740,000 chickens in 1979 to 5 million chickens in 1985, and it is expected to reach 6.7 million chickens in 1990, then 8.55 million in 1995. Refrigerated and frozen chickens are sold in plastic bags, then distributed in plastic crates.

AS for egg production, it rose from 3.7 million eggs in 1979 to 150 million in 1984, and in 1990 it is estimated that it will be about 180 million, and in 1995 308 million. The eggs are put in cardboard trays, then sold in cardboard boxes.

A recent study prepared by Arab Union of Food Industries said that Saudi Arabia has 385 projects for chicken meat production, and production has risen from 68.2 million chickens in 1981 to about 406 million in 1995. Saudi Arabia also has 277 projects for egg production, whose production was up to 1.852 billion eggs in 1984, and [it will reach] 2.495 billion in 1990, and 2.888 billion in 1995.

Qatar produced 776 tons of meat chickens in 1981, then it rose to 1675 tons in 1984, and it is expected to reach 2500 tons in 1990, and 3200 tons in 1995. Chickens are sold in Qatar after they are packed in plastic crates. In 1981 Qatar also produced about 318 tons of eggs, and that rose to 580 tons in 1984, and it is expected to reach 870 tons in 1990 and 1100 tons in 1995.

In Kuwait, the average annual [consumption] per individual is 28.6 chickens. The estimated demand for chicken in 1985 was around 49 million chickens, and it is expected to reach 61 million in 1990 and 76.4 million in 1995.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

'Peace Now' Document Criticized

440400470 Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI
in Arabic 24 Jun 89 p 11

[Text] In the first week of June the Peace Now movement published a six-point document on the "peace" plan (Shamir's initiative) which the Israeli government adopted on 14 May 1989.

Compared with the Peace Now movement's stands it is considered to be weak; it lacks many fundamental and essential elements. The first point says: "The movement sees in the Israeli initiative a sign that the Israeli leaders realize that there is no military solution to the uprising and that the present political stalemate cannot possibly continue."

This view by the movement is simple and naive. The leadership has realized this fact and the fact that there is no military solution for the uprising even before this initiative. As for the claim that they realized that the

present political stalemate cannot continue, such realization is not being felt. The Israel leaders' statements say differently. The political observer often feels that Israel is fighting a battle so that this political stalemate will continue.

In point two the Peace Now movement "blesses the recognition by the two main parties in the government of the need to conduct free elections in order to elect a Palestinian leadership with whom Israel would negotiate an interim and a permanent settlement." Such blessing confirms three facts:

- That the movement supports the establishment of an alternative leadership in the territories.
- That it ignores the existing Palestinian leadership, the PLO.
- That the PLO will have no role in the permanent settlement because the "elected" leadership is the one that will negotiate the interim and the permanent settlement.

Yet the movement did not endorse the Palestinian stand that supports the principle of holding free elections after Israel's withdrawal from the territories. The movement also did not refer to the fact that it is difficult to hold free elections in the present difficult circumstances, under Israeli occupation and under the present government policy that bans individuals from the Peace Now movement and other Israeli peace movements from expressing solidarity with the Palestinians in a number of West Bank and Gaza towns.

In point three the movement draws the Israeli public attention to the existing contradiction in the plan between the idea of free negotiations with the elected Palestinian leadership—in which each side will be allowed to raise all the subjects it wishes—and the concepts that oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state and the holding of negotiations with the PLO. The movement said the Israeli government must declare that the elections will be a first stage in the process that will lead to a final and lasting settlement agreed upon by the Israelis and the Palestinians.

This point confirms that only "the elected leadership" can hold dialogue and negotiations with the PLO but not the Israeli side. It recognizes that there is contradiction between what Shamir's initiative contained and other contexts, forgetting that that Shamir's initiative contains many contradictions.

In point four the movement calls on the Israeli government to allow the Arab residents of east Jerusalem to elect and to be elected, to accept an international supervision, to allow the establishment of political organizations and totally free expression, and to grant immunity to the elected ones.

This point is good but it does not refer to any Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories before elections are held, as if it accepts that Israeli forces may be present during the elections together with the presence of international control. The movement hopes that the elected ones will be granted immunity, as if confirming that no elected person can have immunity under occupation. Which is true.

In point five the movement calls on head of the Israeli government Yitzhaq Shamir not lend the plan interpretations that would negate its positive aspects and thus place obstacles before the Palestinian acceptance of elections.

It is as if this point accepts that there are negative aspects and the movement is aware that there are harmful goals which interpretations might reveal, thus placing obstacles before the Palestinian acceptance of the idea of elections. The movement here stresses that the "elections" are only an initial step and wishes the Palestinians to accept it.

The sixth and last point is that the Peace Now movement calls upon the Palestinian leadership movement to accept the idea of election as proposed and to agree to submit questions regarding the conditions of putting the idea into effect. This means that the Peace Now movement accepts Shamir's plan with all its points. And its appeal is directed to the Palestinian leadership and not to the PLO, thus disregarding the fact that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and ignoring its role. The Peace Now movement calls for putting questions to Israel. The big question is through which channels the questions are to be put, to whom does "Palestinian Leadership Movement" refer, and who can guarantee that Israel will answer these questions.

There are clear contradictions in this document which is addressed to the Israeli and not the Palestinian public. In our view these contradictions represent a back-tracking by the movement from its previous courageous stands.

There are however some minor positive aspects in this document, but the contents and the language confirm that negativism is still dominant and overwhelming since the negative aspects overpower the positive ones. Therefore, the document is very weak and is less than what was expected from the movement which sometimes stood on the Palestinians' side.

The observers stress that the weakness is due to the "rough" situation in the Israeli arena and, perhaps, the movement temporarily does not wish to reveal what it has on its mind. It only wanted to lend support to the political peace process by supporting Shamir's plan even though cautiously, fearing that its outright support might lead to a strong reaction from the Right. Fear from reaction is in itself a definite sign of the movement's weakness in the Israeli arena at present.

The observes express the view that the "document" should not be regarded as a final political stand by the movement because if it is so regarded the movement, in comparison with other Israeli groups and parties, would appear to be less supporting the Palestinian rights, less decisive in its stand, and less effective in the Israeli arena.

Expatriate Palestinians Discuss Lives, Ambitions

Kuwait

44040481 London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 28 Jun-4 Jul 89 pp 28-30

[Article: "Kuwait's Palestinians Formed Fatah and They Enjoy Highest Education Rate; Abu-Nayif From Kuwait: We Are Awaiting Palestine's Rise So That We May Return to It"]

[Text] Abu-Nayif was 19 when he, along with 5 other youths from his tribe, left Palestine for Kuwait by land via Jordan and Iraq. He recalls that day, saying: "On 4 May 1957, the day preceding our departure, I took out my herd of sheep as usual. Our tribe, which extends from Bethlehem to Jericho, lives on herding. My eyes were not watching the sheep as much as they were gathering images of the green plains, the tree-covered mountains and the stone terraces. It is as if they wanted to carry those images so that they might be my sustenance in my exile, the duration of which I could not know."

Abu-Nayif ('Ali Ahmad Dayfullah al-Ta'mari) added: "We were 5 youths who headed for the unknown, with each carrying in his pocket a few dinars and a paper with the address: Abu-Ibrahim Restaurant, Public Security Square, Kuwait. After a long bus journey from Amman to Baghdad and then to al-Basrah, we arrived at that square at 2100."

[AL-MAJALLAH] How much did that trip cost you?

[Abu-Nayif] Two dinars for the bus fare from Amman to Baghdad and 600 Iraqi fils from Baghdad to al-Basrah. A few more fils got us to Kuwait.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Did you get to Abu-Ibrahim's restaurant easily?

[Abu-Nayif] With utter ease. Our countryman, the restaurant owner, welcomed and hosted us generously and then took us to Hajj Muhammad 'Atiyah Nasir, a relative of ours who had preceded us to Kuwait in 1952.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Did you find work easily?

[Abu-Nayif] We had no educational degrees. So our relatives who had come with me looked for simple work while my cousins and uncles collected a sum of money and bought me small transport vehicle which was sort of

a small motor scooter mounted with a structure for deliveries. The use of this type of vehicles was permitted in Kuwait then, but it has now been stopped.

[AL-MAJALLAH] How much did the vehicle cost?

[Abu-Nayif] 3,000 rupees.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Before they bought you that vehicle, how did you cover your personal expenses?

[Abu-Nayif] We are a closely-knit and cooperative tribe, as you say these days. A tribal solidarity system existed, and continues to exist, among us. My cousins and uncles covered my expenses until I started working.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What was your average daily income?

[Abu-Nayif] It ranged from 40-50 rupees daily. This sum was the fruit of an effort which started at dawn and ended in the evening. After the dawn prayers, I started my day by going to Nuqtat Saqr where fishermen gathered and transported fish from al-Sayf area to the fish market. I then went to the vegetable market, also in al-Sayf area, and carried vegetables to groceries in al-Mirqab, al-Sharq and al-Rasmah areas. The newly developed area of al-Qadisiyah was then included in 1958. In addition to this work, I transported construction materials to all parts of Kuwait.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Where did you reside?

[Abu-Nayif] Initially, I lived in shacks designated for unmarried people in al-Shamiyah area. I then moved to al-Mirqab where houses are built of clay and brick. House rent in al-Mirqab was nearly 100 rupees. We shared housing and rent. Thus, we were able to meet our expenses in Kuwait and to remit some money to our kinsman in the West Bank.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Did you operate this vehicle for a long time?

[Abu-Nayif] I acquired a driver's license in 1959. In 1960, I bought a blue Vanette car, one of 5 cars imported by 'Abd-al-Muhsin al-Babutayn. With the purchase of this car, my income rose, of course, to 150 dinars monthly. I also opened in al-Naqrah a grocery which I called al-'Asifah Grocery. I then changed the name to al-Qantarah Grocery at the request of the Ministry of Commerce. [al-'asifah, "the storm," is another name for Fatah]

[AL-MAJALLAH] Did you visit your relatives in the West Bank?

[Abu-Nayif] Whenever I had the opportunity. During my presence in Kuwait, my wife gave birth to Nawfan, our second son, the first-born being Nawwaf. In 1962, I married a second wife who gave birth to Hani in the West Bank. I brought her to Kuwait and settled her in

Tifan where she gave birth to 'Adil. I then took her back to the West Bank and returned to Kuwait alone. During my stay with the family in 1967, Israel invaded the West Bank. So I took my entire family to Jordan and settled them in Amman. I then brought my wife and children to Kuwait. My parents and some brothers remained in Jordan. God willing, we will return to our home in Palestine when the land is regained.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Did your children study in Kuwait, and where are they now?

[Abu-Nayif] I have 8 boys and 2 girls from both my wives. All of them have completed their high school, except for Muhammad, Sulayman and Tha'ir who are still in school.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Are you satisfied with your past life?

[Abu-Nayif] Fully satisfied. I have lived in Kuwait which opened its heart and hosted a large number of Palestinians driven homeless by Israel. With my work, simple as it was, I have been able to educate my children and graduate them from universities. We are awaiting the rise of our state on Palestine's soil so that we may return to it, regardless of how long we remain absent from it.

The Palestinian presence in Kuwait dates back to the arrival in 1936 of the education mission dispatched by the All-Palestine Government. But the relationship between the two countries' peoples dates farther back when prominent Kuwaitis studied in Palestine and traded with it before 1948. With the onset of the 1950's, the name of Safwan Center, the border crossing point between Iraq and Kuwait, began to be reiterated in the Palestinian circles. Palestinian people began to immigrate to all parts of the world in search of a livelihood when they could no longer endure the hard living conditions in the refugee camps. However, Palestinian immigration from the West Bank to Kuwait had begun before the West Bank was occupied. Kuwait was one of the Arab countries in which Palestinians sought refuge after the 1948 war. But this immigration gained impetus with the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. Initially, it was difficult to get to Kuwait because of the restrictions imposed by the British in this country before it gained independence in 1961. Some Palestinians recount that they had to sell all their possessions at times to be able to afford a plane ticket or a bus fare to Kuwait. Those who were not fortunate enough to be able to enter Kuwait officially had to travel a hard and difficult route among gangs smuggling illegal aliens and in the desert heat and cold. Dozens of them perished but hundreds made it to Kuwait successfully with their determination to survive and fight for their existence. Most of those who arrived officially belonged to the middle class of engineers, doctors and teachers. Whereas another group, consisting mainly of farmers, workers and students, sneaked into the country. The well-to-do minority felt at home and employed its intrinsic resources to attain a good economic and social position.

Percentage of Palestinians among non-Kuwaiti Arabs in Kuwait

Year	Number	Percentage
1961	37,327	44.3%
1965	77,712	70.49%
1970	147,696	-
1975	204,178	-
(Palestinians with Jordanians)		

Most sources, including the Palestinian Studies Institute, agree that the education mission was the forerunner of the Palestinian immigration. The latest to be written in this regard is an article entitled "Palestinians in Kuwait" by Bilal al-Hasan who belongs to a family that has participated in the course of the Palestinian revolution.

Official statistics published in Kuwait in 1961 show that the first education mission included 4 teachers, namely: Jabir Hadid, Muhammad al-Maghribi, Khamis Najm and Ahmad Shihab al-Din who became director of the Kuwaiti Scientific Research Institute after he moved there from Kuwait University.

A U.S. study published in February 1986 states that the number Palestinians in Kuwait has reached nearly 330,000 and that from 1975 to 1984 they increased at an annual rate of 32 percent. This study also says that literacy rate among Palestinians living in Kuwait is 94 percent, the highest in the Arab land, perhaps in the world. With proclamation of the Palestinian state on 15 November 1988, Britain's THE ECONOMIST said that the number of Palestinians in Kuwait amounts to 400,000. This figure seems to be exaggerated because most of the Palestinians working in Kuwait carry Jordanian citizenship, not to mention that the objectives of these studies and statistics are often tendentious and seek to arouse fear of the Palestinian presence in the host countries.

The Palestinian's bond to Kuwait is nearly as strong as actual belonging, by virtue of the pan-Arab sentiment harbored by the Palestinians and of the gratitude the Palestinians feel for Kuwait. It saw the early preparation for inception of the Palestinian revolution in 1965 and the subsequent setting up of training centers which supplied the revolution with fighters. In this regard, it must be noted that most of the leaders of the Palestinian revolution have worked in Kuwait. 'Arafat, the president of the state of Palestine, worked as an engineer in Kuwait. Salah Khalaf (Abu-Iyad), the number two man in Fatah, taught there. Faruq al-Qaddumi (Abu-al-Lutf), head of the PLO Political Department, worked in the Ministry of Health; Khalid al-Hasan worked in Kuwait Municipality; and Salim al-Za'nun, the PNC vice president and Fatah's accredited officer to Kuwait and the Gulf, worked in the Kuwaiti prosecutor general's office.

The Palestinians have contributed to building modern Kuwait under the umbrella of its policy of openness to the world. They have also worked in the various government and private sectors. Some of them have risen to prominent positions, such as Yusuf Shuhaybir who rose to the position of assistant deputy minister of interior and has joined with Palestinian businessmen and Kuwaiti financiers in setting up numerous contracting and commercial firms. Numerous Palestinian figures have risen to prominence in this field, such as al-Jabashi, al-Qattan, al-Shakhshir, al-Siddiq, Shahin, al-Sarraf, al-Qutub, Barakat, Abu-Ghazalah, Abu-Hajalah, al-Hasan, al-Rushuq, al-Dabbagh, al-Sa'di, al-Sabbagh, al-Sharif and dozens of other names.

In the media field, the Palestinian presence has been distinguished. Numerous Palestinian pens have contributed to the Kuwaiti press since the 1960's, such as Najib 'Abd-al-Hadi, Mustafa Abu-Lubdah, Muhammad Yunis, 'Abdullah al-Shiti, 'Abdullah al-Qaq, Walid Abu-Bakr, Salih Nazzal, Salim Salim and Naji al-'Ali. In the medical field, there are prominent figures working in government hospitals and private clinics, such as doctors Fadl Abu-Laban, Subhi Ghawshah, Nazim al-Ghabra, Suhayl Khammar, Muhammad Saffuri, Yusuf al-Kaylani, Hani Shuhaybir, 'Abd-al-Ra'uf Lulu and others. At Kuwait University, the Palestinian professors' contribution has been and continues to be great and distinguished. A large number of these professors, such as As'ad 'Abd-al-Rahman, Basim Sarhan, Yusuf al-Qutub, Yahya Haddad, Muhammad Salihyah, Siham Abu-'Atiyah and Amin Mahmud, have worked at this university.

Large numbers of Palestinians live in certain parts of Kuwait, such as Hawalli and al-Naqrah, as a result of the early immigration and because of family relationships and the relatively moderate apartment rents in comparison with the modern residential areas. Most middle-income and below-middle-income families live in Hawalli and al-Naqrah, whereas well-to-do families live in model communities, such as al-Salimiyah, al-Jabiriyah, al-Ahmadi and others. Some of these families own their own residence, if they have Kuwaiti citizenship.

Saudi Arabia

44040481 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
28 Jun-4 Jul 89 p 30

[Article: "Saudi Arabia's Palestinians Are Tied to Palestinian Soil; Abu-Ya'qub: Stone-Throwing Children Make Us Feel Ashamed; We Will Return"]

[Text] Walid Ya'qub al-Saqqa is a 50-year old Palestinian from Gaza. When he left his town for Riyadh, capital of Saudi Arabia, in 1967, he thought that he would return very shortly and that his departure from Palestine was a temporary thing until withdrawal of the invading Israeli forces to the pre-5 June borders. But the return has been very slow in coming and Ya'qub has lived in Riyadh for more than 22 years and is still living there. He has married his cousin during this time and has had

4 children: Ya'qub (13), Lu'ay (12), Lubna (11) and Muhammad (5). These children represent the Palestinian generation born outside the occupied territories.

Abu-Ya'qub is eager, as he says, to have his children visit the occupied territories every year so that they may be bound to the Palestinian soil. He asserts that they will return to their land someday after it is liberated. When we interviewed Abu-Ya'qub, we found a group of his friends at the place where he works. He was reminding them of Palestine. The place is specialized in coffee-grinding and in selling thyme, nuts and other goods. Walid al-Saqqa's entire family, consisting of his mother, his 6 brothers, and his 4 sisters, lives in Saudi Arabia. All his brothers and sisters are married.

Al-Saqqa stresses that he is living a good life in Saudi Arabia and that all his children go to Saudi government schools. He constantly points out to his children that their presence on this good land is temporary and that they must return to the homeland someday.

Abu-Ya'qub speaks proudly of the Palestinian people's intifadah [uprising] and views it as the most important development from his departure from the occupied territories to the present. This is why he says: "This is why I am careful to watch the television newscast, with its pictures, with my children. We all feel proud of our valiant people's resistance in repelling the occupying aggressor." Pointing to his Palestinian friends, he adds: "We feel ashamed at times because the young stone-throwing children have been able to achieve in less than 2 years what we grownups failed to achieve in a lifetime."

Jordan

44040481 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
28 Jun-4 Jul 89 p 30

[Article: "Refugee Camps in Occupied Territories: No Reunification Without Establishment of Palestinian State"]

[Text] The family of Dhib 'Ulayyan is one of the Palestinian families scattered by the occupation in all parts of the world. The remaining members of this family live in one of the refugee camps scattered throughout the West Bank and Gaza, namely 'Ayidah Camp next to Bethlehem. UNRWA set up this camp, as it has set up the other Palestinian refugee camps.

Al-Hajj Abu-Zaki (Dhib 'Ulayyan) has passed his 70th year of age, of which he has spent 41 years waiting to leave the camp and return to his homeland—that little village hanging on the foothill of a mountain overlooking Bab al-Wad Road which links Jerusalem with Jaffa and which the Arabs controlled for several months, blocking Jewish supplies from entering Jerusalem. When Jerusalem's Jews were about to surrender, the United Nations intervened and persuaded the forces controlling the road to lift the blockade under the temporary truce. The Jews

where then able to provide those blockaded with supplies and munitions. The 1948 battles then took place and 'Ulayyan's village (Dayr Ayyub) was subjected to artillery shelling and to repeated attacks by armed Jews. Numerous martyrs, including children and women, fell.

Abu-Zaki said: "I left the village to flee the Jews' artillery and machineguns. The areas surrounding us were a war theater. When the 1948 truce was concluded, we were outside the village, which had fallen to Jewish control. We were prevented from returning. So we found refuge in the town of Bayt Jala. The family consisted of 9 members: Myself and Umm Zaki [wife], our 4 sons and 3 daughters. I accepted any work offered me, whatever it was, to feed these mouths. In 1961, we moved to an UNRWA-provided house in Ayda Camp where we still live."

[AL-MAJALLAH] Where have the sons and the daughters gone?

[Ulayyan] The daughters are married and the sons have scattered in Kuwait, the United States and Jordan. In 1963, I was not able to provide for the family, despite UNRWA's assistance. Immigration to Kuwait was open and so I sent Zaki, my son, to work there and help me. He was in high school at the time. With time, Zaki settled there. He came back prior to the 1967 war, married and took his wife with him to where he works. Since then, letters have been our sole means of communication. In 1973, Mahmud, the second son, finished high school and went to Jordan and then left Jordan and went to work as a steward with Kuwait Airways. In 1975, 'Abd-al-Salam, another son, enrolled in a British university, got an engineering degree and went to the United States where he settled in California and married an American wife. Muhammad, the fourth and youngest son, went to New York in 1978, found work, settled there and also married an American wife.

Since 1978, the house has been empty of the young men, each of whom has his wife and children now. The cousins know each other only through the letters and pictures they exchange from continent to continent. Abu-Zaki said that their sons came for summer visits some years. But it has never happened that they came together, and this still grieves all the family members. Visits by sons require special permits from the Israeli military authorities and such permits have become almost impossible under the conditions existing since the intifadah. What grieves the aging parents is the impossibility of a reunion of the family that has multiplied and grown apart. Despite the relative prosperity in which this family lives, separation continues to be like a knife wound that disturbs life. Umm Zaki's tears flow whenever her sons are mentioned in her presence. She has not seen them for 3 years. She doesn't know what has become of her grandchildren and whether those grandchildren in the United States speak Arabic or know anything about Dayr Ayyub, their private little Palestine, and about Ayda, the camp in which their family grew up. The

parents' wish is to give a party to which they invite all the camp residents when the sons and grandchildren return under the umbrella of an Arab authority, and when the family reunites and everybody gets acquainted with everybody.

Ayda Camp, like the other camps, is constantly subjected to persecution, arrests, oppression, travel bans and a concentrated Israeli military presence. The camp families expect night "visits" from the occupation troops and border guards.

The camp has played a prominent role in the intifadah and has witnessed large-scale clashes and violent confrontations with the occupation troops. All the homes have been subjected to raids and to the destruction of furniture. The camp has been subjected to curfew several times. Dhib 'Ulayyan's home has been stormed by troops looking for participants in the intifadah. In this regard, Abu-Zaki said: The intifadah has restored the Palestinians' dignity and the small stone has proven that it is sharper than firearms and that the Palestinians are capable of standing fast in the face of the violent and inhumane Israeli oppression. Regarding proclamation of the independent Palestinian state, he said: "We implore God to help the PLO achieve this just demand. We know that the state will only be in the West Bank and Gaza but it will bring us national dignity and lift the occupation nightmare from among us. At the personal level, our presence under the umbrella of a national Arab authority will give us the opportunity to bring our children together, to live in freedom and dignity, and to eliminate the hardship, the separation and the estrangement."

Morocco

44040481 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
28 Jun-4 Jul 89 p 32

[Article: "Morocco's Palestinians: Our Hope Is That Our Children Will See Palestine"]

[Text] In a small apartment in a building in Hassan Quarter of the city of Rabat, lives a Palestinian family consisting of the husband, Mahmud Ma'ruf, his wife and 3 children: two girls and a boy. We didn't feel like strangers when we entered the home. Nabil and Dalya, the little children, clung to us. Mahmud Ma'ruf is a correspondent for a number of Palestinian newspapers and magazines. His small family is almost similar to all the neighboring Moroccan families, except for one thing that may not occur to the mind of a passing visitor. This thing is the big dream on which this family lives and establishes its existence so that this dream may give it greater hope and life. Ma'ruf's family is, put very simply, one of 150 Palestinian families that live in Morocco and that carry the dream they have inherited from parents and grandparents from exile to exile.

Does the Palestinian's memory dry up? We asked while entering the home of Ma'ruf Mahmud who has never seen Palestine. He was born and grew up in a Palestinian

refugee camp in Lebanon. Yet, he said: "I have never seen Palestine because my family immigrated in the 1940's. I was born and grew up in Lebanon's camps. However, I still retain my family's beautiful memories of Palestine."

[AL-MAJALLAH] What about the hope of returning to Palestine someday?

[Ma'ruf] We live on hope only. I am trying to raise my children with this hope. I do not dream of a day when I will return to Palestine. But I console myself with the thought that my children may realize this dream.

As to whether the resolution proclaiming the state of Palestine has filled him with some hope, Mahmud Ma'ruf said: "The resolution has been political primarily. The hope this resolution harbors belongs to the future generations—the generation of Dalya, Nabil and Rasha."

We asked Dalya what the word "Palestine" means to her and she responded innocently: "It is the homeland." She then fell silent. We asked Nabil: And what do you feel when you hear the word "Palestine?" He stammered and then said: "Distant." At the same moment, two tears shimmered in his eyes. We turned to Rasha, Ma'ruf's oldest daughter, and asked her: When will you return to Palestine? Looking at her parents as if seeking their reassurance, she said to us: "When the Jews stop beating the stone-throwing children."

When Bahriyah (Mahmud Ma'ruf's wife) stopped pouring the coffee, we asked her if she had any memories of Palestine. She responded: "I come from a Haifa family which left Palestine after the 1948 catastrophe to live in Iraq. Even though I have never visited Palestine, my family's stories about Palestine have motivated me to learn the minutest details about my town and origins. I have inherited from my family the biggest dream of which a Palestinian dreams, namely hope. Palestine, which I have never seen, has continued to live inside me and I have continued to hope of realizing this dream."

Palestinian Unity Eroded by Fundamentalism
44000587a Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 12 Jul 89 p 7

[Analysis by Ely Rekhes]

[Text] One of the favourite accusations by Palestinian spokesmen in recent years against the Israeli government has been that the military government fosters the Islamic fundamentalist movement in the occupied territories. The arrest late in May of 250 Islamic militants, and the Israeli crackdown on HAMAS (Arabic acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement) may put an end to this brand of Palestinian propaganda.

At the same time, the firm military action reflects the mounting Israeli concern with the resurgence of Islam as a key factor in the Palestinian uprising since late 1987. The depth of the involvement of religious elements in the intifadah is exposed almost daily. The Islamic Jihad, for example, claimed responsibility for plunging the Jerusalem-bound bus No. 405 into a ravine last week. Similarly, in May, a Palestinian assailant frantically shouting the traditional jihad cry, "Allahu Ahkbar," knifed to death two elderly citizens in the heart of Jerusalem. And the village of Nahalin in the West Bank, where one of the most severe confrontations between Border Police and local rioters erupted recently, has been reported to be almost exclusively controlled by HAMAS.

The popular uprising in the occupied territories displayed, right from its inception, a markedly Islamic component. One central group which came to the fore was the Islamic Jihad, a militant violent Sunni movement, steeped in Sunni actions and traditions, yet inspired and emboldened by the Shiite revolution in Iran. Prior to the uprising, the Jihad movement had stepped up its operations, causing increased tensions between the population and the Israeli authorities.

Once the intifadah began, the Islamic Jihad played a central role in mobilizing large masses. Its appeal to the population was in the name of Islam and, unlike the leaflets distributed by the (PLO-dominated) "Unified Leadership of the Intifadah," proclamations called for an "Islamic revolution...to liberate Palestine—all of Palestine." Publications reflecting its views, such as al-Mukhtar al-Islami, stressed again and again that the uprising must not be thought of as a Palestinian revolt but as a wholly Islamic revolution.

The active involvement of the Islamic trends in the initial stages of the intifadah elicited a forceful response on the part of the authorities; arrests, administrative detention orders and deportations multiplied. These and other measures affected the operational ability of the Jihad group and reduced its share in the intifadah activities.

However, Israeli counter-measures were only one reason for the comparative decline of the movement. By the beginning of 1988, it had become clear that the group had lost its monopoly on Islamic activism and violent action. These had now become the common ground of all fundamentalist groupings in the territories, first and foremost the Muslim Brotherhood.

This movement traditionally followed a gradual, evolutionist approach, calling for reformist action through education and the slow infusion of Islamic thinking and practice into all aspects of daily life. When the intifadah broke out, the Muslim Brotherhood found themselves militarily inferior, "outflanked and outgunned" by the activist Islamic Jihad movement. At an early stage, the Brotherhood (then under the roof of the Gaza-based al-Mujamma) opted for the military alternative.

It formed its own military arm, HAMAS, and adopted jihad as a central means of struggle. The new path found formal expression in HAMAS' platform, the so-called "Islamic Covenant." The document, published in August 1988, stated clearly: "there is no solution for the Palestinian question except through jihad." The emphasis on fighting the enemy was a new departure, attesting to the Brotherhood's attempt to draw closer to the ideas of the Islamic Jihad movement.

This was also true of other concepts which had previously divided them. A salient innovation in the "Covenant," for example, was the emphasis laid on the distinctively Palestinian character of HAMAS. Earlier Brotherhood writings had not highlighted such a motif, while the Jihad group had done so all along. Now the "Covenant" stated that it strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine.

Another instance of convergence is discernable in the attitude towards the PLO. On the one hand, the very publication of the "Covenant" was a forceful protest against what the Brotherhood considered the PLO's "compromising tendencies." It rejected in no uncertain terms the secular nature of the PLO and the political path it has chosen.

As in the past, the Brotherhood came out against the concept of "the secular state," but this time the Islamic argumentation was more solidly pronounced. Referring to the early Moslem conquest of Palestine, the document asserted that it is "a shar'iah (Moslem legal system) ruling that any land acquired by force was acclaimed Waqf (Moslem trust)...[therefore] Palestine is ... an eternal Islamic heritage." The covenant offered a solution of its own: "from above the mosques, the voice of the call for prayer would emerge, declaring the establishment of the State of Islam."

The PLO was now posed an even more threatening ideological challenge when HAMAS defined itself not only as a religious alternative but also as a nationalist one. Nationalism (al-wataniyah) it stated, "is a part of the religious creed (al-'aqidah al-diniyah)."

The PLO's political initiative, adopted in the November 1988 Algiers PNC Convention, heightened the tension between the Palestinian and the Islamic trends. The professed acceptance of UN Resolution 242 elicited sharp condemnation. Yet, at a later stage, HAMAS' stand was modified, reflecting a greater measure of ambivalence.

Asked in April 1989 about his reaction to the PLO's declaration of statehood in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, the accepted leader of HAMAS, replied that he supported the idea of having a state, but at the same time was opposed to giving up the rest of Palestine. He was not against the PLO, Yasin explained. Rather, he rejected the "line of the organization which does not follow the spirit and laws of Islam."

The closer the PLO becomes to Islam, he further clarified, "the stronger [his] commitment to the PLO will become." What the shaykh was actually saying was that he anticipated an "Islamicized PLO." He was, perhaps, even hinting that an Islamic takeover of the PLO is not that farfetched.

It seems that HAMAS has been working towards this objective relentlessly. The movement published its own serialized network of periodical leaflets, comparable to those issued by the PLO-oriented Unified Command. Leaflet 36, for example, distributed in the territories in February 1989, called upon the PLO to immediately sever the dialogue with the U.S. as well as to reject the notion of elections.

At the same time, the leaflet gave the local population specific dates for strikes, ordered a boycott on Israeli merchandise and encouraged independent economic growth. All directives were disseminated in classical Islamic language and symbolism, which have proved so attractive and appealing to the territories' Arabs since the beginning of the intifadah.

The PLO is quite alarmed at the emerging Islamic alternative. Some observers claim that one of the motivations behind Arafat's staunch opposition to West Bank elections is the fear that the Islamists may win. Similar apprehensions were also detected several months ago when Abu Iyad, addressing himself to the Israeli public, advised the Israelis to grasp the PLO's "peace initiative." Otherwise, he "warned," in the near future they would be compelled to sit with the fundamentalists.

Aware of the change, the PLO has been making vigorous efforts to strengthen its Islamic profile. Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid Sayih, a religious dignitary, was appointed chairman of the PNC; 'Arafat meticulously repeats "bismillah" and mentions Jerusalem with every speech and statement; PLO spokesmen, some of whom have their early roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, try to minimize the differences with the Islamists; others, mainly within Fatah, encourage cooperation in terror-related acts, offering operational experience, arms supplies, logistical support and financial resources.

Much has been said about the success and the achievements of the intifadah. Yet, it is important to mention additional outcomes, perhaps less positive from the Palestinian perspective. Politically and ideologically, Palestinian unity has been substantively eroded, if not divided, by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic resurgence in the West Bank and Gaza marks not only the Islamization of the Israeli-Arab conflict, but also the further fragmentation of the Palestinian national movement.

Threatened by expanding Islamic militancy and extremism, the PLO may be bound to retain, and perhaps even toughen, its hardline position, and at the same time continue to cultivate its own brand of commitment to Islam.

On the West Bank/Gaza scene, the competition between secular-nationalists and Islamists, on the one hand, and between the two rival fundamentalist factions on the other, is most likely to accelerate. The intensified waves of Islamic and PLO terror acts, as reflected in the intifadah, indicate the escalation of the conflict. Simultaneously, terrorism may prove to be chosen as the future arena for the growing contest in the split Palestinian community.

The above is based on an article due to be published in David Menashri's forthcoming *The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World*. Dr. Rekhes is a senior researcher at Tel Aviv University's Dayan Centre and is currently the Philip and Muriel Berman visiting professor at Lehigh University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.

Intifadah Cards Designed for Fund Raising
44000587b Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English
29-30 Jun 89 p 6

[Text] Cards to mark the National Palestinian Uprising have been designed and the public have been requested to purchase these cards, according to the Chairman of Palestinian Union in Kuwait, Siham al-Dabbagh.

The yield from the sale of these cards will be channelled to the Palestinian Child Education Fund in Kuwait, al-Dabbagh said and added that the project had been adopted by the union since 1980. The project had benefitted 2,500 students till the present time. The annual tuition fee borne by the Fund amounted to 200,000 Kuwaiti Dinars.

The price of each card has been affixed at 200 fils and the official expressed the hope that the project will receive the necessary support of individuals and institutions.

Speaking of the Fund's financing sources, she said that these were the contributions of Palestinians and Kuwaitis in addition to returns from some activities organised by the union.

Results Of Survey On Elections In Territories
44040491b Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI
in Arabic 1 Jul 89 p 12

[Article: "104 Palestinians From Occupied Territories State Their Opinion on Elections; 83 Percent Support Holding Elections, With Conditions; Majority Demands Complete Withdrawal and International Supervision; Election as Part of Complete and Lasting Solution"]

[Text] The large-scale survey which was conducted by AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI and which is published here—pp 35-48 [not included]—merits the title of a popular survey because it is the fruit of a serious and sincere endeavor to explore the opinions of ordinary Palestinians from various segments and political and ideological tendencies. Those surveyed amounted to 104 individuals, including a large number of elected mayors,

union leaders, and heads of professional, labor, and women's organizations. The survey was not conducted according to the scientific rules required by the science of statistics because current circumstances do not permit conducting such a survey. However, the conclusions derived from the comprehensive survey and from the notables who participated in it are undoubtedly an indicator of what Palestinians in the occupied territories believe and are a reflection of their aspirations and hopes. The survey will also act as an element assisting in making the Palestinian decision on the election plan proposed by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

It is concluded from this survey that there are a number of constants which are tantamount to the common denominator in all the responses and answers to the question addressed by AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI to those surveyed. These constants are:

- Adherence to the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to establishing their independent state and considering the PLO the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative.
- Decisive rejection of Shamir's plan in its original form.
- No free and impartial elections can be held under the presence of the occupation forces.
- The elections are not an objective but a means to reach a just and comprehensive solution.

Outcome of Survey

Even though the majority of the responses were not defined by a "yes" or "no" answer, they did respond to the main questions, namely:

- Support or oppose the elections?
- Complete withdrawal before the elections are held, or is withdrawal from the population centers enough?
- The elections as a part of a provisional solution, or a comprehensive solution?

Seventeen Percent Oppose

Seventeen percent of those surveyed oppose the election idea, regardless of the conditions under which they are held, on the basis that Shamir's and Rabin's intentions behind proposing this idea are not sincere and that the idea seeks to outflank the PLO, to create alternatives to the PLO, and to plant the seeds of divisions between Palestinians at home and those abroad.

Election With Conditions

Those who support elections in the occupied territories (amounting to 83 percent) make it conditional on the Israeli forces withdrawing and the elections being held under international supervision, on the basis that they

are a means to accomplish the ultimate objective, namely establishment of the Palestinian state, and complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.

Only 5 percent of those surveyed support the elections on the basis that they are a democratic procedure. They note, meanwhile, that by proposing the election idea, Israel has sought to win over world public opinion, and that this makes its credibility doubtful.

Ninety-five percent of those surveyed supported holding elections, but under certain conditions:

- Withdrawal of the Israeli forces, considering that no free and impartial elections can be held under the occupation's umbrella. While 14 percent are content with withdrawal from the cities, villages, and refugee camps, 86 percent view complete withdrawal as a condition for holding the elections.
- International supervision: All those who supported the idea of election with conditions consider international supervision of the elections an important element to insure that Israel does not intervene in the elections and to bestow international legitimacy on the elections so as to protect the winners. Some of those surveyed recalled the fate of the mayors elected in 1976.
- The overwhelming majority view the elections as a means, not an end, and consider them a part of a comprehensive and lasting solution defined in advance. This means that they consider them part of a phased solution, unlike Shamir who wants the elections to lead to self-rule, and then wants negotiations on the permanent solution to be held several years later.

Those who support the election idea have stressed that accepting the elections hinges on the advance approval of the PLO, which is the only Palestinian circle that sees the conditions in their entirety, and that has a clear vision of the future. This is why the PLO, in its capacity as the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative, is entitled to determine the conditions for holding the elections.

Editorial Expresses Frustration With U.S. Position

*44040491a Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI
in Arabic 1 Jul 89 p 13*

[Editorial by Muhammad Watad: "Before Palestinians Lose Their Underwear"]

[Text] The Palestinian observation agencies measure the political developments with the millimeter and its subdivisions. In addition to representing the epitome of discipline, this conduct also represents the epitome of optimism, thus affecting a sound assessment of the U.S. positions from the time the latest Palestine National Council adopted its revolutionary political resolutions in Algiers to the present.

This brief editorial offers a quick viewpoint of the declared, and the emphasis should be put on declared, U.S. position because the U.S. political corridors are more secretive than others. But their practical political influence is lesser than that of the political corridors of any other countries. This is a result of the unique system of U.S. corridors, of the Congress' independence and of the numerous pressure groups and centers of influence capable of twisting the administration's arm and of freezing what goes on in the corridors.

Therefore, what this article will focus on may pour cold water on those ceaselessly looking for "progress" in the U.S. position. This is because this "progress" has not dealt with any of the fundamental points forming the crux of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. To date, we have not read or heard that Washington has received reliable and documented responses from the Israeli Government to the questions addressed to it by the U.S. administration in connection with the "Israeli Government's initiative."

On the other hand, the U.S. administration has neglected the Palestinian peace plan which turned into an Arab peace plan when endorsed by the special Arab summit without reservation.

The question that poses itself is: Why does the U.S. administration act as if only the Israeli Government's plan is the subject of discussion?

A full answer to this question may lead to a departure from the topic. However, the general impression is that a flaw developed in selling the Palestinian-Arab peace plan to public opinion and that the Arab role in selling the plan to the European and U.S. media was so weak that the plan did not impose itself in the international corridors. For reasons which the world and the United States are aware of, the Israeli Government's plan has continued to be a salable commodity, even though there is nobody who will buy this plan with all its flaws.

Why doesn't the Palestinian-Arab peace plan impose itself on the carpet of discussion. Why aren't those concerned asking for clarifications on the plan, and why isn't the peace message harbored in this plan infiltrating every mind?

To date, the U.S. administration has not changed any provision of its old strategy. Professor Edward Said's study of Baker's address proves this. The address excludes a Palestinian state, the PLO, and the right to self-determination, and stresses the bartering of peace for land. But the main question continues to be: Barter with whom, within what bounds of sovereignty and under what conditions? And why isn't the PLO's revolutionary position vis-a-vis Israel receiving the praise the Israeli Government's plan is receiving from the U.S. officials?

There is an obvious imbalance between the positions of the two superpowers. Whereas the Soviet Union is demonstrating flexibility compatible with the development, the U.S. administration is displaying such obstinacy and arrogance that Baker has expressed regret for using the phrase urging the Israeli Government to abandon the "dream of the Greater Israel!"

The observer can appreciate the motives and reasons behing urging the Soviet Union to display this flexibility and to continue seeking a formula that subsequently leads to holding an international conference. But continuation of the U.S. game in its present form and procrastination in dotting the "i's" may consequently lead to a series of popular explosions throughout the region—explosions that pose a threat to world peace in its entirety.

Some local papers have considered the permission given to U.S. Ambassador Pelletreau (in Tunis) to contact Abu-Iyad, the number two man in the PLO, an elevation of the level of the U.S.-Palestinian talks. In diplomatic usage, an ambassador contacts whomever his country wishes him to contact, beginning with the head of government and ending with foreign minister, within the bounds of a well-known protocol. But the U.S. administration has violated all the rules of protocol in its contacts with the PLO, beginning with its refusal to let the head of the Palestinian state take part in the UN General Assembly session held on U.S. soil and ending with the administration's attempt to shut down the Palestinian delegation to the United Nations itself. Elevating the contacts could be reflected, for example, in having Pelletreau carry a message from the U.S. president to the head of the Palestinian state. What has been elevated in this case is Mr Pelletreau, not the crucial subject of the contacts.

A few days ago, Bassam Sharif, Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat's adviser, urged the United States to "declare a clear and decisive position on the Israeli Government's rejection of dialogue and peace."

I believe that this demand is the minimum to which the U.S. administration should respond before it snatches the underwear of the Palestinian diplomacy.

ALGERIA

Committee Spokesman Discusses Obstacles Facing Democratic Activity

45190098 Paris ALGERIE-ACTUALITE
in French Jun 89 pp 8-9

[Interview with Mustapha Toumi, spokesman for six opposition parties, by Fatiha Akeb and Abdelkrim Debbih; introductory commentary by Abdelkrim Debbih.]

[Text]

Today's Turmoil

While a constitution opening the way for a multiparty system has allowed political parties to come out in the open, the delay in providing a legal framework has placed the parties that have stepped forward in the situation of being "just for laughs," to put it mildly. In the shelter of article 40 of the constitution, six of the least empty parties (MDA [Movement for Algerian Democracy], PSD [Social Democrat Party], UFP [Union of Forces for Progress], UFD [Union of Democratic Forces], FIS [Islamic Salvation Front], and PNA [Algerian National Party]) are cooking up very similar political recipes, to the great disappointment of the masses, who want change. They began by putting whatever came easily to hand in the basket: "democracy," "social justice," "development," Islam and finally Arabic as the national language. Perhaps the only exception was the National Party, which preferred to make a sensational entry as soon as the curtain went up. Like a parimutual bettor going for all or nothing, it came out for the creation of 2 million jobs and the convertibility of the weakened dinar, while waiting to beef up its political program. The democracy market, we are told, is not yet open for business, and will not be as long as the FLN [National Liberation Front] (the FLN is not spared in the statement of the "Six," whose attempt to swim against the current has created turmoil) maintains its monopoly over official political activity.

What is more, the FLN supposedly has more than the political monopoly. The representatives of the six organizations who signed the statement accuse it of having taken advantage of what, they say, belongs to the entire nation. Note the strategem. Aren't these organizations claiming their piece of the pie before any elections have even been held because they are aware of the difficulty of existing? The party representatives with whom we met were unanimous. Everything except the promises in the constitution is taking place in the wings, in an FLN national assembly. "But the FLN cannot have democracy without us." This profession of faith, which has allowed a conjunctural alliance among all these parties clamoring for democracy, has led to a first political act, in the form of a public statement. We interviewed Mr Mustapha Toumi, the spokesman for the "Six," about the statement, which is already a clever political stance. We believe that other parties responded to the appeal of the "Six," but that they cautiously preferred to refrain from signing the statement while awaiting passage by the APN [National People's Assembly] of the political associations bill. Playing at forming an opposition without any legal guarantee surely has political risks that should not yet be taken. Staying in under cover, it must be said, has at least one merit. It lets you dream.

At the Crossroads of Democracy

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] Six political parties, of which you are one of the principal officials, have published a joint statement dealing with various subjects. Would you tell us why?

[Toumi] Immediately after the October 1988 revolt, it became obvious that democracy could not be held back for much longer and, especially, that we could no longer keep the people from the great crossroads of freedom nor delay their entry into the political life of the country.

It was on the promise and the personal commitment of the president of the Republic to institute democracy and to abide faithfully by the rules that calm returned and that the vast majority of the people began to hope for a brighter future.

This was the atmosphere that reigned during the information campaign and the approval, by the vast majority, of a new constitution—despite the active, open opposition of FLN apparatchiks who did not want to give up their quarter-of-a-century monopoly on power.

With democracy hallowed in the constitution by popular vote, all that the people were waiting for was to see democracy actually take shape.

Democrats began to hope, or to hope again. They started to organize or reorganize parties, to the great satisfaction of the masses, including many management-level personnel, who had never had the chance really to become involved in politics. Enthusiasm went into the creation and organization of the new political associations, and the first results were promising.

Meanwhile, an underhanded battle was being fought in the Temple between the "constitutionalists" and the "conservatives." The "priests" watched jealously, and in the end, they either won over or limited the actions of the constitutionalists in order to delay dismantling the dogma, so that they could devise a new ritual and a new language together.

The tactic was simple: just put the brakes on the democratic process by blocking the most important bills, the ones applying the constitution. Without any point of reference or legal existence, the new parties would stagnate. Disenchantment would infect the ranks, who would eventually become discouraged and give up on participating in the building of a democracy. Then all that would be needed would be to impose a law creating a voting system that favored the old apparatus, while at the same time making sure that the media remained silent.

This tactic has already killed one of the new parties, Saida, which has just announced that it is shutting down.

The most convincing illustration of this is the wait-and-see attitude and the inhibition shown by the political parties.

However, while the application of the constitutional provisions favoring the institution of democracy lagged, through its representatives, the party in power continued to put forward the bills that suited it, containing exclusively its own ideas.

The isolation in which the new political parties had been placed, especially by cutting them off from media channels, made it impossible for them to exercise one of their fundamental rights under the constitution: freedom of expression as legally constituted political associations.

Since this isolation affected most of the newly created political formations, these parties found the idea of joint, concerted action vital, and they decided to join in the UFD initiative.

Thus, faced with the crude maneuver of the enemies of democracy, which might completely denature the spirit of the February 1989 constitution, the new parties met together and reached a consensus on a body of issues vital to the future of democracy in Algeria.

It is not enough to proclaim democracy. It must be lived and allowed to live!

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] You say that most of these newly formed political parties were affected by this isolation. In other words, not all of them were. In that case, can you tell us which ones were favored by the media?

[Toumi] I think that that should be seen mostly as a slip. This ostracism—this attempt to smother—extended to not most, but all of the political parties, except of course the FLN party.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITES] How can it be shown that an attempt actually was made to isolate them?

[Toumi] Most of these political parties have sent press releases to the press agency and the newspapers, which have refused to print them and to bring them to the attention of their readers.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITES] Isn't there an idea of a front behind this rapprochement—and if so, against whom?

[Toumi] As soon as political parties get together to study their common problems in the face of attempts by certain authorities or institutions to prevent the normal development of the democratic process desired and approved by three-quarters of the people, there will inevitably be a rapprochement.

Democrats of every persuasion must form a common front against the danger of a reemergence of the pre-October 1988 spirit and behavior. Forming a common front does not necessarily mean creating an institutional

front. When there is a danger of losing our dearly won democracy, after so much suffering and so many frustrations, the partisan spirit must necessarily give way to political realism.

This attitude is normal, and it would not be in the least surprising for true democrats who still belong to the FLN, or those who belong to no political party, to join this democratic front for a certain time.

There are examples in both universal history and, closer to home, in our own past, either in organizing and sustaining a war of national liberation (the Algerian National Liberation Front, from 1954 to 1962) or in rebuilding a country after an exhausting war.

When parties analyze a given situation in the same way and draw the same conclusions, they can obviously manage to find points on which they agree and can work together to find the best solutions to problems that they cannot solve separately. This is a case of political partnership, just as there is economic partnership.

So we feel that it would not be proper to call our joint effort a "front" in the institutional sense of the term, to the extent that the term "front" implies the idea of a union of several political forces.

As the statement released to the press on 24 May emphasizes, the purpose of our coming together is simply to denounce the censorship suffered by the signatory parties and the failure to respect the rules of the game insofar as the actual implementation of the constitutional provisions is concerned.

The bills to implement these provisions currently before the APN would keep the single party, which has been rejected by the people and the constitution, in power forever. Unconstitutional and unfair means are being used to keep it there. It is openly cheating with the rules of the democratic game. If its maneuvers scandalize all democrats, it is precisely because, rather than to promote democracy, it has only accepted it grudgingly.

The rapprochement that led to the six political parties' joint statement of 24 May is thus a momentary, conjunctural front that allows the signatory political parties complete ideological and political freedom.

Should such hindrances to democracy occur at a later date, they would certainly give rise to the same type of concerted, joint action among the parties. Against whom might such a "front" be directed? The answer could hardly be simpler: against conservatives in the single party and against false democrats who are trying to take the guts out of the democracy of February 1989.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] So you see the FLN as having conservative and non-conservative members?

[Toumi] The current National Liberation Front party is certainly not monolithic, particularly after the purges, exclusions, new memberships, and recruitment—I might even say, to use a slightly pejorative term, recruitment including by "solicitation." It is not monolithic.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] Aren't the various political parties planning to draw up a joint platform?

[Toumi] No. There is a joint plan of action for specific actions that constitute the minimum valid consensus for all democrats, in other words, to participate actively in establishing democracy, or at least in getting the democratic process moving and achieving the fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the constitution.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] Certain passages of your joint statement seem to constitute a political challenge. Can you confirm this analysis?

[Toumi] Your question can be answered by another. Is the FLN party capable of meeting the current challenge alone? It assuredly is not, and even supposing that it were, our joint stance is not a challenge to anyone. We have a specific goal that is limited in time and space: the exercise of real democracy.

The government's refusal to accelerate the democratic process encourages the political parties to join in denouncing this situation and to demand that the democracy for which the people have fought become a reality without delay.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] In your statement, you say that the APN is not representative.

[Toumi] We are coming to that. The constitution of 23 February sanctions democracy in our country. Obviously, the first legal consequence that we can draw is that all the instruments or institutions that are not in accordance with the provisions of the constitution are outdated and invalid.

The APN is one of these institutions.

We know that the APN is made up of FLN party members. It is "FLN," as officials have said publicly.

Yet, under the related provisions of the constitution, the legislature is supposed to represent the people, not a party, even the party that is illegitimately still in power.

The assembly should have been dissolved as soon as the constitution was declared.

Of course, doing so would have created a legal vacuum. It would have been impossible to organize elections, because, in the absence of either a law on political

associations or an electoral law, the parties themselves did not have the means to take legal or media action, nor did they have the time to organize in order to run candidates.

However, the president of the Republic, who is the president of all the people by virtue of the powers conferred upon him in the constitution, should have declared a "holiday" for the APN and legislated by decree, so that all the political parties, including the FLN party, could participate in the election of a truly representative APN on an equal footing.

We would, thereby, have avoided the phenomenon we are witnessing today, which we find unacceptable. One political party, which is still the de facto single party, has been granted legal instruments, such as very considerable financial backing and the current government's immense logistical apparatus, that obviously assure it of political predominance even though it has lost all credibility with the vast majority of the people. The six political parties wanted to organize a press conference. We thought we would hold it at the wilaya cultural center. We were told that the FLN had given strict orders that no room under the authority of a local government be used by a political party for any meeting whatsoever. This is absurd.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] If, according to this statement, the National People's Assembly does not represent anything, then what do your parties represent?

[Toumi] It has become a cliché to say that the APN only represents itself. It is, in fact, concerned with its own interests and the future of its own current members. However, your question reflects neither reality nor the spirit and the letter of the statement of the "Six."

The APN is currently exclusively FLN. It would be wrong to say that it does not represent anything, since it is the natural, subsisting extension of the single party.

The paradox of the assembly's current situation is that it, the creation of a single party system, is being asked to debate and vote on bills intended to govern a multiparty system and a real democracy.

In addition to being illegitimate since the new constitution of February 1989, through the majority of its members, the APN is prey to an obsessive fear that is not conducive to either the peace of mind of the deputies or to that of the various sponsors of the bills that are to contribute to building a democracy. A perfect illustration of this fear and of the disarray of the deputies is the multitude of bills with the same purpose that have been introduced by different sources—such as, in the case of the new information code, the Ministry of Information, the president's office, or another group of technocrats or consultants.

To stick to this one example, in order to give the legislation a pseudo-democratic basis, the APN on the one hand, through its speaker and the related committee, and the government on the other, through the head of government, finally heard the representatives of the reporters' movements on the day on that they demonstrated. Why just the reporters? The primary parties concerned can only be the political parties. Reporters are the medium of public opinion. The parties make public opinion, create ideologies. Meanwhile, why begin with the information code? Other issues are more pressing.

Isn't this absolute proof that the current APN is not representative and that the government does not act democratically?

If the assembly were composed of freely and democratically elected deputies, would there have been this type of demonstration and this type of government action after the fact?

Obviously not, because the legislature would have exercised its prerogatives in a normal, uncontested fashion.

Currently, the APN patently does not represent the people, since its legitimacy was violently denounced by the uprising of 5 October 1988.

To answer your question briefly: We say that our parties represent the people's desire for change, which gives them undeniable legitimacy under the constitution.

[ALGERIA-ACTUALITE] You say, "Our parties represent the people's desire for change." Desire is vague. The FLN has 400 thousand members. Be more precise.

[Toumi] The FLN can have 400 thousand members, it can have 800 thousand members, but it is still a single party. The main desire for change is that there no longer be a single party. Since we are for a multiparty system, we represent that desire for change.

[ALGERIA-ACTUALITE] But individually, as political parties, what do you represent?

[Toumi] You know as well as I that each body, each institution, such as the Defense Ministry, has certain secrets that cannot be revealed. They are not public information. We do not have to provide information on our potential or our membership.

(Editor's Note: The party representatives asked to supplement their spokesman's answer to this question.)

[Bouzar (Social Democrat Party)] We have been asked: How many people do you actually represent? The FLN has 400 thousand members. The MJA [Algerian Journalists Movement] was able to mobilize a certain number of people in no time. We are being asked where our strengths are. There are approaches that consist of not revealing your strengths, or your weaknesses either, but

your question can easily be answered this way: As soon as a party has all the media at its disposal for the purpose of mobilizing, informing, and educating, there is nothing easier for it than to fill Tiananmen Square. But give the new political parties the same means and you will see the impact. The 400 thousand members of the FLN do not all believe in the FLN. Only 1 percent really believe in the FLN. The others believe in their own future. People have not joined the FLN for ideological reasons. First answer. Second answer: Insofar as means are concerned, contrary to what is said, the PSD, like the other parties that signed the joint statement, does have real potential strength, and I will tell you in what form. Many people are waiting for a law on political parties to be instituted, because the vast majority do not believe the promise of democracy. Secondly, they are waiting to get a better idea of these parties' means of action. If we were free to go directly to the people, without any hindrance, it would be very easy to dispel the myth of the FLN. The myth has already been dispelled and is being recreated artificially.

[Guernouche (Movement for Democracy in Algeria, MDA)] Despite the president's proclamation of the democratization of Algerian politics, even the general amnesty is not being respected. Our party members are attacked daily. In a week, we have had two arrests at the airport, seizures of passports and periodicals.... You ask us who supports us, when we have no way of speaking to the people....

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] You contest privileges still accorded the FLN. Would you be more specific?

[Toumi] The government's application of the constitution, through the bills introduced, constitutes a flagrant violation of the very spirit of the constitution.

It is absurd for the party in power to continue to enjoy the privileges it had as the single party, when it should now be on an equal footing with the other parties.

Specifically, its officials are still paid from government funds, which come out of the taxpayer's pocket, despite the economic crisis that is weighing heavily on most Algerians. This is unacceptable.

How can we believe the sincerity of the people who are proclaiming the "democratic era" in Algeria under these circumstances?

Our parties have joined in strongly and unsparingly denouncing all of these issues, which constitute the very foundation for building a democracy.

The immediate elimination of these anachronisms is still a *sine qua non* for the effective practice of real democracy in our country.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] Have you contacted other political parties? What was their response?

[Toumi] Yes, there certainly were preliminary bilateral meetings and contacts with other political parties. For internal reasons, certain parties did not approve of this rapprochement. And, while some of them did, their internal motivations prevented them from joining with us in signing the statement.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] What other parties were contacted?

For ethical reasons, I am not authorized to say.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] Were there many of them?

No, there were not. However, I can tell you that we are still contacting certain parties within the context of this rapprochement.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] If we give you the information, will you confirm it?

[Toumi] I will confirm general information, but I cannot go into the anthropometric identification of each political party.

EGYPT

People's Assembly Approves New Investment Law
45040398 Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI
in Arabic 6 Jul 89 p 5

[Article by Mahmud Mu'awwad, 'Abd-al-Jawad 'Ali, and Sharif al-'Abd: "Exemption Privileges Apply to Egyptian Investors; Prime Minister: People's Assembly Trend 99 Percent Consistent with Government Plan"]

[Text] Following extensive discussions between the opposition and the majority, masterfully moderated by Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub, the People's Assembly approved the investment bill, thereby granting Egyptian investors all the privileges which foreign and Arab investors enjoy under this law. This law simplifies administrative procedures, establishes a system of dealing with a unified authority rather than with several sides which may have conflicting plans that could hamper investment projects, and encourages investment in housing and land reclamation and land cultivation. During these discussions, two trends became apparent. One trend, adopted by all the deputies representing Sinai, demanded that this law be applied to land reclamation and cultivation projects in Sinai to encourage Nile Valley inhabitants to settle there in order to take in 1 million inhabitants as part of the government's plan to populate Sinai. The other trend was expressed by 'Alawi Hafiz, who emphasized the need to prohibit the establishment of any free zones in Sinai to keep all foreigners out of these territories, which are of special strategic importance to Egypt.

The session opened with a debate of Article II. Al-Kashif Muhammad al-Kashif said: "This article grants a 10-year tax exemption, for newly-reclaimed land in particular.

We in Sinai are in need of such a provision if we are to cultivate the land in order to attract 1 million Nile Valley inhabitants to develop Sinai. I want Sinai to be considered an outlying area in order to qualify under this article.

[Dr al-Mahjub] "We have no objection, but it has to be by a government decision."

[Muhammad Salih] "I hail the government's decisive setting of development priorities in the outlying areas in particular."

[Dr Mahjub] "I would like to take up this matter, for we have a long enough time to debate a large number of topics."

[Muhammad Salih] "I agree with brother al-Kashif's request because Sinai is an outlying area in need of a push toward development. It should be made subject to such exemptions if we are to encourage people to build it up."

[Ma'mun al-Hudaybi] "We must give a push to the use of local elements. To encourage local investments, I propose that local elements in investment projects be given an additional 3 years over and above the 10 years established in the article."

[Dr Mahjub] "Do the members approve this proposal?"

[Members] "No, no, no."

[Dr Mahjub] "Whoever has a specific proposal may submit it, but we do not want a long explanation."

[Dr Muhammad 'Abdallah] "It would be better to stipulate in the article that exemption can only be extended by a cabinet decision and for a period of 5 years."

[Dr Mahjub] "The article is sound in its present form and there is no need for this sort of thing."

[Mamduh Ya'qub] "I ask that Qantarah East be designated an outlying area and ask the prime minister to issue a decision to this effect right now."

[Dr Mahjub] "The prime minister always makes his decisions at his office after due consideration."

[Abd-al-Wahhab Qutah] "I object to one word in the article pertaining to the privileges granted to investors. Investors come to Egypt to escape the burdens placed on them abroad and we must encourage them in this regard."

[Muhyi-al-Din al-Sharib] "The article stipulates that they not be subject to the same taxes here as there."

[Ma'mun al-Hudaybi] "Exemption here may be an excuse for tax evasion."

[Dr 'Atif Sidqi] "If they are exempted here, they are subject to taxation there."

[Dr al-Mahjub] "They would be subject only if they are exempted here."

[Dr 'Atif Sidqi] "True, true. They are not exempted under the article in its former version."

[Abd-al-Wahhab Qutah] "Who is intended here, the investor himself or the company that comes to invest?"

[Dr 'Atif Sidqi] "This question is answered in the same article."

At the conclusion of the debate, the People's Assembly approved Article 11, which exempts projects from paying taxes on commercial and industrial profits, movable capital and general income for 5 years, renewable for another 5 years as deemed necessary by the public interest.

When Article 12 came under debate, Kamal al-Shazili proposed to Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub that proposals submitted by members be presented by the assembly's president without speeches by members. The assembly approved this motion.

The assembly then approved Article 12, which exempts middle and low-income housing projects from taxes for 15 years if fully rented.

During the debate of Article 18, which regulates the opening of foreign currency bank accounts for investors, Dr Zakariya 'Azmi said: "The committee's version of the article pertaining to the acquisition of hard currency was different from that of the government. I wonder if the executive bylaws will lay down simplified rules whereby projects can obtain the necessary foreign currency to finance their needs?"

[Abd-al-Wahhab Qutah] "Frankly, this article regulates foreign currency accounts of all companies operating in Egypt at the present time. The owners of these companies want to make sure that rules included in the executive bylaws are the same valid ones that are in force."

Prime Minister Dr 'Atif Sidqi stated that the amendment the committee made was done in agreement with the government and that all investors enjoy full flexibility, adding that the article will remain intact, that it constitutes the minimum foreign currency account provisions included in the executive bylaws and that foreign currency accounts may be opened without restrictions to serve the investor's needs.

[Dr Mahjub] "Were the committee's amendments approved by the government? We want to make sure of that."

The prime minister answered that 99 percent of them were approved by the government.

At the conclusion of the debate the assembly approved that article as is.

About Article 19 dealing with production requirements for investment projects, 'Adil al-Haddad said:

"I request that the text as submitted by the government be left unchanged because it includes projects that have been decided upon and must not be amended. The government text is clear and grants the same privileges. Let it [the amendment] apply to new projects."

[Dr Mahjub] "How does the government feel about that?"

[Dr 'Atif Sidqi] "The government has approved this amendment which the committee introduced to achieve discipline, exceptions notwithstanding. Balance between the interests of the national economy as a whole must be created and maintained."

[Dr al-Mahjub] "Mrs Layla Hasan submitted a proposal to add a new paragraph prohibiting the use of imported equipment for purposes other than originally intended. This, of course, is implicit even though not clearly stipulated."

[Faruq Mutawalli] "The article as submitted by the government is better."

[Dr Mahjub] "So what else is new? This is what is being proposed."

[Dr 'Atif Sidqi] "The article has not been impaired in any way."

At the conclusion of the debate, the assembly approved Article 19 as ratified by the committee. The article stipulated that investment projects can import their production needs, material, machinery, and equipment without being subject to recording them in the importers' register or to obtain a government commitment to provide the necessary foreign currency for importation.

Regarding Article 20, which regulates the distribution of new profits, setting employee share at no less than 10 percent annually, 'Abd-al-Wahhab Qutah said: "I do not object to the distribution of 10 percent of new profits to employees, but if this principle is carried out, it has to apply to investment companies and individuals alike and not to one without the other."

[Mustafa Munji] "Article 20 must include full guarantees for the employees, a social dimension that has not been fulfilled. This matter must not be limited to the 10 percent, but must be subject to the principle followed by existing companies and must be put into effect if it is better."

[Ahmad Taha] "This article takes away from the rights of employees working for investment companies, for it excludes the application of laws and special bylaws applied to public sector employees. It must be part of a comprehensive social system."

The assembly approved the article as is.

Regarding Article 23 which focuses on investment re-exportation, Dr Layla Takla said: "I propose that the phrase 'provided that the invested money has been in Egypt for 5 years' be added to ensure the project's seriousness and to prevent any kind of speculation."

[Dr 'Abd-al-Wahhab Qutah] "This ought to come under the jurisdiction of the council of ministers. I am afraid that a market for selling Egyptian debts on the international money market may exist and this would be a very serious matter."

[Muhyi-al-Din al-Gharib] "No money will leave the country without the approval of the Investment Authority's board of directors in accordance with specific precepts. This article is adequate for this."

[Atif Sidqi] "There has to be flexibility because, if for some reason an investor is forced to withdraw his project, we must make it easy for him to do so and must not stand in his way."

[Dr Mahjub] "It must be made clear that an investor who comes in with \$20 million and invests only \$5 million will have the right to take the remaining amount out of the country."

At the conclusion of the debate, the assembly approved the article as is. This article stipulates that investors may take their money out of the country at the highest posted rate of exchange, and if it was brought into the country in kind, it must be taken out in kind. Regarding Article 27, which deals with the matter of foreigners remitting part of their wages abroad, Jamal As'ad said that no more than 50 percent must be permitted to be remitted and Firdaws al-Awdaj said no more than 60 percent.

[Abd-al-Wahhab Qutah] "There are workers and there are experts. An expert who comes in for 48 hours to repair a piece of machinery may receive \$50,000 for his work, so how can we have the same rate for both?"

[Salah Tawfiq] "Exceptions must be made for such experts."

The assembly approved the article as is. This article provided that foreign employees working on investment projects may remit up to 50 percent of their total wages earned in Egypt abroad and these remittances are exempted from income and job earnings taxes.

'Nasirist Wing' Opposes Selling Public Companies

JN0208150689 Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic
1 Aug 89 pp 1, 2

[By Jamal Shawqi]

[Text] Instructions will be given within the next few days to liquidate and sell all companies belonging to local government departments in various governorates. The political leadership has received a report on the activities of 150 projects valued at 1 billion pounds. These projects have sustained losses estimated at 250 million pounds since their establishment.

Reports reveal serious violations by company executives and governorates' officials leading to a work stoppage in 20 projects. It was also revealed that certain senior officials in the governorates received fabulous compensation from these projects under the pretext of supervision.

Within the next few days, instructions will be issued liquidating the shares of the government and the public sector companies in about 50 joint ventures with the private sector. AL-WAFD has learned from informed government sources that the government does not intend to begin selling the failing public sector companies at present. A responsible source said that the political leadership postponed the implementation of the plan following pressures by the Nasirist wing, led by People's Assembly Speaker Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub, who voiced fear of possible labor and public unrest. The responsible source said the government clamor that accompanied the political leadership's statements about selling the public sector companies was aimed at preparing the atmosphere to start negotiations between the government and the World Bank, which demands the liquidation of the failing public sector companies.

Reasons Behind Lawyers Union President's Success Examined

45040434b London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic
24 Jul 89 pp 19-20

[Report on interview with Ahmad al-Khawajah, chairman of Lawyers Union, by 'Adil al-Jawhari: "Al-Khawajah, Who Has Gained Unanimous Support of Egyptian Lawyers, to AL-TADAMUN: I Am 'Wafdist' But My Commitment Is National"; date, place not given]

[Text] Cairo—Finally, the guns in the battlefield on 'Abd-al-Khaliq Tharwat Street, specifically in the premises of the Lawyers Union—the most deep-rooted Egyptian union—in Cairo, have subsided since Ahmad al-Khawajah gained the union chairmanship, overwhelming his opponents and getting votes which nobody had dreamt of. Some have said in jest: "It was a referendum, not an election." Ahmad al-Khawajah won

10,670 votes, compared to 300 votes won by Ahmad Nasir, his opponent. Among others, 'Uthman Zaza won 898 votes, 'Abdullah Rashwan 850 votes and Ahmad Shanan 686 votes.

What does this mean?

Those most ardently supporting al-Khawajah, even al-Khawajah himself, could not believe the enormous 73 percent of the vote he won in free elections held under pistol shots, chains, and physical brawls, not a fight of the minds, in the most violent unionist battle seen by Egypt for a long time. Voter turnout was 90 percent—an extremely high rate—in these elections. This confirms that the lawyers have pledged their loyalty to al-Khawajah in the battle of legitimacy, that no voice will rise above the union's dignity and the law profession, and that any threat against the union and its legitimacy is a threat against all Egyptian lawyers. According to al-Khawajah, the struggle that has occurred in the union was not a struggle against al-Khawajah but against all the lawyers. Therefore, regaining the union's and profession's dignity is not the task of the chairman solely but of every Egyptian lawyer.

It was not al-Khawajah alone who won the battle. The list including his supporters also won, except for a few candidates. Despite the doubts cast from time to time on the outcome of the election, the progress of the election battle provided, as of the moment when the first ballot boxes were counted, indications that al-Khawajah had overwhelmed everybody, especially since the Upper and Lower Egypt governorates had given al-Khawajah a large number of votes as a result of the unionist and national role the most veteran unionist chairman has played and continues to play. His unionist credit spans 23 years. This is why al-Khawajah was sad when some lawyers, totaling 800 in number, had tried to withdraw confidence from him. After having decided not to run for election, he changed his mind and ran anew to defend the union's honor, as he says. The battle has proven that half the votes he won in al-Sharqiyah Governorate totaled more than the number won by those who had tried to withdraw confidence from him. To put it differently, they totaled less than one-third the votes he won in Cairo Governorate.

Unionist History

Why did al-Khawajah overwhelm all his opponents?

Is it because of his deep-rooted unionist history or of his nationalist stances?

Upon reviewing Ahmad al-Khawajah's unionist history, we paused before a number of important dates. In 1947, al-Khawajah was one of two students representing his class at the Law College. He had gained so much of his colleague's confidence that he won 176 votes, compared to 26 votes for his colleague [the other representative].

Al-Khawajah was the Law College permanent representative in the University Federation. It is worth noting that the Egyptian University, particularly the Law College, played a significant national role in that period, especially in the 21 February 1946 uprising in which the Labor Federation and the students participated against the British and the palace. Al-Khawajah, who embraced and continues to embrace al-Wafd Party principles, took part in that uprising. Explaining the story of his life to AL-TADAMUN, al-Khawajah went on to assert:

"I am Wafdist. I was Wafdist before the revolution and was one of those included in the 1964 political isolation decrees. In 1957, I ran for election to the National Assembly as a candidate for al-Mahallah District capital at the age of 30. But the Nationalist Union leaderships excluded me. I then ran for election in 1964 and the Socialist Union leadership did not object because I had been bound to the Arab and nationalist activity advocated by Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. I performed my best nationalist roles in the 1956-67 period during which Arab nationalism was on the rise. In 1966, I ran for the office of Lawyers Union chairman at the age of 40. I won. In 1970, I asked 'Abd-al-Nasir for permission to go to the Arab lawyers conference in Algiers. Egypt had agreed to the Rogers initiative, whereas most of the Arab capitals had objected to it. Despite this, we went to Algiers, explained Egypt's position to the Arab lawyers, and won many of them over to our side. What is interesting is that most members of the delegation which was with me in Algiers were isolated politically. Yet, I was eager to take them with me because I trusted them. At times, trust is stronger than affiliation with any political idea."

This is insofar as Ahmad al-Khawajah's unionist history is concerned. What about his political and nationalist positions?

To begin, I must stress that al-Khawajah believes, as he has told me, in the open-door policy, meaning that a lawyer's main asset is his ability to persuade. Persuasion requires an extraordinary ability to adhere to the ethics of dialogue and to keeping the doors open to all the political forces, including the government. Why?

Because it happens at times that members or leaders of the opposition parties or of the political tendencies are arrested in accordance with the emergency law. So people go to al-Khawajah, who enjoys numerous friendships, even with his political foes, at his office or his home for help. At times, al-Khawajah contacts the minister of interior to reassure himself about the health of a detainee or the case of somebody done an injustice. Al-Khawajah says: "I don't hold the government's or the interior minister's stick. However, dialogue is a successful lawyer's most important characteristic."

Al-Khawajah's foes once charged him with strange accusations, saying he was accused of appeasing everybody, including the government.

With a laugh, al-Khawajah says: "If this is an accusation, then I am honored by it, because I cannot take away a lawyer's, for example a Nasirist lawyer's, freedom just because he disagrees with my viewpoint. I have defended the right of all political forces, regardless of their identity, to legitimate existence, and I have opposed with all my strength the special laws which restrict liberties, including the law on parties. Moreover, one of the union's most prominent stances is embodied in its opposition to the normalization policies and to the Israeli presence in Egypt."

He notes that the Lawyers Union was the union to oppose most strongly—even more strongly than all the Egyptian parties—al-Sadat's policies when al-Sadat went to Jerusalem, concluded the Camp David accord, and signed the agreement on normalization and on establishing an Israeli embassy in Egypt. At the time, the union used all means in confronting these policies to such a degree that al-Sadat tried to dissolve the Union Council and turn the union into a social club. The Union Council, headed by Chairman Ahmad al-Khawajah, confronted al-Sadat. The truth is that whether under al-Khawajah or somebody else, the Lawyers Union has been and will continue to be the security shield for the Egyptian Arab citizen and a podium defending liberty and democracy. It is to be noted that al-Khawajah is the defense counsel of Dr Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir, the number two defendant in the Egypt's Revolution case. He was also the defense counsel for Sulayman Khatir, Khalid al-Islambuli and for all the honorable elements that have stood to defend Egypt's dignity.

So there are other unionist and nationalist reasons which bolstered Ahmad al-Khawajah's position in the fateful battle he waged in the second week of last June—a battle in which he scored results that stunned his supporters before his enemies.

[AL-TADAMUN] Mr al-Khawajah, it is being said now that there will be a settlement of accounts in the near future.

[Al-Khawajah] I extend my hand to shake the hand of those who did not vote for me before I extend it to those who did give me their trust. I do not acknowledge the logic of feuding. The union is not my personal property and it is not any faction's monopoly. We are all members of the same profession and same union and we must safeguard them.

[AL-TADAMUN] Are you thinking of running for election again?

[Al-Khawajah] Absolutely not. The other generations are entitled to this. The trust is permanent and it should be assumed by the younger generations.

Egyptian Pound Gains Strength Against Dollar
45040434a London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT
in Arabic 29 Jul 89 p 8

[Article: "Dollar Continues Rapid Decline Against Egyptian Pound"]

[Text] Cairo—The U.S. dollar exchange rate against the Egyptian pound has continued this week its decline in the free banking market and in the black market. This decline started a month ago. During this period the dollar exchange rate has dropped by 30 piasters per dollar in the black market, compared to a drop of 5 piasters per dollar in the official free market.

By the end of this week, the dollar exchange rate in the free market stood at 255 piasters per dollar for banknotes purchased and at 260 piasters in the black market, i.e. with a difference of 5 piasters.

Egyptian economic officials view this phenomenon as a major accomplishment made by the free banking market, narrowing the difference between its price and the black market price to less than 5 piasters for the first time since this market started operating 2 years ago. This signals the success of the free banking market experiment.

Analysts expect the dollar exchange rate to maintain its present level for at least 2 more months. This rate may even decline further if the fiscal policy adopted by the Ministry of Finance and the Egyptian Central Bank to control the market continues.

Economic analysts also believe that if the dollar exchange rate settles at its present level long, then it will be possible to let supply and demand determine the exchange rate. This may lead to "floating the pound" versus foreign currencies without fear of collapse of the pound exchange rate. But this will not be done, of course, until Egypt abolishes the official exchange rate (70 piasters per dollar) set for the purchase of essential goods imported from abroad, such as sugar and flour. This is the exchange rate to which the Egyptian Government continues to cling so that the prices of these basic goods may not rise in the market in a manner that harms the consumer's interests.

Mufti Supports Edict On Drug, Hashish Users
JN3107121589 Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH
in Arabic 29 Jul 89 pp 1, 2

[By Fawzi 'Awadayn and Mujahid Khalaf]

[Text] Alexandria—The Mufti of the Republic Dr Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi has called for applying Imam Ibn-Taymiyah's edict on hashish and drugs to those claiming that using hashish is permissible and legitimate based on the lack of a Koranic or Sunna text forbidding such practices.

The edict considers people taking drugs as renegades disobeying Islam. Accordingly, their wives are considered divorced, and they must also not be buried in Muslim cemeteries.

The mufti said this edict is worth implementing, as it has been supported by leading ulema in ancient and modern times. Hashish and other drugs are considered a greater taboo than alcohol, especially since corruption resulting from drugs is more dangerous than from drinking alcohol.

The mufti denounced the calls to mislead people into believing that drugs are merely undesirable rather than forbidden.

This edict was issued the day before yesterday in the expanded religious meeting held in Alexandria's Sporting Club.

The mufti said Ibn-Taymiyah had issued the edict after he himself noted the destructive effect of hashish, which led to the defeat of Muslim armies and the downfall of the Islamic caliphate at the hands of Tartars.

He described those advocating the permissibility of taking drugs as ignorant of Islamic jurisprudence, the prophet's traditions, and history. He called for considering those concealing drug smugglers and traffickers as accomplices in the crime who must receive equal punishment, because the one who conceals evil is the same as the one who commits evil.

The mufti said it is possible to punish hashish users with flogging. However, the Islamic shari'ah provides for inflicting a more severe punishment on them, including the death sentence, on the basis that they are corrupt on earth, defying God and His messenger, as stated in the Holy Koran.

Article Explores "Undeclared War" in U.S.-Egyptian Relations

45050323a Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL
in Arabic 8 Apr 89 pp 22-23

[Article by Yusuf al-'Aqid]

[Text] A return to square one is inevitable. In this square, one can discover the essence of the crisis in Egyptian-American relations. America does not want Egypt to have good relations with Europe, the Arabs, or the eastern camp, though America has excellent relations with Europe; in fact, Europe is its foremost ally. Moreover, recent years have seen a now inescapable dialogue between Washington and Moscow.

What Washington takes for itself it forbids to Cairo. That is the essence of the latest crisis in Egyptian-American relations, in spite of the visit by President Husni Mubarak to Washington. But here we have the second crisis in Egyptian-American relations in less than

a year. The first crisis was over 'Abd-al-Qadir Hilmi, the Egyptian soldier who was arrested smuggling sensitive materials from America to Egypt. Just before the matter erupted, President Husni Mubarak had visited the Soviet embassy in Cairo for the first time, and the Cairo-Moscow road had opened for the first time.

'Abd-al-Qadir Hilmi is now imprisoned in America. In Egypt, public opinion believes that he is a prisoner of an undeclared war between Egypt and America. In America, some believe that inasmuch as he had obtained American citizenship, he is a spy. But his arrest and the way in which the matter was made public say that there is a political dimension behind the issue.

This is square one in this wretched, complicated relationship involving Egypt's desire to obtain an honorable friendship with America. But this friendship does not at all mean subordination, for every state has its political positions which might differ from those of another state, but this legitimate difference does not lessen the warmth of the relationship. At the same time, America wants Egyptian-American ties that would ultimately make Egypt a part of American strategy in the Middle East, and this is what Egypt rejects with all its strength, for even though Egypt may be one of the developing countries, it is still a great state in the Middle East, and it is the most important key to the entire region.

We come to square two in Egyptian-American relations, for when Bush came to power, a new administration came with him. Whoever follows the events of the American position towards Egypt in light of this new administration, cannot help but see a general position hostile to Arab aspirations and a lukewarm attitude towards Egypt that manifested itself in Mubarak's first meeting with Bush (in Tokyo) after he became the resident of the American White House. The meeting was obviously devoid of American warmth, and it lasted only a few minutes.

But things moved quickly after that.

The Soviet foreign minister came to Cairo in the first visit of its kind in 14 years, and during this visit it was agreed that Pres Mubarak would visit Moscow, even though Cairo was planning that Mubarak should visit Washington before heading for Moscow. It had already been agreed that Mubarak would visit America on the second of April.

While the Soviet foreign minister was in Cairo, the American administration's annoyance with this step on the part of the Soviets became clear, and Bush made statements against the trip and against the Soviet role in the region.

Then Egypt took steps towards the Arabs, both in the Arab Cooperation Council and through a return to the Arab League that is expected to occur during the upcoming summit. Egypt continued its peace activity in spite of the Israeli and American positions towards this activity.

Then President Mubarak began his European trip that took in three states: Belgium, Holland, and West Germany. In Holland, there was an international conference on preserving the environment attended by 23 heads of state. It is well known that America is especially sensitive about Egypt approaching the European sphere, a sensitivity which goes back a long way. Therefore, before the trip took place, America decided to halt the \$230 million that used to be sent to Egypt as monetary assistance. This amount consists of \$115 million monetary liquidity from 1988 and \$115 million of monetary liquidity from 1989. The receipt of this amount by Egypt has been linked to the economic reform that the International Monetary Fund demands, but it is well known that the fund's conditions usually cause hardship in all the states with which it deals.

President Mubarak said: "We in Egypt have undertaken reform actions and we are still continuing with them, so I hope that the Americans will try to understand this, since they sometimes get inaccurate information on this subject, and we hope that this problem will be solved."

But the amount was halted and that was the end of the matter.

And then the crisis came. When President Husni Mubarak was at his first European stop, news was leaked to some American newspapers that was quickly confirmed by the official spokesman of the American government, and the matter became the number one news item in the news publications.

What was said in the American press was that Egypt is building a factory in the region of Abu Za'bal north of Cairo, that this factory could produce toxic materials, and that the equipment of this factory and the materials used in it were being supplied now to Egypt with the knowledge of the Swiss company Krebs, and that America had contacted Switzerland a while ago about looking into this matter. And thus, says the official American spokesman, it seems difficult to monitor these things.

What is new this time is that the campaign is directed against Egypt. But it was obvious at the conference that was held in Paris on controlling chemical weapons that America joined the conference in taking a position against the Arabs in general.

Needless to say, the campaign began in Iraq, and from there it turned to the Libyan Jamahiriyyah. Now it is Egypt's turn. We will not talk about Israel's position on this issue, nor of the American explanation that it offered to the media that Egypt was trying to arm itself

with nuclear weapons in order to confront Libya, as if Egypt would ready itself to confront an Arab state instead of a confronting the Israeli enemy.

The chain of events that followed is well known. The Swiss government announced thereafter that the Krebs company had halted any dealings with the Egyptian government on building this factory, and the American "hero" announced that there were continuing contacts with the Egyptian government to contain the matter.

Before getting to the Egyptian reaction, it must be said that though America might have an interest in putting pressure on Egypt, and the Zionist lobby in America and Israel has a basic interest behind this campaign: the stopping of the peace offensive which Egypt is conducting with all its might, with the decisive Egyptian rejection of the American and Israeli positions towards this peace activity.

The Israeli goal is clear: creating a peripheral battle to distract Egypt and cause its voice to go unheard when talking about a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. It is also an attempt to strike a blow against the special Egyptian-American relationship, as well as to close the door to any possibility of Egypt possessing any weapons, because it realizes that these weapons would be used against it.

Egyptian and Arab memories should not be so short that they forget the American role, and behind it the Israeli role, in opposing the building of an Egyptian nuclear reactor for peaceful uses only. Things have reached the point that all assistance has ceased, even from Europe, and offers to finance this Egyptian project, which Egypt needs under its present circumstances, have dried up.

When President Mubarak was asked more than once during his European trip about the account of the chemical arms plant, he said, "In fact, this is the first time I've heard of the matter here. The plant that we have is a plant to produce some insecticides such as pyrosol." Mubarak added, "We do not approve of chemical warfare and we are not building factories for chemical warfare. The only reason why the NEW YORK TIMES wrote those words was to stir up trouble, especially under certain international circumstances. We are not among those who support the use of chemical weapons in wars."

In fact, President Mubarak went so far as to say: "Egypt believes that chemical and nuclear plants must be eliminated from the entire Middle East region."

It remains for us to say that what has happened between Egypt and America is bigger than a crisis but less than a break in relations, and perhaps it was less than an objective posture by Egypt towards the American "friend" who still insists upon a friendship of a special kind, which the national administration of Egypt rejects.

But the future carries with it many questions: Will Egypt get through this crisis, and how, and at the expense of which of the two sides will this be? And in that case, what will be the outcome of Mubarak's visit to Washington? And will President Mubarak make his visit to the Soviet Union after that, or will American attempts achieve their aims?

Anwar al-Sadat was the one who built the pillars of this relationship with America, since he used to proclaim that Egypt was a part of the American strategy, and it seems that America wants Egyptian-American relations strictly in the political sense, which is what the Egyptian leadership rejects and does not want.

The misunderstanding in the Egyptian-American relationship is that Egypt's understanding of friendship is filled with a humanitarian spirit, but it seems that Egypt does not mean anything to America other than figures and hard statistics which can be put into the computer at any moment, ultimately to give out information in a dry, scientific manner devoid of human warmth.

In politics, there is no emotion and no feeling; there are interests. Ever since Napoleon Bonaparte came to Egypt, everybody has realized that this tired country suffering from many problems and woes is the key to the east, but this is what America has so far been unable to realize.

It seems that it will never realize it, neither in its dealings with Egypt, nor with all the Arab states in the region.

Therein lies the essence of the American failure in the Middle East in the second half of the twentieth century, since we see that the stage was set for there to be good relations on the part of Egypt and the Arabs with America. Egypt and the Arab states had drunk the waters of national independence that cannot be bargained for.

The root of the problem is that the time of colonialism has passed and that time never goes backwards. America's attempt to bring back the time of colonies, when every ambassador turned into a high commissioner, will cause America to forfeit the possible in pursuit of the impossible.

ISRAEL

Electoral Reform May Curb Proliferation of Parties

44000582a Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 28 Jun 89 p 4

[Article by David Krivine, member of the editorial staff of THE JERUSALEM POST: "Making Israel Governable"]

[Text] The electoral reform bill sponsored by the Ya'aqobi committee (which is holding another meeting today) will probably be voted into law, but it will not solve Israel's constitutional problem. It will certainly

reduce the number of factions represented in the Knesset, and many think that this will create the kind of balance between the powers of the executive and legislature that exists in Britain.

Unfortunately the solution is not so simple. The need is for a stronger executive. The British system provides that because it allows one party to achieve an absolute majority, holding more seats than all the others combined. Britain's prime minister thus has, with his (or her) cabinet, the power to rule undisturbed for five consecutive years.

The Ya'aqobi committee's constitution does not give Israel's leading party the power to rule. It modifies and improves, but basically does not alter, the status quo; and for a good reason. Britain contents itself with a two-party system because only two broad interest groups need representation: the middle and working classes. One of two historic big factions controls the House of Commons while fringe parties are left out in the cold.

Israel is saddled with two big factions as well, Likud and Labour, representing, let us say, the hawks and doves. But two other interest groups exist which cannot be relegated to the sidelines and must be granted representation; the Orthodox and the Arabs.

The Ya'aqobi committee has therefore compromised, making its reform plan (so to speak) half British and half Israeli. Fifty per cent of the delegates will be elected in constituencies, 50 per cent from party national lists.

The intention is democratic, to give every serious faction a chance. The result is that the present deadlock will remain unchanged.

And it is a deadlock. Israel's cabinet is split, the two halves taking diametrically opposite stands on the most critical issue (peace versus territories) that Israel has ever faced. The Likud is divided over its own leader's policy. Three cabinet ministers oppose it openly—yet stay in the cabinet and do not dream of resigning.

The government of Israel is in a state of chronic paralysis. The intifada has raged for a year and a half, without any agreed political initiative to settle the conflict. The centre parties are weakening, extremist parties (on left and right) gaining increasing support. Law and order are breaking down. Right-wingers call their right-wing prime minister a traitor and try to beat him up. The bewildered police confront Arabs one day and Jews the next.

This chaotic situation cannot continue, says Prof Uri'el Reichman, Israel must be granted a government with power to rule. Reichman heads a team at Tel Aviv University which two years ago produced a blueprint for constitutional reform. The Ya'aqobi bill follows in broad terms its recommendations for changing the system of parliamentary elections; but that does not undo the tangle.

A second bill is required instituting something similar to the American presidential system. Instead of letting parliament choose the prime minister, the general public should do the choosing. After voting for a parliament they would in a separate ballot elect the prime minister.

At present the premier is the leader of whichever party comes out on top. He is the creature of the Knesset, being unable to govern without its majority support. Under the new system it does not matter which party wins most seats in parliament, the prime minister does not depend on them, he is voted into office through this national plebiscite.

He chooses his own cabinet ministers and runs the government with their assistance. The Knesset can do nothing about it as long as 40 per cent of its members support him. The proportion has to be at least that because an important measure of parliamentary control is still provided. Should 60 per cent of the members plus one oppose the prime minister's policies—he is out.

Under Reichman's system Israel's prime minister would hold something like the power currently exercised by Britain's prime minister or the American president or the president of France. He would be in full charge of the executive for four years. At the end of that period the electorate would pass judgment. It can re-elect him for a second four-year term, but not for a third.

A head of government endowed with that kind of power would be able to do something never done in Israel before: enact the measures that he, his cabinet, his supporters and his party think right.

He would be unlikely to indulge in crazy policies. A candidate for the top post needs half or more of the population behind him. Unless he gains widespread support among moderates in the centre, he won't make it. This rules out extremists like Ge'ula Kohen, Rehav'an Ze'evi or Me'ir Wilner.

Even so, the elected head of government will still have to watch his step, lest a no-confidence vote with 60 per cent support forces his resignation, necessitating fresh elections.

The point about these checks and balances is that while providing necessary democratic safeguards, they do not bind the prime minister hand and foot. Today he cannot get anything done. Whatever he undertakes is stymied by some special-interest group, whether from the left or the right or the religious or the anti-religious. Under the Reichman proposal he would be free to do his job. For the first time Israel would be properly governable.

Likud MK Shoval Discusses Peace Initiative
4400585 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 11 Jul 89 p 4

[Article by Zalman Shoval: "The Peace Initiative: Still the Best Bet"]

[Text] Now that the Likud Central Committee meeting is out of the way, one can return to the real world. The meeting's outcome - not totally divorced from internal party-politics - has created some temporary difficulties for Prime Minister Shamir, both in the sphere of coalition politics and internationally. But once the hue-and-cry fades away, the momentum of the government's diplomatic initiative will hopefully pick up again.

Washington has been fairly soft-spoken in its reaction: indeed, it would be a grievous U.S. mistake if it were, as a result of what happened, to cool its support for the Israeli election proposal. Raising the "international peace conference" idea from the dead, or upgrading its contacts with the PLO would only make Mr. Shamir's situation more difficult and his internal opposition less cooperative.

After all, the "four principles" adopted by the Likud Central Committee only reflect its traditional and oft-repeated position (and not of the Likud alone), though it can't be denied that the time and place of their reiteration could temporarily shift the diplomatic momentum into low gear.

But not for long. Two of the four "principles" relate to the "permanent status" of the territories, which the government's initiative in any case doesn't touch upon at this stage, so there is no reason to change anything in it as it stands. As to the other two, the demand that violence should stop before negotiations take place is surely a reasonable one; and East Jerusalem Arabs' participation in the election process (as voters only or also as candidates) is more problematical - but wasn't part of the original initiative anyway. With the passage of time, there may be more than one way of dealing with it. Nor is the matter of new settlements linked formally with the initiative; one may assume that decisions on this point will, as before, be dictated by economic and political realities.

Arab hardliners inside and outside the PLO have, not surprisingly, seized upon the Likud resolutions to become even more vocal than before in rejecting the Israeli initiative. Yet the odds are still even that, provided the U.S. remains steadfast in its support, the Arab side will ultimately find it advantageous to accept it. On the other hand, Israel, too, should perhaps make it clear the the proposal is not open-ended; and that if, after a certain time, the Palestinians do not agree, Israel will have to look for other ideas.

It should be remembered that elections represent only one point in the proposed programme; at least one other (the need to solve the refugee problem through resettlement) must surely be part and parcel of any solution conducive to peace in this part of the world.

For several reasons (perhaps related to our traditional shortcomings in hasbara) only the elections clause is viewed as immediate and concrete - and indeed, Messrs. Bush and Baker seized upon it with enthusiasm not only because, like all good Americans, they love to see free elections anywhere, any time, but also because the proposal did in fact fit into America's own scheme of things.

This involved restarting the "peace process" without necessarily having to kick off with an international conference - an idea they disliked anyway. As an added bonus, the plan once again confirmed America's position as the leading great power which can get things moving in the Middle East.

At this juncture, Washington is still opposed to an independent Palestinian state, as it has assured us, preferring to speak about the Palestinians' "political rights" and not about the "right of self-determination" (a term synonymous with independent statehood). Still, there arises the question - hypothetical for the moment - how Washington would react if Israel should one day have to prevent the creation of a separate Palestinian state, even by force.

Ever since President Carter's abortive attempt to ram his "Soviet-American declaration on the Middle East" down Israel's throat, all U.S. administrations have been reluctant to come to an all-out confrontation with the Jewish state on matters pertaining to the peace process. The U.S. clearly prefers to build upon ideas which enjoy the support of important segments of the Israeli political establishment (e.g. the 1982 "Reagan initiative" was not too dissimilar from some of the ideas circulating around the Labour Party at the time). If necessary, it presses for "clarifications" and "alterations" (this is already happening).

In the past, the Americans habitually encountered total Arab rejection (except by Egypt) of any idea which the Arabs perceived, rightly or wrongly, as favouring Israel. This time, however, U.S. diplomats believe that the PLO will eventually react differently.

One of the most important tasks now facing Israeli diplomacy is to reach an understanding with Washington about the meaning of the term "interim solution," i.e., whether this only connotes temporariness or refers also to its inherent nature of compromise. The signals coming from Washington on this point are not always clear; in the past, at least some U.S. policy-makers have

used the term "overlapping sovereignty" in connection with the future of the "West Bank." Israel's main diplomatic thrust must now be aimed at clarifying the coordinating this aspect.

However, what happens if it should become clear at some point that Israel's initiative has reached a dead end? Not because of the Likud or any other of Israel's parties but either because the PLO rejects it lock, stock and barrel or, if the elections do take place and negotiations do start, it will sooner or later transpire that the Palestinian representatives do not agree to anything even faintly resembling any of the formulas which either Shamir or Rabin has in mind.

Moreover, it should be remembered that there is agreement among Israel's major parties only on the first stage, relating to the interim period; there was and is no agreement on the final status of the territories - nor, given the present political circumstances, can there be (at least publicly). It may be surmised that neither Shamir nor Rabin has illusions about any Arab party putting its signature to an agreement with any similarity to the official platforms of either the Likud or Labour.

Thus, one may assume that they have taken into account the distinct possibility that the initiative could, under certain circumstances, lead either to the establishment of a full-fledged, irredentist, independent Palestinian state, or of Israel having to take far-reaching steps, including military steps, to prevent such a development taking place.

Indeed, recent statements even of supposedly moderate PLO functionaries (like Nabil Sha'ath, that darling of Israeli leftists) impel the conclusion that the ultimate annihilation of the Jewish state is still uppermost in their minds. Another prominent PLO leader, Yasir 'Abd Rabbu, who heads the PLO delegation in the pourparler with the U.S., in a recent statement expressly denied the Jewish People's right to self-determination on what he termed "Palestinian soil," adding that "the implementation of Zionism...will be the subject of a future struggle."

Though for several reasons, including tactical ones, the government is right at this stage to play its cards close to its chest, ultimately no tactic can succeed if there is no clear strategic thinking behind it. In other words, if such an agreed long-term strategic concept doesn't exist, then there would indeed be a danger that the final outcome might be neither that envisioned by Labour nor by the Likud, but the one which 'Arafat plans.

Therefore, Israel will sooner or later have to determine for itself what is absolutely vital and what isn't, what is practicable and achievable and what isn't. The present initiative, in spite of its potential pitfalls, could be a passage-way towards an acceptable solution - provided the correct conclusions will be drawn from these deliberations.

It may well be that Israel will have to be prepared to implement such a solution unilaterally, should it prove impossible to reach a formal agreement with the Palestinians. This will, of course, be more complicated than it would have been 10 years ago. Perpetuating the status quo is not in anybody's interest, neither Israel's nor the Palestinians' nor that of the U.S. So should the present initiative come to naught for one reason or another, other ways must be looked at.

As to what is achievable and what is not, I dare say that in Israel there is consensus, or near-consensus, today on several points, chiefly that strategically the West Bank dominates and controls the territory of the State of Israel - its population centres, most of its industrial plant, etc. There is practically no argument between defence experts, Right or Left, "hawkish" or "dovish," that Samaria and Judaea constitute the "vital area" for Israel's defence.

Whatever political solution is arrived at, almost all Israelis are determined to keep strategic control of the territories. As General Gazit, one of the authors of the "Yariv Report," and certainly not an extreme "hawk," said only the other day: "Even if Israel should reach peace agreements with all her Arab neighbours, and the Palestinians - its survival will continue to depend entirely on its military strength, and on the knowledge of the Arabs that they can't defeat Israel in a war."

But strategic considerations aren't everything; on the political solutions, controversy is rife, though it seems that most Israelis realize, consciously or not, that neither withdrawal to the '67 borders, nor full, all-encompassing incorporation of all Judaea, Samaria and Gaza and their 1.5 million Arab inhabitants into Israel - "annexation" in other words - is a viable or desirable option.

Where does that leave us? Once again, we need to look for unconventional solutions which will not completely fulfil all the expectations and aspirations of everybody, but neither will they deny the fulfillment of all of them.

Of late, one often hears a rather strange idea, especially from British and American experts: "Let's grant the Palestinians the right of self-determination (i.e. sovereignty) and, five minutes later, they will voluntarily accept constraints on their sovereignty."

Maybe they will, maybe they won't. But let us make absolutely clear what we are talking about: first, that "self-determination" is a code-word for one thing only - an independent Palestinian state; and secondly, an international law, "sovereignty" is just that, namely the "highest power." This means that a sovereign Palestinian state would be completely free to make agreements as well as break them, unilaterally - as has happened ever so often in modern history.

"But yes," the retort usually goes, "then Israel would be entitled to send in its troops." That is also correct, but wouldn't it be rather short-sighted and irresponsible to forge stop-gap solutions which already contain the seeds of almost certain war in the future?

I think we must try to provide the Palestinian Arabs with a sense of national identity - but this doesn't mean that they should be entitled to translate this into a reality which would be fatal to our state's existence.

We must stress that without tackling the Arab refugee question - not just those refugees in the camps in the West Bank and Gaza but also those outside Palestine, since the PLO refers to both groups when it speaks about the "right of return" - any solution for the Palestinian problem would be meaningless and short-lived. Indeed, the "Palestinian problem" is much more than that of the Palestinian refugees, whose plight has been perpetuated by the Arab world for political reasons for the last 14 years, than just the problem of the "territories."

Unless the refugee problem is resolved, mainly through settlement in other parts of the Arab world (the resettlement of the Gaza refugees being especially urgent) the wound will continue to fester the Israelis will be justified in interpreting the "right of return" as a return to Yafa and Akko, and not to Nabulus and Jenin, which anyhow could not and will not - economically, demographically, etc. - absorb another million and a half refugees in their midst.

To return to the main issue: the two formulas mentioned above, "annexation" or complete evacuation, are unacceptable, because both are based on a complete denial of the rights and interests of one or the other of the parties. But no less impossible is the idea of "territorial compromise." This is so because no Arab party, whether King Husayn or any of the Palestinian leaders, has ever been willing or able to consider giving up, legally and finally, any part of what they call "Holy Arab Land."

This attitude hasn't changed, nor is it likely to in future; thus, when U.S. diplomats speak today about the principle of "land for peace" (by the way, they are not part of 242), the real implication is not "territorial compromise" but complete Israeli withdrawal.

So what other solution can there be?

In my view, the one formula which may have a chance of succeeding is based on a synthesis of three separate, but not irreconcilable, concepts: firstly, condominium, or "shared rule"; secondly, Palestinian self-government; and thirdly, territorial arrangements.

The basic premise of this approach is that in Palestine, west and east of the Jordan River, there can only be two full-fledged sovereign states: Israel and Jordan - or, if one prefers, Jordan-Palestine. However, there is also that small but crucial area of the "West Bank" (Gaza is a

different kettle of fish) measuring no more than 5,500 sq. kms., in which both the Jewish people and the Palestinian people have certain legitimate claims and interests which neither will completely give up nor be able to impose on the other in totality and .

The areas of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza have historically always been dependent economies; their economic fortunes will continue to be closely linked with those of Israel as well as Jordan. Considering the circumstances and the constraints mentioned, the solution can therefore only be pluralistic and functional - or, a term now preferred by some, "cooperationist." Israel and its neighbours to the east would divide the functions of government - but not the land. The West Bank (and perhaps Gaza) could consequently be sub-divided into predominantly Arab and Jewish cantons, the latter conforming as far as possible with the concept of "specified security locations" mentioned in the Camp David Agreements.

The Arab cantons would maintain a special relationship with the eastern part of Palestine, now called Jordan; and their Arab residents would be Palestinian-Jordanian citizens, vote for a Palestinian-Jordanian parliament as well as for their own autonomous institutions. Jewish residents would be Israeli citizens and enjoy all the rights and duties of Israelis everywhere - though from the strictly legal point of view, the land they will live on will be under joint Israeli and Palestinian-Jordanian sovereignty.

There would be a joint control council which would, among other things, deal with such questions as water resources, public land, electricity in addition to local police duties and the economic and fiscal relationships with Israel and Jordan.

As the ideas outlined in this article are based on an approach predicated on the unity of the land and the cooperation between the two peoples living in it as neighbours (though not as intertwined tenants) it may contain the necessary ingredients for an equitable solution.

Knesset Law Panel Debates Death Penalty
44000584a Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 12 Jul 89 p 2

[Article by Dvorah Getzler]

[Text] There are circumstances in which a family's demands for vengeance against their loved one's murderer must be met with the death penalty, Knesset Law Committee chairman Uriel Linn (Likud) argued yesterday when his panel spent close to three hours in detailed discussion of the issue.

Linn has legislation pending that would restore the death penalty for murderers whose crime was preceded by the sexual abuse of a child victim, who tortured their victims, of whose crime resulted in mass death. Linn

emphasized that it did not matter to him whether the murderer was Arab or Jew; what was important was the character of the murder, no matter who the murderer was.

Shulamit Aloni (Citizens Right Movement) said she utterly and on principle opposed the death penalty. What she proposes is the institution of a category of first-degree murder under which the convicted murdered would not be eligible for any dispensation granted to other killers.

Former Tel Aviv University law faculty dean David Liba'i (Alignment) agreed with Aloni. He would tolerate the death penalty only for crimes against humanity, he said.

In answer to those who believe in the deterrent value of the death penalty, Liba'i pointed out that since the penalty was abolished in 1954, the average number of murders per year has not increased from the 60-80 figure, though the population has more than doubled in the past 35 years.

Liba'i scored as "populist" the tendency of politicians to raise the issue alongside the graves of the victims of terrorism.

Change of Command in Territories Examined

44040471 London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 30 Jun 89 p 29

[Article by Mazin Mustafa: "Rabin Encourages Internal Initiatives to Weaken the Intifadah"]

[Text] Recent changes in the Israeli military command in the West bank indicate that the Israeli government has begun taking steps to implement the elections plan.

The military rule there is the executive arm for implementing the government's policy. The ministry of defense is directly and solely responsible for the occupied territories. The ministry's importance is on the rise because of its being the balancing factor between the Labor left and the Likud right and of the fact that the military establishment is the number one ruler of Israel. The ministry enjoys foreign relations that transcend the foreign ministry because of its direct strategic links with the United States.

The combination of all these factors with the personality of Yitzhaq Rabin, have made him the lord of a military and political fiefdom; he throws his weight around and colors with his own views any proposed Israeli political plan concerning the future of the occupied Palestinian territories. For this reason Shamir's plan would not have come into being had it not in the first place been in harmony with the ideas proposed by Rabin which he tried to implement earlier this year, six months before Shamir proposed his plan. Also, Shamir's plan would not have succeeded in the Knesset had it not been combined

with Rabin's ideas. So, the final wording of the plan was a combination of the "Jordanian option", which the labor party adopted, and "autonomy", which the Likud adopted since the signing of Camp David agreement.

The Palestinians in the occupied territories, who have become experts in identifying the characters on the Israeli military stage, both on the official and personal levels, believe that the West Bank military command is linked to Washington more than it is so to Tel Aviv by virtue of the defense ministry's ties. They also believe that the new era under General Yitzhaq Mordekhay's leadership will be more complicated and more politicized than that of his predecessor General 'Amiram Mitzna', given the local, regional, and international changes the uprising has brought about. The difference between the two generals throws light on this complication. Mitzna' was brought to the West Bank command from the operations command in southern Lebanon. He was hailed as "moderate" and "reasonable" after he voiced criticism of "humanitarian" nature against the Israeli army command for its treatment of civilians during the invasion of Lebanon and the encirclement of Beirut. His appointment to the West Bank coincided with the U.S. State Department's push for Israel to pursue a policy of "improving the standard of living" which George Shultz considered as one of the means that would enable the emergence of local leadership from outside the PLO.

But the intifadah [uprising] has gone beyond the calculations of the White House and the Israeli Defense Ministry, for it has imposed new facts. Most important of these is the fact that political initiatives can no longer be just trial balloons but should be a serious program that can be put into practice. This was what prompted Israel to adopt the election plan and to seek international support for it.

While the "good fence" wall in southern Lebanon was Mitzna's political background when he assumed the West Bank command, his successor is of an oriental origin (Iraqi born) from the paratroopers corp and served three years as commander of Gaza sector. He assumed that command after he was accused of killing a Palestinian fedayeen with the butt of his gun after having surrendered. This was known as the "Bus #101" case in which two Palestinian fedayeen kidnapped a bus on Gaza road. However, what is more significant in Mordekhay's political character is that he likens himself to Rabin in enjoying the support of the extreme right, particularly the settlers, and the Labor Party because he has been a labor-supporter. He was brought in order to satisfy the settlers in the West Bank who called for suppressing the intifadah militarily, pointing out to Mordekhay's style in Gaza where he did not hesitate to enforce collective punishment and long curfews and to use live bullets against the demonstrators.

However, Palestinian sources in Gaza do not expect any changes in the method of confrontation between the intifadah and the occupation. Where repression is

concerned, they see no difference between Mitzna' and Mordekhay. In fact, they see the difference in the political role and the objectives being sought. They believe that Mordekhay will undertake implementing Yitzhaq Rabin's plan within the boundaries of new restrictions and new methods that will preclude the military solution and the resort to pressure and intimidation. They point to the statements of Chief of Staff General Dan Shamron who believes that the intifadah could be ended with a military solution but this would destroy Israel in the international community. He said that annihilation is out of question and the Palestinians' nationalist aspirations to have a state of their own cannot be crushed. These statements are in harmony with Rabin's objectives.

These sources link the changes and the accompanying statements with the new method by which the ministry of defense, with direct pressure from the United States, is trying to create a new climate for the emergence of Palestinian personalities in the territories who would agree with the outlines of the Israeli proposed elections. The military administration has begun expanding its contacts with local personalities, even with those known for their close ties with the PLO. It also allowed many delegations to travel abroad, particularly to the Arab countries, Egypt, and Europe, in order to meet with PLO representatives in order to agree with them on the coming stage. It also lifted military orders placing under house arrest or restricting movement to one's place of residence against several Palestinian personalities and allowed them to travel abroad.

In the light of these developments, western observers are following up the silent struggle between Foreign Minister Moshe Arens and Yitzhaq Rabin who has succeeded in winning Washington's support for his policy after Washington had for a long time relied on Arens. Western observer point to the difference between Arens, who does not wish the Palestinians, at home or abroad, to participate in consultations regarding proposed solutions, and Rabin who, although is opposed to consultations with the PLO in Tunis, does not object to holding contacts with its supporters in the West Bank and Gaza, the contacts which Mitzna' organized during the past two weeks.

The observers also point to the fact that Rabin allowed a school principal from Gaza to visit Washington in order put forward proposals which, according to Israeli sources, came from a personality known of its affiliation to Fatah (something which the organization denies), and which enjoy the support of many personalities in the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time Rabin met with Arab Knesset member 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Darawishah and charged him with conveying messages to the PLO in Cairo.

With regard to the Unified National Command of the Intifadah, apprehensions and reservations abound because of the increasing and wide contacts being held

between the Israeli Defense Ministry and many personalities in the occupied territories that are not in harmony with one another nor are organized according to clear political lines. Sources close to the Unified National Command say that Rabin, in cooperation with the United States, is now encouraging the launching of Palestinian initiatives of all kinds, whether these call for the reopening of schools or calming the situation because this would render the intifadah and its command less effective in the political arena. But the intifadah's first and ultimate wager is on what the PLO would achieve under an internationally guaranteed plan that would lead, even if through interim periods, to a just and comprehensive solution that would guarantee the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. If the military rule is the means to implement the Rabin-Shamir plan, then the intifadah is the means to realize the Palestinian people's national will.

Political Changes Among Israeli Arabs Discussed *TA0308154189*

[Editorial Report] On 28 July the YEDI'OT AHARONOT Weekend Supplement in Hebrew reports that according to police figures, investigation files opened in the police's northern district in 1988 included 162 acts of arson, 119 cases of stone throwing, 31 stone barricades, 205 incidents of slogan writing and the flying of Palestinian flags, and 131 acts of sabotage. In the first half of 1989, close to 430 files were opened. Reporter Ari'ela Ringel-Hoffman states that "at the end of the 1970s, the State of Israel was called to the Galilee. A term was invented: Judaization of the Galilee. About 50 settlements were established during a period of several years. The Judaization of the Galilee, which entered with a bang, slowly faded away. The urban centers that were mainly populated by immigrants from North Africa encountered great difficulties and turned into development towns. Thousands left them. The number of settlers residing in them did not increase substantially. The rural settlements, which were meant to create territorial continuity in the Galilee, had more or less already exhausted their potential for growth in the beginning of the 1980s. Comparative figures between 1980 and 1987 point to a growing increase in the number of Arab residents in the Galilee, and to Jewish emigration from the region. This is the picture, excluding Haifa: in 1980, 296,000 members of the minority population inhabited the Galilee. In 1987, there were 375,000, constituting a 27 percent increase. In 1980, there was a Jewish majority of 51 percent in the Galilee; in 1987, there was an Arab majority of 51.5 percent." Ringel-Hoffman comments that "Northern District Police Commander Albert Musafiyyah is concerned about the hostile propaganda in the Arab sector in the Galilee. According to Musafiyyah, hatred is hard to uproot, especially where easily influenced youths are concerned. Some of the propaganda is spread within the framework of summer camps, and some is spread through the distribution of cassette tapes.

Musafiyyah said that a certain nationalistic faction, whose name he does not wish to reveal, has also been recently taking advantage of family celebrations in order to disseminate its ideology. This faction is prepared to finance the weddings of young people, provided that its members are permitted to show their video cassettes and to make two or three speeches. Weddings are expensive these days, and young couples are easily tempted by the arrangement. At the conclusion of the wedding, propaganda material is sold at a stand which is set up ahead of time." Ringel-Hoffman, who maintains that Musafiyyah's comments refer to the Sons of the Village, also quotes Geography Professor Arnon Sofer, dean of the University of Haifa's humanities faculty, as saying that "while the Jewish people is preoccupied in the West Bank, with the issue of whether or not to remain in the territories, I am concerned about the fact that the Arab sector, consciously or not, is building for itself the tools for a potential state: a follow-up committee, subcommittees, and activities for the revitalization of the Arabic tradition and language. A monitoring of the processes taking place there points to a trend of Arab autonomy in the Galilee." As to whether the suspicion that Israeli Arabs constitute a fifth column could become a self-fulfilling prophecy, Sofer said: "We really are suspicious of them, and this is already beginning to snow-ball. To support my stand, I present attempts made throughout history. The process is taking shape because we find solutions like the Turks' handling of the Armenians, or the Iraqis' handling of the Kurds, unacceptable." Asked whether the establishment of a Palestinian state would solve Israeli Arabs' problem of national identity, Sofer said: "Of course, I support the establishment of a Palestinian state. I'm just not certain that such a state will eliminate the process of the creation of Arab autonomy in the Galilee." Ringel-Hoffman also quotes Minister-without-Portfolio Ehud Olmert, who is responsible for Arab affairs, as saying that "the establishment of a Palestinian state is liable to be a catalyst for the sharpening of the national consciousness among a considerable part of the Arab public," and adding that "the absence of a solution serves as an excuse that accelerates negative processes, but not every solution will solve this."

In HA'ARETZ inb Hebrew on 28 July, Khaled Jabarin writes: "In the name of God the merciful and compassionate, praise be to the Lord, prayer and peace be upon Mohammed the emissary of the Lord and upon those whom he chose. The situation of Umm-el-Fahm is no longer a secret: the new municipal administration took the reins when the crisis reached its peak. We are convinced that the average citizen suffers from the city's problems to the same extent as members of the current municipality, if not more so. The Muslim is his fellow Muslim's brother. He will neither exploit him, nor leave him to face the high waves without allowing him to lean on him... Therefore, it was decided at the city council meeting of 30.4.89 to raise the municipal tax by 35 percent as compared with last year.' This was one of the first leaflets issued by Umm-el-Fahm's new municipal

administration following the last elections, in which the Islamic movement won an overwhelming majority of 76 percent in the race for city mayor and 11 out of 15 seats for the city council. Jabarin comments that "this leaflet emphasizes two new and previously unknown elements in the approach of the new Moslem municipality: Firstly, the Islamic municipality, more than any other political power that has operated to date in the Arab villages and cities, is capable of employing drastic measures without taking popular bitterness into consideration. Secondly, as opposed to the Israeli Communist Party [ICP] and other political forces, its declared political approach is to comply with the demands of the government ministries and to fully cooperate with them so that the latter do not disturb its efforts to consolidate the internal authority of the Islamic movement in Umm-el-Fahm."

Jabarin continues: "Israeli Palestinians' weariness with politics and national struggles is the main reason for the crushing defeat of the movements whose basis of operation is political, such as the ICP, the Sons of the Village and 'Ansar' (a nationalistic movement which broke away from the Sons of the Village in Umm-el-Fahm), and similar movements in other villages ('Al-Nahda' in Taibe and 'Bani Tira' in Tira). It is also the main reason for the dizzying rise of the Islamic movement, and it is especially noticeable in Umm-el-Fahm. The objectives of the dissemination of Islamic notions, the construction of a society in accordance with traditional Islamic law, the establishment of a centralist government with Islam replacing the clan and the party structure as the focus of its identification, and the continual spreading to other Arab villages and cities, are of top priority. In order to realize them, the Islamic movement is willing and able to do what no other movement has been able to do: to remove from the agenda the national struggle for equality, which was especially prominent in Umm el-Fahm for years." According to Jabarin, "the Islamic movement can afford to make concessions in the national realm which no other national or other body could afford to make. The movement's ideology is that Islam is not only a religion, but a regime. Umm-el-Fahm Mayor Shaykh Rayid Salah explained: 'Just as Jews and Christians can live under a capitalist regime like in the United States, or a socialist regime like in the USSR, so, too, can a Muslim, Christian and Jew live under a Moslem regime.'" Jabarin maintains that "the Islamic movement is perceived as a national movement, even when it forgoes the national struggle. The political significance of the idea of an Islamic state is actually one of a state which is subject to Moslem rule and devoid of nationality. Most of those who voted for the Islamic movement did not do so because of its political-religious solution, but because of its guarantees of efficiency, as well as its pledges to make life easier, to repair the sewer system, to pave roads, to supply electricity and telephones, and to develop the city. They also did so out of anger at the corruption and the exploitation of positions of influence by the ICP and representatives of the clans, and out of loathing for the powerlessness and factionalism of the

Sons of the Village. But with the [movement's] assistance, they can now forgo the national struggle, which has reached a dead end, with greater ease and without realizing that this is actually what they are doing. The Islamic movement's principle objective is the internal rule of the city. Less than four months since it conquered Umm-el-Fahm with the slogan 'Islam is the solution,' its rule can already be felt. In the past 10 years, the movement has established in Umm-el-Fahm methods of ostracism and social boycott, including economic sanctions (refraining from buying from the secular, for example), which it currently employs more widely and openly, now that it is in power."

In HA'ARETZ in Hebrew on 28 July 'Uzi Benziman writes: "Negev Subdistrict Police Commander Chaim Ben-Ayun is the only person who speaks about the situation frankly and bluntly. In the recent past he warned about developments in the Bedouin sector, and was the object of angry responses from those in the establishment who deal with the issue. Ben-Ayun said this week that he does not want to sound like a prophet of doom, but he expects that within several years everyone will realize that the 'future is not rosey' (this is the most elegant, diplomatic expression that this veteran policeman succeeded in uttering). Ben-Ayun mentioned that since the start of the intifadah (uprising), 130 incidents involving stone barricades, stone throwing, the waving of PLO flags, the burning of Israeli flags, and the damaging of Israeli vehicles have occurred among the Negev's [70,000] Bedouins. The most severe incident involved the shooting at three soldiers, which is being attributed (albeit, not with absolute certainty) to Bedouins from the Be'ersheva area. Ben-Ayun stated that the Negev is the geographic intersection through which the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza Strip pass, and from which their influence among the Bedouins spreads." According to Benziman, "whether or not the seven Bedouin townships in the Negev are a success story, there is no disagreement over the fact that they have given rise to processes which have produced the recent displays of violence. A Be'ersheva University researcher defined it thusly: The Bedouins have become Arabs, Palestinians. The change took place in the following manner: part of the Bedouin population (known as 'lamam,' comprising people from different places who joined the original Bedouins) did not preserve the modes of marriage among the tribes, but brought in women from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The phenomenon of polygamy is common among this population group. As a result, the 'lamam' element within the general Bedouin community grew, and it currently comprises half of it. The Palestinian women brought their life style to Bedouin society, they educate the children, for example—as well as their world view: Palestinian independence, for instance. At the same time, the Bedouin's educational system has been based on Arab teachers from the Galilee and the Little Triangle. National Palestinian viewpoints seeped in through this channel as well." Benziman remarks that "the changes in the Bedouins' political state of mind were dramatically

expressed in the Knesset elections: In 1969, the Alignment received 76 percent of the Bedouin vote, and in the past elections, it received only 17 percent. While the Bedouins previously considered the Labor Party their natural political home, since 1973 they have voted for an independent Bedouin party headed by Shaykh Hamed Abu-Rabi'a, which was actually a satellite party of the Alignment. Since the murder of Abu-Rabi'a in 1981, there has been an increase in the Bedouin tendency not to vote for Jewish parties, but to prefer independent Arab parties (MK Abdel Wahab Darawisha [Arab Democratic Party] was supported by 39 percent in the past elections). This political affinity also contributed to the development of a Palestinian consciousness among the Bedouins. [Arab affairs adviser to the prime minister] Eli'ezer Tzafrir has stated that when Darawisha meets with Bedouins, he brings them 'greetings from Abu-Ammar (Yasser Arafat), who asked to tell you that we are engaged in a common struggle.' He added that among themselves, many Bedouins talk of their desire for the establishment of a Palestinian state."

Former Head of Military Intelligence Profiled
44230140 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ Weekend Supplement
in Hebrew 9 Jun 89 p 13

[Article by Ety Hasid]

[Excerpts] In all truth, Yehoshu'a Saguy's heart is not with the town of Bat Yam, in which he feels not unlike Gulliver in Lilliput. How does a regal personality like himself get to deal with municipal garbage disposal? He behaves in Bat Yam like a temporary exile in a provincial town far away from Rome.

As a former head of AMAN [Military Intelligence Branch], Knesset member, and member of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, he takes care to preserve a certain aura of secrecy even now that he is a member of the Municipal Council. For example, when last Wednesday he left for Canada, he told associates that he was on a secret mission for the prime minister. Senior officials at the prime minister's office this week knew nothing about the trip or mission.

It is rather absurd to believe that Saguy, who is working together with Ari'el Sharon and others to defeat Yitzhaq Shamir's political plan, was going anywhere on a mission for the prime minister. On May 24th Saguy called on Ari'el Sharon at his East Jerusalem home. It was a historic visit. Between the two there has been a deep rift dating back to the time when the Kohen Commission was gathering testimonies about the massacres at Sabra and Shatila. The Kohen Commission chose to accept then Defense Minister Sharon's version rather than that of then AMAN head Yehoshu'a Saguy. That was the background for the rift between the two and the last time they had anything to do with each other.

Once, when he was asked what would happen if Sharon were elected prime minister, Saguy replied: "Do you really believe that the nation will allow Sharon to become prime minister? What do you want me to do, murder him?" When Saguy, a reserve general, was accepted as a member of the Herut Central Committee, Sharon spurned his proffered hand. Sharon also voted against him in every central committee ballot. Today, however, Sharon, with his typical bulldozer big heart, swept up political novice Saguy, too, on his way to sweep away Herut's central committee into voting against Shamir's plan, thus paving his political way forward. Like Little Red Riding Hood, Saguy was tempted to take a detour to Sharon's home, and the next thing the two were posing for the television cameras, albeit a little pinched with embarrassment. Saguy muttered under his breath: "Uh...he invited me, so I came...I am very pleased." Nothing too obligating. Asked whether he had put aside his differences with Sharon, he answered in the negative; national interests alone had prompted him to set aside his pride.[passage omitted]

Yehoshu'a Saguy is viewed as a difficult man. From his very first years in the army he is remembered as sarcastic and sharp-tongued. He entered intelligence officers' school with a knowledge of spoken Arabic, which he had learned in Jerusalem. He distinguished himself there for his field and reconnaissance abilities. He is remembered as being talkative, not brilliant—some say a lot less than that—but exhaustingly argumentative.

At the beginning of the 1950's, Saguy—then Yehoshu'a Berman—served as a young officer in a special intelligence unit in Nitzana. With him at the time, under the command of Rehavia Vardy, were Ely Papushdo and Ya'akov Nimrody. From there he was transferred to the command of an intelligence unit in Beersheba, under the late Yequiti'el Adam. In his new position he revealed himself as a good field intelligence officer.

From the field he was transferred to intelligence analysis, because after the Yom Kippur War the army felt that analysis needed good field men. He came to take charge of military intelligence because that same war and the Agranat Commission that followed it eroded AMAN's reserve ranks. When in 1977 AMAN head Shlomo Gazit wanted to retire in the wake of the appointment of Begin and Rafel, no replacement could be found.

Gazit pressed, because he wanted to enroll at Harvard. In May 1978 Saguy was brought up as a candidate for the AMAN command. 'Ezer Weitzman, who was the defense minister at the time, wanted to appoint Moshe Levy, commander of the Central Command. Levy refused, choosing to go for chief of staff instead. For some reason, after Saguy was already piggy-backing with Gazit, he was summoned to the defense minister, the doubling up with Gazit was stopped, and he was appointed deputy head of AMAN. About 1 year later, in February 1979 he was nevertheless appointed. Shlomo Gazit said: "There were other candidates for the AMAN command position at

the time. In my opinion, 'Ezer did not bring enough pressure to bear on other candidates. There were about six candidates. Saguy was my candidate, but he certainly was not at the head of the list."

'Ezer Weitzman: "I appointed him because I thought that he was the most suitable in the circumstances. I thought he would make a good AMAN head, and I do not regret my decision."

As head of AMAN he was described by many as "quick to pull out his gun." Many of his apocalyptic prophecies failed to materialize. He opposed the peace with Egypt, and to this day he is still waiting for that peace in a corner. "There will be many more Ras-Burqas," he once said. He opposed the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor for fear of an irreversible rift with the Americans, and he was wrong. At the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war he predicted a quick Iraqi victory, and he was wrong again. With that in mind, his opposition to going into Lebanon was viewed as exaggerated and unrealistic. Unfortunately, that time he was right. The Kohen Commission dealing with the penetration of the phalanges into Sabra and Shatila later accused him of insensitivity and of indecisiveness. The commission recommended that he be removed from his position because in its view, Saguy's testimony had given them an impression of striking indifference and lack of interest on his part; the commission also charged him with shutting his eyes and ears to a matter to which, as head of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] intelligence arm, he was obligated to pay great attention. He was not found directly responsible for the Sabra and Shatila massacres, but for lack of consistency.

In the wake of criticism of his involvement in the stages preceding the Peace to the Galilee campaign, Saguy began to systematically disclaim responsibility, saying that he "moved aside." Once he was out of uniform, he gave a series of interviews in which he attacked the policy that led to the war in Lebanon, particularly the alliance with the Christians. The conclusion that emerged from his statements was that the question as to why he did not resign then, when he was morally and strategically against the war, was not relevant to him. When asked about it, he replied that an officer does not have the right to resign for such reasons. One could say that from Saguy's point of view, obedience knows no bounds.

His defenders claim that he was not the only one to "move aside." The entire general staff did so during the war. It is said that talking to Begin in private and in intimate circumstances Saguy did say what he thought, but at large cabinet meetings he sat aside and kept his mouth shut.[passage omitted]

Many Herut members consider him an alien. In the panel elections he emphasized the fact that he had served as head of AMAN during Begin's era and that he was the only general among the panel candidates. And indeed, he managed to secure a fairly good place in the panels.

Saguy came to his seat in the Knesset thanks to Mikha Reiser's death in an accident, not before he managed to scatter pearls of military wisdom in his path. Thus, for example, in May last year he said: "Sooner or later we will be facing Syrian tanks next to Metulla. This is a process that the Syrians will complete, if not today, then tomorrow." When last December he was asked how he would have ended the intifadah, he replied: "Stop them from marketing their produce in Jordan, across the Green Line, and inside the territories. Stop them from working in Israel. At the same time, have the IDF act like an army, not like a bunch of boy scouts. Nothing will happen if tanks do their exercises there and if they don't stick to the road, but veer into citrus groves, orchards, and fields." With those and similar statements he conquered the hearts of the central committee, which had always thought that a former head of AMAN must base his views on depths beyond their ken.

His current political views are hawkishly rightist, close to Tehiya or Tzomet, and actually not too far from Ghandi's concept. They are based on deep-seated contempt for all Arabs, according to one of his associates.

The fact that he dubbed Shomron "chief of staff of the intifadah" and blamed the army and its leadership for it, is part and parcel of a general rightist philosophy, explained that same associate. It is part of the belief that blame must be put on someone on the inside. Otherwise one might have to admit that Arabs are heroes and that their uprising has been greatly successful. Consequently, one has to find a scapegoat at home.

When the new cabinet was formed, Saguy linked up with Tzahy Hanegby and Michael Eytan. In the beginning, the three were united by their joint opposition to a broad government with Alignment. Their friendship later expanded on the basis of common ideas on political and military issues. They frequently send petitions and letters to the prime minister, but are seldom received by him.

Saguy's right-wing enthusiasm is reminiscent of the Likud liberals' current offensive. Both he and they are now fighting for potential electoral support for the next panel. Saguy, perhaps because he cannot invoke any Jabotinsky connection in his past, is ostentatiously displaying greater loyalty than veteran, tested Herut members. Having set his sights far ahead to the '92 elections, he now runs around from one party branch to another to ensure that he will be remembered when the day comes.

So far he has endeavored to avoid being identified with any camp within Herut and to be perceived as one who votes on each issue on the basis of practical considerations. He saw himself as a natural and correct candidate for the post of deputy defense minister, if the coalition agreement came to pass, and his associates have more than once brought up his name. His disaccord with Sharon should also not be misinterpreted. From the

viewpoint of political and military concepts he is ideologically close to Sharon, despite the serious personal rivalry between them. In a broader sense, he is active within what is known as the "Greater Israel Front," a large group of Knesset members, particularly from Likud, whose hard core is the Saguy-Hanegbi-Eytan trio. Saguy comes to all their meetings and the three have appeared together in Sharon's house, too. From their vantage point, Shamir has already joined the MAPAI [Israeli Labor Party] path to compromise.

About 3 hours before the Knesset plenum vote on the political plan, Saguy was summoned to the prime minister. During their talk, Saguy informed Shamir that he will not be present at the vote because he had a meeting of Bat Yam's council to attend at the same time in his capacity as deputy mayor. Rumor has it that Shamir did not accept that explanation.

Saguy is not viewed as a great luminary at meetings of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. "Some people are heard, and others aren't," commented one committee member. His description of Dan Shomron gathered greater impetus than he had expected. Commission members say that every once in a while he administers the third degree to officers who appear at meetings and that his attitude is insulting and sarcastic. He sometimes gets carried away by his own fervor and later feels a need to apologize. "I didn't mean that personally," he has been repeatedly heard saying to offended officers.

Saguy's gallop is viewed with wonderment within Likud. On the one hand, he rose from obscurity straight into Sharon's living room, on the other hand no one knows where he is rushing to or how he intends to jump over the hurdle of the princes or over the pit of the second generation, his contemporaries. Many people think of Saguy as a political lamb: he kicks and screams, but, like a lamb, chances are he will end up eaten by the wolves.

Interview Presents 'Insider's' Perspective on Unemployment

44230147 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew
23 Jun 89 pp 15, 18

[Article by Doron Sharm]

[Text] Eliyahu Behar, aged 58, was born in Petah Tiqwa. He worked for 37 years as a production worker in the Shimshon tire factory near his home "here, across the road." They say that there is a recession, a crisis, a shake-out. How does a man in the eye of the storm feel? What does he have to say about the situation, the country, the economy? Behar is a nice fellow, broad-fat, one might say—with a bushy mustache as befits his Turkish origin. It's obvious that he's a working man. "So you want to hear what it's like to be unemployed?" he asks.

[DAVAR] I didn't know that you are unemployed.

[Behar] "I also didn't believe that it would happen to me, of all people. But look, buddy, today you run into more unemployed persons than workers. Maybe that's not accurate, but that's the feeling."

[DAVAR] They fired you?

[Behar] "I worked at Shimshon for 37 consecutive years. There isn't a department where I didn't work—at the furnaces, in moulding, in the warehouse—everywhere. Seven months ago they fired 120 men, and I was one of them."

This large man speaks with sorrow, with pain. Of course, he is not one of those who will cry in front of Amos Carmeli's TV camera, but you can see the pain in his eyes, in the pauses when he speaks. He's aware of this. So he speaks quickly, in order not to let the pain overcome him. Not to let the tears flow.

[DAVAR] What did they say to you when they fired you?

[Behar] "It's necessary to cut back, I understand, but why throw out those who have given so many years to the company? After all, there is a certain order: last in, first out. The young ones can find other work. But I can't. I've given this plant 37 years. There were never any problems with me, neither as regards work nor as regards health. I have only certificates of appreciation and recommendations. When I was secretary of the workers' committee there was a high level of discipline. There were never labor disputes, there were never crises in this factory."

[DAVAR] You were secretary of the workers' committee?

[Behar] "Yes. I served the workers for 17 years. When the crisis came, the crisis of profitability as they call it, and it was necessary to cut back, there was no consideration for those persons who had contributed to the factory's progress. And in a way, this frustrates a guy. I gave all my years to the factory. I arrived as a single man and I left as a grandfather."

[DAVAR] This crisis that you mention, when did it begin?

[Behar] "The whole problem began 5 years ago, when Koor purchased Shimshon. The entire time that the factory was privately owned it was great. The problems started the moment that Koor came in."

[DAVAR] What problems?

[Behar] "The factory began to go downhill from the moment that Koor took over. They brought us political party directors instead of professionals. People who could be defined as floating, who didn't come to lend a hand and move the plant forward but cared only for themselves. The previous director took an interest in the workers. He cared about the company. It was his baby.

He knew everyone, and cared about everything. The new directors came, and the first thing that they did was to change the air conditioners in their offices and to purchase new cars. That's what they did. The previous director had an old car. I told him several times, 'You're a director. You need a new car.' But he said that there were more important things in the company than his car. He cared about the workers. He wanted them to feel good, and to get their pay on time. But Koor's director didn't know anyone. He didn't care about anything. When they fired me, I told him, 'Do you even know me? Do you know who I am? What I've contributed? What I'm worth here? And it's not just me - there are 120 other workers like me.' [closing quotation marks supplied] And I'm telling you that the source of all the problems is the unprofessional party management. What bothers me most of all is that no one takes responsibility and pays for his mistakes. In Koor they close down plants, they throw the workers onto the street, while they transfer the director to another plant. Only the workers pay for the mistakes of the big shots. Where, for example, is Gavish, the director general of Koor? Did he pay the price for his unsuccessful management? Because of him, thousands of workers are jobless. Believe me, the situation would improve and change completely if there were deterrent punishment."

[DAVAR] What would be different?

[Behar] "I can say what would happen if they don't do something."

[DAVAR] What really will happen if they don't do something?

[Behar] "There will be tremendous social ferment. There will be disturbances such as in Wadi Salib if all this swindling isn't halted. Yes, swindling. That's the only way to describe the situation."

[DAVAR] Who's responsible for all this?

[Behar] "The Histadrut [Federation of Workers in Israel] is mainly to blame. It's bankrupt. The trade union organization has disappointed me, and I speak as a man who has been secretary of a workers' committee. My feeling is that the source of all the problems is that the Histadrut is the owner of the factories, and has an internal conflict of interest with the trade union organization. And, of course, the parties are also to blame. They divvy up the spoils between themselves, while the people are hungry, and this doesn't bother anyone."

[DAVAR] Do you really think that no one cares?

[Behar] "Look, buddy, our state is disappearing gradually. Nobody is doing anything. The Arabs are not our enemies, but we ourselves. If we don't wake up really fast, I foresee a disaster. What pains me is that this is not the state that we dreamt of when we fought in the

underground. We didn't think that we'd reach such a situation from the social, moral, and economic viewpoints. All this disappoints me."

[DAVAR] Let's drop politics. Let's talk about you. How do you feel?

[Behar] "In one word: frustrated. I'll tell you why. There's a saying that the black man has done his job—now he can go. Then at least let him go with the feeling that what he has done is appreciated. He deserves to get the minimum. These people deserve it. The state owes it to them. They supported themselves honorably all their lives, and suddenly they don't know what tomorrow will bring. And there are a lot of people. Good people. They don't deserve to go around frustrated in the streets. I never got anything from the state and I don't want anything, but it's impossible to live like this. Each person is a world in himself, and no one cares what will be for the rest of his life, how he'll support himself. When a guy doesn't have a job he becomes a burden on his family, and not only economically. If he's not successful economically, he becomes frustrated and nervous.

"I'll tell you something else. Most of the traffic accidents are the result of the persons' frustration. It's not because of the roads. People are going around preoccupied all the time—about reserve duty, the family, making a living. People are driving in their cars, and all the while they're thinking and worried. That's why there are accidents. Don't let them tell you that the accidents are caused by the roads. We have good roads, there are highways. It's all because of peoples' frustration. Frustration is what causes all the problems in the country. It's too bad, because it's a good country. But maybe it's because we don't have enough experience. We're a young country. Maybe we still haven't grown up."

[DAVAR] What else makes you angry?

[Behar] "The directors' salaries make me angry. They take home in a month more than I make in a year. In general, the economic system in the county hurts only the weak. When there's a managerial failure, no one is responsible. No one is punished. Only the workers bear the burden. Take me, for example. I've been unemployed for 7 months already. Once I worked 10, 11 hours a day, and today I don't do anything. What can I tell you? It hurts me, it hurts me. It hurts me really bad."

[DAVAR] Explain.

[Behar] "Now I don't vote Labor, but while I was secretary of the plant workers' committee for 17 years, I fought for socialism and social justice. The individual concerned me: the man. Even the secretary of the Petah Tiqwa Workers' Council asked me how it is that I vote Likud when I have such socialist ideas. But I make a distinction between political ideas and social ideas. On the basis of my personal experience, I tell you that the trade union organization has been very disappointing.

After all, they exist to defend the worker, but they aren't doing that. Somehow, I don't feel good about the whole system. The situation in the country isn't good. It's not what we dreamt of. If I were 15 years younger, it would be different. There's a big problem for people my age in this country. They have no defense, no support.

"When a man reaches a certain age, he becomes a burden. No businessman is willing to take him on. People go around frustrated because of this. When I go to a workplace and state my age, they tell me that they are very sorry. They're not leaving me a choice. They turn a guy into a welfare case. I gave three-fourths of my life to the plant, and now they throw me out. You want to make a living, but there is nothing. Even the small severance pay is beginning to disappear. Now, instead of going to work, I go to the labor exchange, and there I meet my friends from Shimshon. Yesterday, they sent me to Supersol. They said that they need warehouse workers. I went there, they spoke with me, I brought them letters of recommendation. Finally, they told me that I'm qualified for the job, but there's a problem with the age. Everything they write in the newspaper about there being a law against age discrimination is wrong. It's all bullshit. But you can't go on like that until your pension begins, because there are expenses. All this also results in friction at home. The problems come without anyone wanting them, because there are certain demands that you can no longer fulfill. The wife doesn't work. She never worked. We got by all along only on my wages. I loved to work. I loved my workplace. I had the joy of producing and the joy of living. As long as I worked, it was OK. I had no complaints."

[DAVAR] And now you have complaints? About whom?

[Behar] "I have complaints about the Histadrut. About the trade union organization. I learned that no one respects my rights. I thought that somehow I was protected, but I was wrong. Now even the minister of finance comes and wants to impose on the unemployed all kinds of jobs so that they won't receive unemployment compensation. It's really a scandal. Why, this was money that we paid to National Insurance, and when we need it they begin to put on an act. OK, let all the big shots prove themselves and give us honorable jobs. I want to see them get by with a salary of 700 shekels a month. That's exactly half of what I earned when I was working. I've been receiving unemployment compensation for 6 months already, and next month I'll lose that, too. I just don't know what's going to be. It's not like what it used to be."

[DAVAR] How did it used to be?

[Behar] "Before, there was no work that I didn't do. I worked in construction, in road-building, in orchards, in industry. And now, nothing. Now, I'm classified as an unemployed person. I have a big problem with how to pass the time. I'm frustrated and bored. Really bored. I'm not the kind of guy that can sit in a coffee shop all

day long. Suddenly, you're not worth anything. You don't contribute anything. You sense that you're a burden. That you can no longer give anything. That's the frustration."

[DAVAR] So, what's going to be?

[Behar] "If they don't find a way real fast to stop the unemployment, I foresee real chaos. A very serious social shock. There will be anarchy, and then there won't be any choice and a dictatorship will come. Maybe that's what the country needs. You better believe it, crime and traffic accidents are not increasing for nothing. If there is no source of livelihood, there's frustration."

"That's the way things are, buddy. That's the way it is, and it's too bad."

Officers Now Drawn From Broader Social Spectrum

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[Article by David Richardson who looks at a recent study which finds that the IDF's officer corps is now drawn from a much wider range of social groups]

[Text] "...Art thou officer?" "Or art thou base, common and popular?"

(Henry V, iv:i)

Pistol's assumption in challenging the King is probably still quite valid today—and not only in the British army. Officers of all but revolutionary armies are still largely drawn from the upper socio-economic classes of their societies.

And even as the composition of the officer's corps has changed as societies have become more democratic, these bastions of conservatism and tradition have continued to reflect at least the values of the elites who founded them.

The officer corps of the IDF [Israel Defense Force]—more of a citizen's army than the professional armies of the West—did not differ at its inception. As Ben-Gurion and his lieutenants forged a new army from the underground movements of pre-State Israel, the officers were the sons of the elite of the "yishuv".

Prof Yo'av Gelber, head of the Institute of Zionist Studies at Haifa University and a leading historian of the IDF, has compiled a fascinating computer-based database drawn from the lists of Israeli fallen in 1948. Although, he warns, the sample is skewed, in that it reflects primarily the fighting echelons of the army, it is a useful basis for comparison of a group that served as an elite and provided both the men and the model for much of the IDF's officer corps to date.

Of the 500 officers and warrant officers who fell in the battles which came to be known as the War of Independence (they represented 20 per cent of the total number of men killed) more than 80 percent were either born or educated in pre-state Eretz Yisra'el, 23 percent were from the kibbutzim and moshavim, and over 50 percent were from the three major cities. Less than 10 percent had academic education, only 32 percent had completed high school and more than 80 percent were Ashkenazim in origin. Sephardim made up less than 10 percent of the officer corps then, while they comprised 19 percent of the soldiers.

Today, the army adamantly refused to be drawn into providing statistics of the ethnic origins of its officers (if these exist at all). But a casual survey at a hitch-hiking station or a few hours in an officer's mess will show that this has changed dramatically. The IDF has already retired its first Iraqi-born Chief of Staff, Moshe Levy.

"The Romanians were the first immigrant group to make it as officers," according to Prof Moshe Lisak, a Hebrew University sociologist who has conducted comparative research into the IDF and other armies.

"It's not that social groups are being replaced as a source of manpower for the officer corps, but they are being added," said Gelber. As a reserve brigadier-general in the paratroopers, an educator long involved in the training of officers and the author of the seminal study "Gar'in Letzava 'Ivri Sadir" ("The Nucleus of a Regular Hebrew Army"; Yad Ben-Zvi, 1986), he is especially well-placed to note the changes in this key element of Israel's military.

Gelber says that in 1948 the officer corps offered young men like Yitzhaq Rabin and his contemporaries a path for rapid professional and social advancement. "It wasn't only that security was considered of paramount importance (in fact, apart from the Kadesh campaign in Sinai it receded as a dominant national concern until 1967) but politics, commerce and academia offered limited opportunities at the time."

"Today," says Lisak, "the officer corps serves as a path of social mobility for other classes—the sons of the more established immigrants of the 50s." The sons of the Ashkenazi elite, urban or rural, have other alternatives today—primarily academic or in family businesses that weren't available then.

However, an important distinction must be drawn between those recruits or regular servicemen who agree to serve an additional two or three years as officers and those who choose a long-term military career. In this, too, the IDF differs. "There is still definitely an atmosphere, a feeling, that serving as an officer is something that one does 'temporarily,'" acknowledges a reserve captain in one of the elite reconnaissance units who

chose academia over infantry. "It seems to me that, at least for the former social elites, that is increasing." Their places (and more) are being filled by other social groups.

This tendency was dramatically accelerated in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. The army, by most accounts, almost doubled in size. Whether the army admits it or not, Gelber contends, standards were lowered in order to recruit officers to fill the ranks of the new units.

He notes that in officers courses he attended or commanded before the Six Day War the pass rate was some 60 percent. After 1973 it rose to some 80 percent. "The potential of the population could not have improved by such an extent and the only conclusion can be that several hundred officers who would not have made it by the standards of the army in 1967 were commissioned after 1973," Gelber says. "As time passed, they gradually edged up the ranks" he says, explaining the criticism that there is too much mediocrity among the IDF's officer corps.

The new officers were drawn from sectors of society which had had little to do with the army before. One of the most dramatic examples is the presence of Orthodox soldiers and officers in the fighting echelons where they were practically unseen before 1967. The Mizrahi movement had not educated its youth for military or national service before the Six Day War. The dramatic victory which spawned nationalist-Orthodoxy, Gush Emunim and so much else in Israeli society also sent young men into the army where many chose to become officers.

Officers were also drawn from the newer urban populations and the sons of the better-established immigrants of the development towns and moshavim. In fact they contributed far more significantly than did the military academies which are generally regarded today as something of a disappointment.

The military machine also became far more specialized and technical, creating a demand for thousands of technicians, clerks and storemen. These men and the officers who commanded them were very different from the make-do soldiers of the infantry and the armoured corps. "The 8-0-5 brigade" was the cynical dismissal of these new military workers who were said to come at 8, do zero and leave at 5.

Statistics published in the Wald Report on the IDF's land forces two years ago indicate that some 70 percent of the positions added between 1973 and 1982 were in the non-combatant echelons. There was also an inflation in the ratio of officers to men during this period. In 1973, there were 915 officers per 10,000 non-officers; in 1982, 1,337—and only 10 per cent of these additional officers were trained for combat duties.

Not only did the composition of the officers corps change but so, too, did something of the tradition and spirit. Until 1967, like most armies, the IDF was an organization dedicated to extracting above-average performance from average people through the application of organization and discipline. This applied to men and officers to an almost equal degree although there were the almost mythical exceptions of the elite reconnaissance units such as 101. The Six Day War undid the classic bootlaces tradition of the Hebrew army.

In the heady aftermath of a victory that stunned the world, the IDF and its senior commanders basked in the adulation of a grateful public and a fawning press. Long-established taboos on naming more than the most senior members of the general staff—let alone interview them—were swept aside. Ben-Gurion's rule that it was the defence minister who briefed the government and that the Chief of Staff or of Military Intelligence was called only if necessary has long been forgotten. Today, olive-green uniforms occupy several chairs in the cabinet room every week.

Gelber feels that the IDF's commanders were unprepared both for the hero-worship and the criticism that came in its wake. Personal brilliance, proven or otherwise during the Six Day War, gradually replaced the dogged rules of military organization eventually leading to the debacle of Yom Kippur.

The army responded to the shock of 1973 by growing and becoming far more bureaucratic. And while the altruism of military service remains a basic motivation, the new officers are also driven by the concerns of their age. Careerism and materialism that were frowned on the early days of the state have become legitimate concerns. Men considering a career in the military no longer compare their salaries with the public sector but rather with what they can earn in industry or business.

The result is increasing competition. Tat-Aluf Yirmiyahu Olmert, head of Officer Personnel Management in the IDF's Manpower Branch, says that it has taken some three years of intense effort to reverse a critical reduction in the number of junior officers willing to extend their military service sufficiently for the army to be able to count on them as career officers.

Through a range of cleverly-planned inducements the IDF has been able to improve its recruitment. Two years ago, for instance, the Navy was faced with a sign-on rate which is short of its projected requirements. By offering the young recruits easier terms for academic study earlier in their careers and more personal attention, the sign-on rate has climbed somewhat.

Other inducements today include housing plans (such as Yavne and Modi'in), more concern for the requirements of the officers' families, mid-career opportunities for

study and an elaborate preparation for civilian life when officers take early retirement at 45. In addition, military salaries are competitive with the private sector.

Gelber says that there has also been something of a change of atmosphere. For nearly a decade the general staff was characterized by something of an "anti-intellectual approach." Today, the army's general staff college has launched a programme which takes military studies to a far higher academic level than ever before. Conducted in part under the auspices of Haifa University, its participants will earn half an academic degree while studying some of the classic military texts which, for many IDF officers, are no more than names.

"The IDF is an army with a lot of experience but little learning," says Gelber. "We are still lacking a cadre of professional officers who choose military careers early on and perhaps we will never have it to the degree it is common with other armies. But it is beginning."

Lisak suggests that the classic military professionalism of the past is no longer sufficient. Military commanders also require an understanding of economics, sociology and psychology in addition to their military and technical skills. Defending the IDF's senior command in the face of recent criticism as it confronts the intifada, Lisak says that Israel should look to these officers as pioneers showing the way politicians should be dealing with the country's problems. "They have displayed far more understanding and flexibility of thought than those who have criticised them."

Intellectuals Discuss Violence in Israeli Society
4400584b Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 14 Jul 89 p 5

[Article by Dvorah Getzler: "Licence for Violence"]

[Text] Of the state of Israel were to make peace tomorrow, there would be an immediate end to the recent frightening waves of anti-Arab, anti-left wing violence, argues, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, who, at 86, is still, for many, a guru-cum-conscience of Israel.

Not necessarily so, says Hebrew University sociology professor Moshe Lisak, for the authority of the state has been seriously challenged, even rejected, by the radical right, and it has thus been weakened in the eyes of the population at large. The rot set in at Sebastia in 1974 and Yamit in 1982 among the super-patriots of Gush Emunim and within the ranks of the newly religious, newly Israeli of Meir Kahane's Kach.

For Lisak, those in Jerusalem who this week attacked Arab passersby, disrupted funerals attended by Vice Premier Peres and the Likud's Ehud Olmert, and who last Saturday attacked the home of Citizens Rights

Movement MK Dedi Tzuqer, fit "the Kach profile" newly religious immigrants from Russia and the U.S., joined by yeshiva students—both Ashkenazi and Sephardi.

"They are certainly not the stereotype of the disadvantaged we have been used to believing were involved on such occasions. True, in the south, and in Caesarea, the violence seems to have come from a different element, from those who represent the typical population of the development towns."

Fellow Hebrew University professor Ehud Sprinzak, now completing a major Oxford University Press book on the Israeli radical right, offers a similar analysis, adding that Kahane has had considerable success in exploiting all the bitterness and anti-establishment anger of what has been called the Second Israel.

Incitement to violence, Lisak warns chillingly, comes not from among the socially deprived, but from those who have some education.

'Israeli Politics Has Become Theorized'

"I don't know exactly what [Police Minister Hayim] Bar-Lev meant when he referred to them as 'primitives.' Certainly what we understand by the term today does not exclude the so-called educated. Properly used the word has to be applied to those who see the world in simple primitive terms of black and white, to those who hate what is foreign to them, who fear the unknown and the strange. Regretably, that definition can be applied to too many rabbis and their followers, a group that certainly is not illiterate, but has its own form of education and culture."

Taking the point further, Lisak charges that no rabbi has taken up Kahane's challenge to refute the halachic underpinning of his racist hate message. To the contrary, some - in particular the head of the yeshiva at Joseph's tomb in Nabulus and others in Hebron - preach revenge as a religious precept, insisting that Halacha does distinguish between Jewish and non-Jewish blood. True, he concedes, most rabbis have been careful to stop short of that; but none has risen publicly to offer an explicit refutation of that ugly, racist interpretation of Judaism.

And to those who doubt the political role of the rabbis, Lisak recalls that Israeli politics in the 1980s has undergone a sea-change.

"Political life has - to coin a phrase - become theologized. Where once we witnessed the politicization of religion, which incidentally drove many away from the religious parties, now we are witnessing a theologization of politics in which political parties seek the approval and advice of the rabbis even on totally secular matters; that gives the dictates of the rabbis a quite new authority which, in turn, has led to a radicalization of certain Orthodox groups."

That development, combined with the rise of fervent religious nationalism, he believes, is central to the growth of political violence.

Sprinzak categorizes Kahane as "the ideologist of violence, a man who believes that violence against the enemies of the Jews, avenging Jewish blood, is kiddush Hashem - sanctification of the Name of God. For Kach, violence as revenge is a goal, rather than an instrument. It may, of course, also serve as an instrument in the struggle to convince the Arabs that they must leave this land."

Not that the mass of Kach supporters show much sophisticated political and ideological commitment. Emotion plays the major part in their political responses. Hence Kahane thrives on the intifadah and terrorist attacks such as that on the no. 405 bus, all of which he knows how to exploit to the full.

Important to an understanding of Kach is that it makes no pretence of affirming its loyalty to the institutions of the State of Israel.

On the contrary, it specifically states that the government lacks all legitimacy, Sprinzak says, offering a glimpse into the powder-keg that such a movement may be.

Violence, both professors agree, is no new phenomenon in Israeli political life.

But in the late 1970s, notes Sprinzak, analyzing when changes may have begun, the nationalist camp underwent a deep crisis.

"Menachem Begin, the man who had given its members some hope in the efficacy of the parliamentary system, became the god that failed. He gave away territory! And at Camp David he recognized the existence of a Palestinian people and conceded that they had legitimate rights!

"It was after Camp David that Kahane turned his back on the Declaration of Independence, and that the Jewish underground went into action.

"It is also the period when the PLO came to the fore, when Israeli Arabs underwent Palestinization. And so there developed a sense of Jewish-Arab rivalry, especially among those in the lower strata of the population.

"As the Likud opened the entire West Bank to Jewish settlement, friction grew within and beyond the Green Line. It even emerged in the universities where some young Likud activists, notably Tzahi Hanegbi and Yisrael Katz, made their political careers by violently exploiting Jewish-Arab rivalries."

The Lebanon War, accentuating the sharp differences between right and left, marked a turning point, Sprinzak argue.

"Since the war was waged to smash the PLO, all those who opposed it were immediately labelled and denounced as pro-PLO traitors.

"Then the war went wrong. While that made many rational people question its planning and conception, for the emotional, the irrational, the defeat and the awful losses were all part and parcel of the great betrayal - by the left, by the media."

Sprinzak notes that the crisis of the Lebanon War was preceded by the watershed of the traumatic 1981 elections.

The blame for the horrors of that long hot summer is to be placed squarely at the door of the Likud, Sprinzak believes. That party, he says, lost its nerve in the early months of the year: its leader, Menachem Begin, fell sick; time was running out, and the party felt that the 1977 'revolution' which brought them to power was slipping through their fingers even as the polls gave Labour a healthy lead. The panicky response was a show of naked Likud-led violence against their political enemies such as Israel had never witnessed.

'The Disturbing Double-Speak of Cabinet Ministers'

"Begin came to life overnight as the gloves came off and the Likud used anything and everything, especially and deliberately playing on ethnic divisions, in their desperate bid for victory. That's when one saw the mob in action, easily whipped up because the bitterness had been festering since the days of the Black Panthers in the early 1970s."

There is a direct link leading from the 1981 election, through the Lebanon War, the murder of Emil Grunzweig, the emergence of shadowy groups such as the Sicarii, to today's violence, Sprinzak argues.

What is new, says Lisak, is the "mealy-mouthed, double-speak condemnation of violence that is all the response elicited from our ministers.

"By contrast, Labour-led governments spoke up quickly and clearly in the 50s, 60s and early 70s. For they had a long, firmly maintained tradition of moral and practical self-restraint.

"The right, on the other hand, has time and again cried out for immediate and extreme reaction to Arab violence."

The message of last Sunday's cabinet meeting - highlighted by Yitzhaq Moda'i's attack on fellow minister Avraham Katz-Oz's sharp denunciation of Jewish violence against innocent Arabs - was a disturbing example of that double-speak, Lisak says.

"It is clarity above all that is needed. The line between right and wrong becomes blurred if there is even partial 'understanding' for and legitimization of the hotheads and their misdeeds," Lisak stresses.

For Leibowitz matters are starkly simpler.

"Since 1967, Israel has been sliding steadily downward: we are moving from humanism, through nationalism, to bestiality.

"Our problem is not one of human relations. It is that since 1967 the State has become the instrument of violent Jewish domination over another people. Everything that has happened since derives from that."

Those who vent their rage against Arab passersby are "wild beasts," Leibowitz says. But their actions are to be understood as "an expression of the political lead given by the State."

Pinning the blame on the socially deprived of the development towns is "blatant deception, allies. The heads of the so-called national camp are all Ashkenazim, some of them intellectuals: the father of it all, Vladimir Jabotinsky, was a European intellectual!

"Who started settlement beyond the Green Line: Kibbutz Hame'u had and its Yigal Allon! Who said there was no Palestinian people? The American, Golda Meir!"

Where, asks the veteran educator, railing against the worship of the State and the evils to which it has led, all those who dare to teach that "it is more important to be a decent, honest person than a good soldier."

Meanwhile, Leibowitz counsels "organized refusal to serve in the occupied territories," to the scores of young people who seek his advice.

"They come to me because they are frightened of having to kill. And killing children is what they are asked to do. Only an organized refusal to serve in the territories will force the government to come to its senses."

'The Uncertainty Has Led to Frustration'

Lisak highlights the "banalization of violence" that the intifadah has produced. With the casualty toll in the territories continuing at the rate of one, three, five fatalities a day, the news reports drop in size and importance. "Today, people will probably only take notice if there are 20 killed."

Israeli society is more prone to accept anti-Arab violence today than it was in the past, Lisak claims.

"People have become frustrated because of a situation that is so full of uncertainty, that offers no quick and easy solutions, and they want to hit back. They want a strong-arm policy. Rabin is endlessly at pains to show that that is what he is providing - the numbers of killed, injured and imprisoned rise constantly: 600 killed, 5,000 injured, 20,000 in and out of jails. Many people are only too willing to see the numbers rise further and faster; and to add mass expulsions, too."

Lisak believes that the attitudes and language of last Sunday's cabinet meeting send a clear message to only too many Israelis that "the government is divided into the good nationalists and the others, the spineless, defeatist Arab-lovers who give legitimacy to the intifada." And although the ministers concerned have been warned of the danger of their rhetoric, they repeat the message time and again, Lisak notes.

"I very much fear that before long there will be a serious attempt on the life of a politician."

Citizens Rights Movement MK Dedi Tzuqer, explaining why he was singled out recently for violence, noted that "with a reputation for fighting for Arab civil rights in the territories, I am a special object of hatred. My work makes the Arabs into human beings, while the policy of the radical right is to dehumanize and demonize them."

It is fear and a serious erosion of self-confidence, Tzuqer believes, that are at least partially to blame for the recent violence against Arabs. He recalls the crowd's insistence outside his home that "the Arabs are murdering us one by one!"

"What a ludicrous sense of weakness that betrays; it takes us back to the times when we were a minority and not the sovereign rulers, to the times when we were weak ghetto Jews at the mercy of the pogromist mob!

"The fears are apparently stronger today than ever before in our 40 years of statehood, perhaps because we are a less-cohesive, far more deeply divided society.

"The attacks on Shamir and on Peres weaken the most basic symbols of state sovereignty," he says.

The big change, he believes came with the intifadah and the deep erosion of Israeli national self-confidence that it has produced.

"For the first time, and right on our own doorstep, we are up against a problem that people feel we cannot solve."

For Tzuqer, too, the response from the country's political leadership has been far too dismally muted to have any effect. The politicians, and the president, have to lay it on the line and state quite unequivocally that no violence will be tolerated, he says.

What can be done to combat the violence?

Shinuy leader Amnon Rubinstein believes that there is sufficient legislation on the statute books, but it must be more often and more vigorously invoked: the law against racism has only been used once, he points out, and that case too is still hanging fire before the courts. Beyond the Green Line he suggests that Kach members be disarmed of what he notes with irony are the very "weapons that the IDF [Israel Defense Force] has given them."

A political solution is the only viable answer, all five agreed.

Leibowitz put it simply and strongly: The violence will stop only if the government has the will to relinquish the territories and make peace.

Sprinzak believes that even the start of negotiations would offer the hope needed to put an end to violence.

But Lisak is less optimistic. The start of peace negotiations, he fears, may even be met by an increase in violence. That possibility should not be underestimated and the government must gird itself to take prompt action to nip it in the bud.

Rubinstein proposes that until some permanent solution is found - and he believes it must be partition - there should be an interim policy of gradual and partial separation between Israel and the territories that will minimize the areas of friction and violence between Jews and Arabs.

"Jews must not be allowed to enter Arab villages in the West Bank, while the Palestinians of the territories will have to acquire visas if they want to enter Israel. Dayan's open-bridges policies are bankrupt. It's good fences that may make good neighbours."

There is all but unanimous agreement that civil war a la Spain or certain Latin American countries is not a serious likelihood.

But Lisak discerns the existence of some disturbing elements that - under extreme circumstances such as a bloody war with heavy casualties, a forced withdrawal from the territories, or a deep economic crisis - could lead to violent clashes with the organs of the state. "It would be a case of Yamit writ large and much more serious," he says.

He cautions against the continued existence and even strengthening of that ideological-theological base which inspired the Jewish terror underground. An embryonic

organization - the armed settlers - exists. There is motivation, too. And finally, extreme right-wing groups are not isolated. They enjoy the sympathy of some politicians and of various elite groups. They are still within the national consensus.

But fortunately, Lisak concurs, these extremist groups are still small and the majority within Gush Emunim still abhor fratricidal war. The catastrophe of Second Temple civil strife still echoes in their ears.

Editorial Considers Baker, PLO, U.S. Policy
44000582b Jerusalem *THE JERUSALEM POST*
in English 30 Jun 89 pp 4, 9

[Editorial by Dore Gold, director of the U.S. Foreign and Defence Policy Project at the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University: "Secretary Baker's PLO Fixation"]

[Text] A momentary tranquility has set into the U.S.-Israeli relationship since Secretary of State James Baker gave his controversial "even-handed" talk at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (Aipac) policy conference in Washington on 22 May. Certainly, Baker and his State Department have become extremely careful about further comments on the peace process until after the Likud Central Committee finishes its deliberations next week.

But looming beyond the present lull is a probable clash between Israel and the Bush administration over the ultimate direction in which the peace process ought to move. At the heart of their disagreement is the potential role of the PLO as the current Israeli initiative unfolds. Already this week, the United States was reported to have quietly attempted to upgrade the level of discussions in a meeting in Tunis between Ambassador Robert Pelletreau and 'Arafat's deputy, Salah Khalaf (Abu-Iyad).

The overall policy of the Bush-Baker team on the PLO is very different from that of the Reagan-Shultz team in its last month in office.

First of all, the U.S.-PLO dialogue appeared to be a great deal more fragile when it was instituted by former Secretary of State Shultz. Reagan himself was quoted after the dialogue began as saying that, if PLO terrorism persisted, the United States would cut all connection with the organization.

Subsequently, the former Under-Secretary of State Michael Armacost, appearing on "Face the Nation" on 18 December, detailed the previous administration's doctrine on PLO terrorism:

"If terrorism persists and they're accountable for it, then we would be unable to move forward in our dialogue; if attacks occur, and it appears the responsibility of

elements that are close to the PLO, we would expect him [Arafat] to denounce them, to disassociate from them, certainly to expel any elements that are involved in this from the PLO."

Bush and Baker have refused to define what sort of action the PLO might take that would lead to a break in the dialogue. In fact, precisely when the attempted incursions by PLO constituent organizations into Israel from Lebanon began multiplying during February and March, Baker hinted that the United States was prepared to move forward in the dialogue, suggesting that the PLO might become Israel's eventual interlocutor.

President Bush himself, in a White House press conference on 7 March, seemed to be saying it was important that Arafat did not condone terrorist acts, tepidly adding, "to the degree terroristic acts are condoned, it doesn't help the dialogue."

Privately, lower-level officials were saying that the Israeli army was an important factor in maintaining the U.S.-PLO dialogue; that had the IDF not succeeded in intercepting infiltrators and they had caused a bloodbath in a moshav or kibbutz in the North, then the United States would face a difficult diplomatic dilemma.

With no disincentive for halting cross-border attacks, out of 18 attempted infiltrations since Arafat's 14 December 1988 renunciation of terrorism, it is little wonder that PLO constituent groups (PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine], DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine], PLF [Palestine Liberation Front]-Tal'at Ya'qub) have been involved in 12 of them. Fatah's last attempted operation from Lebanon was on 12 November, though some Fatah involvement had been noted in an attack on an IDF [Israel Defense Force] barracks in Rafiah on 10 March.

A second major difference between the policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations involving the PLO has to do with how the organization becomes a party in the peace process.

Last December, Shultz's State Department spokesman, Charles Redman, carefully clarified the point that "the question of which parties participate in negotiations is not for the United States to decide unilaterally."

Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance has recounted in his memoirs that in August 1977, when he was attempting to open a U.S.-PLO dialogue through the Saudis, he warned his Saudi hosts that he could not guarantee PLO participation at a Geneva peace conference as that was a matter which, according to U.S. treaty obligations, would require Israel approval.

Israel has clearly indicated its willingness to have a Palestinian interlocutor in that part of its initiative that calls for electing a Palestinian negotiating team among the Palestinians residing in the territories.

Point One of Prime Minister Shamir's four-point plan that calls for a renewed commitment to the Camp David process is also relevant in this regard. The Camp David agreements show a clear preference for a Palestinian settlement based on the "inside" Palestinians of the territories rather than the "outside" PLO.

In the paragraphs dealing with negotiations for an interim self-governing authority, Camp David conceives of negotiations between Israel and either Egyptian or Jordanian delegations that may include Palestinians from the territories; but regarding "other Palestinians"—that is to say, those from outside the territories—Camp David requires the prior approval of all the parties, including Israel.

On 15 March, in testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Secretary Baker appeared to be going along with the Israeli preference for a Palestinian interlocutor. Referring to an Israel-Arab peace he said: "If that can be accomplished through a dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians in the occupied territories, that would be, of course, a preferred approach."

Of course, Baker subsequently stated that if such a process did not work, negotiations between Israel and the PLO could not be ruled out. That, of course, led Israeli officials to say that, by even proposing an Israeli-PLO dialogue, the United States was precluding an Israeli-local Palestinian dialogue.

By the time of Mr Baker's Aipac speech, the distinction between the PLO and local Palestinians in the territories had completely disappeared. After telling Israel what it had "to lay aside," Baker turned to the Palestinians, calling on them to renounce the "policy of phases" (addressed to the PLO); not to distort international organizations (also aimed at the PLO); to amend the Palestine Covenant (again the PLO); and finally, to convert the intifada into diplomacy (directed to either the PLO or the Palestinians of the territories).

About one month later, on 19 June, Dan Kurtzer, a Baker adviser on the State Department's policy planning staff, was asked at a conference of the National Association of Arab Americans whether the United States would support the return of the Palestinians' deported leaders—some of whom are now leading figures in the PLO—in connection with the election proposal.

Kurtzer gave the following reply: "We've said often in public that our intention is not to divide the Palestinian community, and we will not associate with efforts by others to do so."

The upshot of these trends is that, whereas Israel sees its election proposal as a means of excluding the PLO from the peace process, the United States is interested in marrying its dialogue with the PLO and the election

proposal. Both are pursuing very different strategies, which could lead to considerable discord as the details of the election proposal are worked out.

Besides the issue of deported leaders and their possible role, there is the question of whether elected Palestinians might later join the Palestine National Council. The further upgrading of the dialogue, like the Pelletreau-Abu-Iyad meetings reported this week, can be expected as the PLO indicates a readiness to give a green light to the Palestinians of the territories to start the election process.

The ultimate cause of the difference of view between the United States and Israel is that while the United States is currently process-oriented—looking at how its dialogue can be used to advance the election idea—Israel is end-product oriented, concerned that American concessions in the dialogue might prejudice the nature of the final status of the territories by creating guarantees that will assure the emergence of a PLO-controlled state.

Israel's position, should these fundamental disagreements break into the open, is far from hopeless.

Baker's commitment to his PLO strategy is not grounded in a declared "Baker Plan," leaving him room to alter his approach without sacrificing his reputation. While it is difficult for Israeli officials to convince their American counterparts that non-PLO Palestinians, other than fundamentalists, exist in the territories, the notion that the basic interests of the Palestinians here can be met by Israel, while those of the PLO's refugee constituency cannot, is very persuasive.

Most of all, even with Baker's PLO fixation, it is highly unlikely that the Bush administration, which adopts such a cautious approach to the Soviet Union and the preservation of points of Western strength, is interested in a process that will lead to the insertion of Fatah's Soviet-trained security apparatus into the heart of the territories.

No less a person than Dennis Ross, the State Department's policy planning director, on 14 June noted the dangers that an independent Palestinian state might pose to Jordan, not just to Israel.

But for Israel to influence American diplomacy on this sort of issue, it will not only have to remain on the diplomatic offensive, but also begin to address the parameters of a final-status settlement in discussions with Washington.

Presently, it is more comfortable to avoid reference to the final-status issue because of the differences between American and Israeli positions. But by avoiding it, Israel may be forced into accepting American procedural concessions to the PLO that will have a direct impact on the possible end-product that looms ahead.

JORDAN

10 Percent of Workforce Reported Unemployed 44000588a Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 28 Jun 89 p 3

[Article: "Unemployment Stands at 10 percent of Workforce"]

[Text] Amman (J.T.)—Unemployment in Jordan now stands at the rate of 10 per cent of the total volume of the national workforce, creating a serious problem for the Kingdom which, unlike other Arab states, relies mainly on its skilled manpower as a major source of national income, according to Muhammad 'Asfur, chairman of the Federation of Jordanian Chambers of Commerce (FJCC).

Growing unemployment in the country is bound to weaken the national economy and stem attempts to increase national revenues which, in turn, can only adversely affect Jordan politically, socially and economically, 'Asfur said in a statement published by AL-RA'Y Arabic daily.

Unemployment in Jordan, he noted, is due to external and internal forces which the government and all concerned authorities are trying to deal with at the moment.

A decline in the oil revenues of Gulf states which normally employ a good number of Jordanian skilled manpower has led to a drop in demand on Jordanian workers, and also caused the Gulf states to reduce their imports of Jordanian products, 'Asfur pointed out.

On the domestic front, 'Asfur said, the great increase in the number of university graduates especially doctors and engineers, and the limited areas where they can be absorbed, has aggravated the unemployment problem in the Kingdom.

He said that certain measures should be taken and patience is needed in handling this problem.

'Asfur proposed the following measures to be taken to help deal with the problem:-

- A reexamination of educational policies with a view to directing students towards specialisations in great demand here and abroad. Students, he said, could be advised against studying engineering or medicine for which the chance of employment is very grim.
- Giving more attention to cooperation with Arab countries, especially those members of the Arab Cooperation Council, in the field of industrialisation which can create jobs and reduce dependence on foreign products, thus saving a lot of foreign exchange.
- Directing more attention towards improving the tourism industry in Jordan. Tourism is the second major

foreign exchange earner for Jordan after the transfers of expatriates, 'Asfur noted.

- Giving the Jordanian private sector a greater role in economic activity.
- Providing more support and assistance to the agricultural sector which can absorb a greater number of workers.
- Introducing measures designed to bolster the country's economic, financial and monetary systems, a move which is bound to encourage investments and create more jobs.
- Selecting the most appropriate technology that can be of use in the country and which can promote industrial production and improve the quality of goods produced by Jordanian workers.

Private University for Expatriates To Open Next January

44000588b Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English
6 Jul 89 p 5

[Article: "Jordanian University"]

[Text] Amman, July 3 (Kuna): The private university which was approved during the 4th conference of Jordanian expatriates will open its doors for applicants starting next January, it was officially announced here today.

An official source at the Labour Ministry said that the \$12.5 million university project is now in its final stages.

The source noted that 60 per cent of the total costs have been covered until now from Jordanians in Kuwait, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman.

KUWAIT

Law Amendments Allow Expatriates To Own Property

44000589b Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English
3 Jul 89 p 1

[Article by Khalid Ahmad: "Expats Might Own Property"]

[Excerpt] The new amendments of the Commercial Law, approved by the cabinet yesterday will allow non-Kuwaitis to indirectly own property and assets in Kuwait, a Kuwaiti economic expert said.

Head of al-Shal Consultants Bureau, Jasim al-Sa'dun said that the new amendments are designed to allow non-Kuwaitis to invest their money in investment funds.

He added, the action also aims at increasing the amount of liquidity that can be invested in the local market. The new measures will result in increasing the demand for assets and will raise their value, he said.

But al-Sa'dun expressed the belief that the effect of such amendments will be limited and temporary as the estimated amount of cash available with non-Kuwaitis is not large enough.

He expected its effect to be only psychological for a limited period and may result in a slight increase in the value of some local assets. He added that the problem is the lack of investment opportunities in the local market and the small returns.

He added that there is plenty of cash available with the Kuwaiti investors themselves, but they prefer to invest their funds outside Kuwait. He stressed that the essence of the problem is the limited availability of investment channels in the local market and the weakness in the administration of local companies.

Al-Sa'dun said that the new amendments have been prepared for issuing the necessary laws to establish the investment funds. The laws on these funds are already with the Council of Ministers. Al-Sa'dun expected that all these laws may be issued together to represent a government plan concerning the local market.

Meanwhile, a senior financial source said that the new amendments aim in the first place to solve problems that took place recently in the local market. He said that exchange companies and banks dealing with foreign currency and shares and gold according to the "options" system resulted in some losses and cases were filed in the courts, involving non-Kuwaiti investors.

He added that as the law does not allow non-Kuwaitis to invest in such deals, the new amendments are intended to solve this abnormal position. The source added that the new amendments are also considered an important way for the introduction in the near future of the financial and real estate investment funds.

The new amendments to the commercial law will allow non-Kuwaitis to deposit their money with Kuwaiti banks and investment companies, demanding it be invested in a particular project or in the stock market, meaning thereby, allowing non-Kuwaitis to indirectly own property in Kuwait. The new amendments will become effective after being issued in an Amiri decree. [passage omitted]

Port Director Describes 5-Year Development Plan, Loss of Premier Port Status

44000589c Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English
2 Jul 89 p 6

[Text] Acting Director of Planning and Research at the Public Ports Authority, Basil al-Naqib ruled out the possibility that Kuwait will regain its position as the main commercial centre in sea transportation. He attributed this to the fact that many ports have come up in the

region and they are well equipped to provide better facilities in dealing with ships. Al-Naqib admitted that the Iraq-Iran war has greatly affected the business of Kuwaiti ports.

But he said that the next five-year development plan includes the setting up of an advanced commercial centre in Kuwait, capable of attracting merchants from all over the world. He said that the total allocations to the projects of the ports authority during the current five-year plan amounts to 47 million Kuwaiti dinars and among the main projects is the construction of a huge 30,000 square metre administrative complex for Shuwaykh Port. The cost of the project is 9 million Kuwaiti dinars and is expected to be completed in May next year.

Advanced

Among the main projects in the current plan, is the establishment of a building for marine operations to be supplied with an advanced operation room that will govern the movement of ships and will be linked with control towers in some other ports in the country. A fully equipped health centre will also be constructed to offer medical services to sailors and others at Shuwaykh port. Al-Naqib said that among projects tabled for the next fiscal year is the re-organisation of a major store at Shuwaykh Port to store dangerous materials that need special handling. He added that the marine operations building will be completed in November this year and will include six towers each of 55 metres high to control ship movements at the port.

Al-Naqib said that a free trade zone is planned during the second five-year plan 90/91-94/95. The total financial allocations for port projects during the period of the plan is 15 million Kuwaiti dinars. He said that the free trade zone will be established in response to the government's intention to promote free trading. A number of important projects, will also be carried out at Shu'aybah port, the official added.

Al-Naqib said that the performance of the Public Ports Authority has picked up recently. He added that imports through Kuwaiti ports increased to 5.6 million tons last year, compared to 4.7 million in the previous year, an increase of 21 percent. He added that exports also went up by 15 percent in 1988 compared to 1987. The total exports in 1988 were 1.6 million tons compared to 1.4 million in 1987. Also, the number of arriving containers increased from 200,000 containers in 1987 to 220,000 containers in 1988, an increase of 10 percent. He said that accordingly, authority revenues shot up to 25.4 million Kuwaiti dinars in 1988 compared to 21.5 million Kuwaiti dinars in 1987, recording an 18 percent increase. A big portion of the revenues was diverted to development projects, al-Naqib said.

Diversion

Speaking of the influence of Iraq-Iran, al-Naqib said that a major portion of the transit trade that used to pass through Kuwaiti ports to both Iraq and Iran before the war, have now been diverted to other ports in the region. He said that most of the Iraqi goods now come through the Jordanian port of 'Aqabah from where a huge fleet of trucks carries the goods to Iraq. At the same time, Iran has been using, almost exclusively, the Dubayy port for its imports. Al-Naqib added that other ports in the region have greatly developed during the war and a number of agreements were also held, increasing their role in sea transportation. For that it is difficult to restore Kuwait's position that existed before the war, particularly in transit trading.

He denied that the reason for this was an increase of charges at Kuwaiti ports or lack of modern equipment and other facilities. He stressed that the restoration of goods flow to Kuwaiti ports is no more linked to development of its services, as all modern equipment and facilities are available at Kuwaiti ports. He added that the authority makes contacts with international specialised marine organisations to obtain experts and consultants to contribute to modernisation at the country's ports.

Report of Petroleum Corporation, Projects Worldwide

44000589a Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English
5 Jul 89 p 11

[Text] Kuwait, July 4 (OPECNA)—The Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Company (KUFPEC) scored notable successes in countries across the world during the year ended June 30, 1988.

The annual report of the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) for 1987-88 lists the main projects undertaken by the subsidiary in association with national and international companies in Asia, Africa and Australia. Among them:

Indonesia—Studies on the development of the "Anoa" field were continued with the eventual aim of making it productive in 1990. KUFPEC spudded its first exploratory well on Seram island in June 1988. An appraisal well at the site of a future platform in the "Camar" field was to have been spudded in late 1988. Production is expected this year.

Pakistan—KUFPEC completed the seismic survey of 1,176 km in the country's "Tajjal" area. The second phase was to begin in August 1988 with the first well scheduled for drilling this year.

South Yemen—KUFPEC acquired an exploratory permit for an area stretching over 2,050 km east of "Shabwa," completing the necessary seismic work. The first drilling location will be chosen this year.

China—KUFPEC continued its negotiations with the Chinese government following its oil discovery at "Ya Cheng 13-1."

KUFPEC is also planning new joint ventures in Syria, Vietnam and Thailand.

Australia—Although KUFPEC's three-well programme in 1987 was unsuccessful, it began and was continuing a four-well programme as the year ended. The company is also planning additional acquisitions and is confident of forming a new joint-venture group in some of the offshore areas. It is also interested in buying reserves. It has continued gas production from the "Amadeus" basin, while producing small quantities of oil from the "Eromanga" basin.

Africa (Congo)—KUFPEC tested the offshore "Yombo" oil well for production rates of up to 2,000 BPD. A five-well evaluation programme was also begun during the year and if the results are positive, the Congolese government is expected to grant an extension of three years to the company.

Egypt—KUFPEC increased its interest in the exploitation permit given to it for the "Amal" area in the Gulf of Suez. During the year, the first of the three wells planned was completed. Production was scheduled to start by the end of 1988. A new concession agreement for a block in the western desert was ready for signing as the financial year drew to a close.

Tunisia—Although KUFPEC struck the first wildcat well in a four-well exploratory programme, it was abandoned because it only showed gas. An extension permit was granted to the company and drilling has been resumed since.

Algeria—KUFPEC is planning a joint venture with OPEC member Algeria, but no details have so far emerged.

In the United States, the Kuwait-owned Santa Fe International Corporation continued its oil and gas exploration activities through its specialised operating group of companies. Some of them were:

Santa Fe Minerals—Improving oil prices gave the company a much-needed fillip, resulting in the implementation of several programmes which had to be postponed because of the weak market. This included the development of the "Miller" field in the North Sea. The company, which also carries out exploration and production of oil and gas in the USA and the UK, achieved a production rate of 31.9 million BPD of crude oil equivalent.

It continued its involvement in gas transmission and gas processing facilities in the US state of Oklahoma, besides operating an electricity generating company in north California, utilizing geothermal steam.

The company concentrated during the year on the development of gas fields discovered in the Gulf of Mexico and the United States. Production was to begin this year.

Santa Fe Drilling Company—Because of rising oil prices, the company was able to resume its activities internationally. During the year, seven drilling rigs that had been rendered non-operational due to low oil prices were returned to the company's fleet of working rigs.

It also initiated several capital-expenditure projects for improving the efficiency of its drilling rigs in Egypt, Venezuela, Nigeria and the UK. It also purchased an jack-up rig and ordered a second one, to be delivered later this year. Two new land rigs were committed for construction under a four-year contract in Oman.

Santa Fe Braun—The company, also benefiting from improved oil prices, won new engineering assignments, including a contract for expanding a crude oil pipeline from the east to the west of Saudi Arabia.

It also managed to gain two contracts for detailed engineering and procurement of two ethylene plants in Texas, each with a capacity of 680,000 tonnes per year. It was also involved in the modernization of Kuwait's Mina' Abdallah Refinery and another KPC refining facility in Europort, the Netherlands.

Planning, Obstacles for al-Shu'aybah Industry Described

44040441 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 21 May p 7

[Interview with Nasir al-'Ajil, deputy director general of financial and administrative affairs in the al-Shu'aybah Area Public Administration, by Salim al-'Ajami; date and place not specified; first four paragraphs are AL-WATAN introduction]

[Excerpt] Nasir al-'Ajil, deputy director general of financial and administrative affairs of the al-Shu'aybah Area Public Administration, said that in order to set out in earnest on the road to economic growth, an effort must be made to bring about an intrinsic change in the structure of society, from a society that limits its economic activity to providing primary materials and opportunities for consumption into a society that is able to benefit from the sources of its national wealth and effectively participate in international trade.

In an exclusive interview with AL-WATAN, al-'Ajil cited the obstacles with which the al-Shu'aybah Area Public Administration has been faced and still is, such as: the noticeable delay in the issuance of the sought after decree which would again raise the level of the administration to that of a public authority for the industrial areas; the lack of a clear plan for an industrialization strategy in the country; the lack of consistency in the

plans of companies existing in the area; in addition to the lack of additional benefits for those working in the public administration compared to other companies operating in the area.

Al-'Ajil stressed the importance of training, describing it as an effective weapon in the progress of the development process. As such, the public administration has already begun to lay the cornerstone for training in it, inasmuch as it has established a training section and given it the means for success, and it has also formed a training committee to take care of drawing up policies and setting up training plans for Kuwaiti workers in the public administration.

He said that the al-Shu'aybah Area Administration, through the integrated infrastructure of industrial services and facilities and its attentive and prudent administration in the al-Shu'aybah industrial area, has provided the most important elements for attracting and encouraging industrial companies and projects to come to and settle in this area. After its first quarter century we rightly consider al-Shu'aybah to be an outstanding model area. Herein follows the text of the interview.

[AL-WATAN] What services does the public administration offer to the al-Shu'aybah area?

[Al-'Ajil] Motivated by its goals to develop the area and set up a model industrial area, the administration provides many services and facilities. These may either be direct, such as allocating lots for long term goals and others for temporary use purposes, providing sea water for refrigeration and fire fighting, road services, and monitoring air and water pollution; or they may be provided in cooperation with other parties such as electrical energy, gas fuel, distilled and fresh water, health services, and weather and sea observations.

Positive Impact of the Projects

[AL-WATAN] What social and economic importance does the administration's projects have?

[Al-'Ajil] In order to set out in earnest along the road to economic growth, an effort much be made to bring about an intrinsic change in the structure of society, by changing it from a society that limits its economic activity to providing primary materials and opportunities for consumption into a society that is able to benefit from the sources of its national wealth and to participate effectively in world economic trade. One of the most important activities that must be carried out in the developing nations is planning in order to achieve balance and coordination between economic and social advancement. That is because the path to development is not limited to improving production fields, discovering more resources and diversifying sources of national income. Attention must also be paid to the human aspect and developing social services in order to realize desired social and economic goals.

The public administration has prepared scientific studies and implemented some projects to serve the expanded al-Shu'aybah industrial area. The positive effects of these projects have extended to Kuwait and the Gulf region in general. The importance of these projects is apparent and they have the obvious benefit of lowering the cost of shipping raw materials from outside of Kuwait for existing industries, and reducing the cost of shipping produced goods from the established industries and others to world markets. The public administration accomplished that by greatly expanding the commercial port and petroleum products dock, and completing a modern container station before turning the supervision and administration of the port over to the public port establishment. That helped to speed up loading and unloading operations, increase the safety of the goods, and reduce human effort in cargo operations. The administration has also provided some basic services such as supplying the needs of existing industrial firms for sea water for refrigeration, and natural gas, and lowering the costs of shipping these benefits by establishing networks and extending transport lines. The administration has facilitated means of transport and movement within the area by developing infrastructure requirements. It has accomplished this by building roads, connecting industries to one another and to some of the important facilities, and equipping the lots and furnishing the area with various benefits so as to receive and settle new industries. It combats, limits, and reduces air and water pollution by intensifying environmental monitoring operations so as to preserve natural resources and the health, safety, and continuity of human life in a way that ensures growth and comfort, and absorbs the by-products of industrial development. It improves work conditions in the various industries for individuals and groups by providing and facilitating public services. It provides protection and security for the established industries by establishing fire fighting systems, dams to protect against floods, drainage systems for rainwater and for industries, and sewers. It also conducts studies on security. It opens up new areas of work so as to employ graduates, technicians, and the Kuwaiti labor force, and it prepares and trains them through local training programs, and upgrades their skills levels by sending them abroad to learn about the latest developments in their fields of specialization.

It is clear from all of this that the public administration's projects aim for the best. Their goal is to keep up with current events and developments in modern science and technology, and to create a generation of skilled manufacturers, technicians, and workers who could help to expand existing industries by raising their production and technical level in order to build a firm industrial base. This would increase this sector's participation in social and economic development plans as well as increase the national income.

Obstacles

[AL-WATAN] What are the most important obstacles which confront the al-Shu'aybah Area Public Administration?

[Al-'Ajl] We have already faced, and are still facing, several difficulties and obstacles in the administration and development of the al-Shu'aybah industrial area. One we might mention by way of example: a noticeable delay in the issuance of the sought after decree that would again raise the level of the "al-Shu'aybah Area Public Administration" to that of the "al-Shu'aybah Area Public Authority." This would give it broader authority befitting the heavy burdens which it takes on, and would give it the flexibility to make decisions on pressing matters at the appropriate time. Another obstacle is the lack of a clear industrialization strategy in the country. This means that information is lacking on the numbers and kinds of industries that are expected or planned to be established in the area. This affects the policies of settling and the volume of industrial services and facilities—projects which are to be studied and implemented according to well studied programs with the knowledge of the al-Shu'aybah Area Public Administration. Next there is the lack of clarity or constancy in the plans of the companies existing in the area, something which makes it impossible for the administration to complete or to do proper studies on them. In fact, this hampers the implementation of its projects to provide the demanded services and benefits, or leads to the failure to meet implementation programs, which has a negative impact on the integration of programs linked to one another. Finally, those working in the public administration do not now get the extra benefits that they should in order that they be kept as employees, while many material and non-material benefits are available to corresponding workers in the area's companies.

Training the Cadres

[AL-WATAN] What is the public administration's strategy for training and qualifying national cadres for leadership positions?

[Al-'Ajl] Training is an effective weapon in the progress of the development process in various fields. It is essential to development, both in the administrative and technical fields, because of the far-reaching impact that it has on the abilities, skills, behavior and orientation of the labor force. While the state may now be convinced of the importance of training, as evidenced by the "Sector of Administrative Training and Development" office, the public administration has already begun to lay the cornerstone for its own training, inasmuch as it has established a section for training and provided it with the means to succeed. It has also formed a training committee to take care of drawing up policies and laying down plans for training Kuwaiti workers in the public administration. It has given training a central position so as to do the job itself: training within the public administration. One of the most important strategies of training in the public administration is seeing that all Kuwaiti workers who need training get it. Moreover, training represents one of the mainstays in the process of Kuwaitization, since here when an employee first takes a job in the public administration he is given "introductory

training." Then his training continues whether in the technical area or the administrative one until his employment ends. In this manner the employee is able to learn about changes relating to his job, from the practical and scientific aspects, and thus to acquaint himself with all that is new relating to this job. One of the administration's strategies in this field is developing its training center so that in the future it will be able to train technical and administrative cadres in various activities to ensure that the training process will go on, and to avoid the obstacles and problems which could threaten the course of training done outside of the framework of the public administration. This is particularly important because the administration runs 90 percent of its training courses through local training establishments "within Kuwait." Through its 88/89 training plan, the public administration has been able to train close to 68 percent of all its Kuwaiti employees having university credentials or higher.

Attracting and Encouraging the Investor

[AL-WATAN] What has the public administration offered to attract and encourage the industrial investor to establish himself in the area?

[Al-'Ajl] The public administration, through the integrated infrastructure of industrial services and facilities that it has set up in the al-Shu'aybah industrial area, and its attentive and prudent administration, has provided the most important elements of attracting and encouraging industrial projects and companies to come and establish themselves in this area. We rightly consider this area to be an outstanding model area after its first quarter century. It is a well organized area, with a system and well defined priorities and steps for settling industries in it, and it provides the appropriate environmental, security, and industrial benefits and services. It has prepared lots, roads, fences, and systems for water, electricity, gas, drainage, lighting, fire-fighting, and wired and wireless communications and mail. It has health and environmental services, police, security, guard, civil defense services, banking services, national banks, airlines, and weather observation. It has mosques for the performance of prayers and Islamic rites; and within it lies the al-Shu'aybah port with its various facilitations for import and export and customs services. This is in addition to the services provided by the public administration pertaining to industrial security and safety, public relations, statistics and data, information, etc.

It might be mentioned that the public administration offers prepared industrial and nonindustrial lots as well as other industrial services, directly and indirectly, in exchange for credit payments or token prices that almost represent the cost.

The public administration also has an office that does feasibility studies and research, and evaluates projects and offers industrial and engineering consulting to investors and project owners who want to establish themselves in the area. [passage omitted]

MOROCCO

Istiqlal Party Uncovers Negative Aspects of Local Taxes

45040397 Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 28 Jun 89 p 4

[Article: "Istiqlal Group for Unity and Equality Uncovers Negative Social, Legal and Fiscal Aspects of Government Bill on Local Taxes"]

[Text]

Bill Studied Under Inconvenient Circumstances

I am honored to express the opinion of the Istiqlal Group for Unity and Equality on this bill which concerns reforming the system of taxes payable to local governments and their agencies. Before I embark on the crux of the issue, I must give a reminder of the inconvenient circumstances under which this bill has been studied—circumstances characterized by unfavorable time pressure. The bill has been studied with a great haste that does not befit its material and moral value. It is a bill closely tied to the progress of democracy and to providing the means to achieve local development. It would have behooved us to study the bill deliberately and carefully and to give it its due consideration so that it may befit and be conducive to the function for which it is created instead of tying it to certain events that exerted pressure and made it necessary to issue it at this particular time, keeping in mind that the government procrastinated for more than 5 years in presenting it. The bill was supposed to be presented immediately following the framework [itar] law of April 1984 in which the government pledged to present a form that guarantees financial resources for the local governments and that seeks to enhance and stabilize these resources in accordance with the collective of 1976.

In Istiqlal Party, We Defended Credibility and Powers of Local Governments and Providing Them With Means

We in the Istiqlal Party view local governments as the main brick in building and strengthening the representative institutions and the first cell in achieving decentralization, considering that they are the ideal framework through and within which the citizens exercise their constitutional rights and oversee all the requirements of local development which ultimately flows into the national economic development current generally.

This is why from the beginning, we in the Istiqlal Party have constantly demanded:

First, that the local councils emanate from the voters' free will and remotely from all manifestations of forgery and all kinds of material and moral pressure so that they may enjoy the credibility required by the citizens.

Second, that legislative provisions be issued to give the councils the powers that befit their economically, socially and politically vital role.

Third, that they be given the material means that enable them to perform the developmental role they are required to perform.

Because we believe that the failure to respond to the first demand which is the rejection to falsify the citizens' will is the biggest flaw from which the local councils suffer, we re-emphasize that this negative aspect must be overcome in the coming phases so that we may restore to the citizens their trust in the elected institutions, considering that the voters' trust is the biggest asset and the strongest support on which the local councils can lean.

As for powers, we truly consider the 30 September 1976 decree an important gain for local democracy because it represents a significant qualitative leap in giving councils the power of decision-making in most areas. But the actual practice has exposed numerous violations and excesses which contradict and which are incompatible with the spirit of the legislation. This has practically prevented producing the positive results sought by the decree.

Regarding resources, the House of Representatives previously approved allocating 30 percent of the value-added tax for the local governments. Despite the significance of the financial cover represented by this percentage, most local governments have continued to be denied it, not to mention the flaw engulfing the method of distribution which aroused at the national level numerous questions that were the subject of the meetings held to discuss the topics of the hour during the last session. If this law was issued to bolster the local governments by giving them very significant new resources, then we draw attention to the need to learn from the mistakes of the past and the need to respect the spirit of the provision and the noble goals of the law in actual practice, whether by the local government heads or by the authority in charge, so that the law provisions may produce their desired positive results and may not be devoided of their content, thus paralyzing local development at the various levels.

Measures That Undermine Housing, Private Education, Conventional Industry, Trade and Transportation; Bill With No Social Vision

From a preliminary reading of the bill, the reader can conclude the following:

On the positive side, we do not deny that this bill combines fees and taxes, unifies prices and tariffs nationally and simplifies their scale. The bill also offers new sources that are capable of providing additional financial revenues to the local governments.

On the negative side, the bill is extremely serious. If we examine its various sections, especially those defining the financial revenues, we find that they strain the citizen who is the main source of these revenues. Thus, the bill's social vision is obliterated and the citizen becomes the captive of financial obligations beyond his capacity whenever he needs a service offered by the local government or needs to acquire a license or a permit.

The bill's main concern is to seek revenues, to determine their value and to impose exorbitant fees without consideration for the negative consequences it will generate in the social field—consequences of which we will note the following in particular:

First, individual housing and reducing tin-shack towns: The levying of 30 dirhams as a maximum for every square meter of housing an individual plans to build for his family is a severe blow which the toiling class, a class that seeks to own its housing so as to rid itself of the rent inflation whose terrible increase knows no limit, will not withstand.

This step will further proliferate and spread, rather than reduce, the shantytowns. Moreover, it is incompatible with the statement of aspirations which the government presented when the plan was debated and in which it expressed its determination to eliminate the shantytowns and to encourage industry, trade, and free crafts. This is what motivated us to present an amendment which we consider reasonable because it takes into account the presence of a financial source and does not harm the citizens generally. But the government and its majority have rejected this amendment.

Second, the levying of fees on private educational institutions without taking into account the negative consequences these fees will generate, whether in terms of the creation of private educational institutions or in terms of diverting these fees to the citizens who will inevitably pay them in registration and schooling costs. This is incompatible with the positive role which private education of all kinds plays in alleviating the government burden and in rendering a fundamental service which the government should make available to all citizens.

Moreover, these fees may discourage investors and make them turn from the field of education and learning on which these fees have been levied to other more secure fields producing a reasonable profit. This will have negative consequences in the employment area.

Instead of contributing to absorbing the unemployed intellectuals and university graduates, this bill will create unemployment among educators employed in the private sector because some institutes will experience a drop in enrollment as a result of the heavy burden shouldered by student parents and guardians in the form of fees and taxes generally—a burden that will make it difficult to pursue private education. This will have its

obvious impact on education generally which is deteriorating tangibly at the instructional and administrative levels. In accordance with our vision of private education and of the positive role it plays in absorbing surplus students and in alleviating the public education's burden, we demanded that these fees be abolished totally. Regrettably, the government and its majority have rejected the demand.

The third negative social aspect is that the bill saddles conventional craftsmen who work in the field of rug making with new fees added to the fees they currently pay. The government has not taken into consideration the numerous problems experienced by this sector, embodied fundamentally in the high cost of production materials. Moreover, the segment working in this sector is one of the poorest segments of craftsmen generally.

This is why the government should have accepted our amendment and should have omitted this section in order to encourage conventional craftsmen.

The fourth negative aspect of the bill is connected with levying fees for the license to operate taxicabs and public transport buses. The negative nature of this fee is in the fact that it increases the great tax pressure on this sector which has begun to die because those working in it cannot earn incomes that enable them to meet their tax obligations. This has caused numerous public transport buses to stop operating and it will inevitably lead to the deterioration of the transport services and to increasing their cost. This will in turn cause the citizens, transport operators and the class working in this sector numerous problems. During the general debates in the specialized committee, we tried to convince the government and its majority to omit the articles connected with transport generally, but to no avail.

Most Levied Taxes Strain Citizens With Financial Obligations; Our Amendments Serve Local Government Revenues But They Have Been Rejected

Because we appreciate the responsibility entrusted to the local governments to provide the citizens with services at the desired level and of the effective role these governments play in developing the country, we proposed amendments that seek to create new financial resources that enhance the local governments' revenues and spare them the need of the fees that we have proposed be omitted. But we have been surprised with the rejection of a number of these amendments, keeping in mind that when we drafted them we took into account not to harm the poor and middle class of citizens. These amendments are closely tied to exploiting the country's wealth and resources.

How can non-payment of a certain percentage of the incomes earned by mine operators be explained? How can the fact that local governments and their citizens reap no benefit from the resources with which their areas abound be explained?

How can the government's refusal to let local governments get a proper recompense from the institutions that operate polluting industries in their territories in order that they may be able to at least fight pollution or alleviate it—how can this refusal be explained? How can one explain the fact that local government reaps no benefit from fees imposed on financial institutions that exploit the resources of citizens in such a local government to often set up projects in the beneficiary Morocco—how can one explain this fact while unfair fees are levied on sectors and services closely tied with citizen employment and with the citizens' urgent needs?

In these amendments, our objective was to create reasonable financial resources for local governments generally and for rural governments in particular out of our awareness of the backwardness which the countryside experiences in all spheres and areas and our awareness of the deep-rooted malady it suffers as a result of the despair that gnaws at the hearts of its citizens because the social and economic conditions are incompatible with the country's requirements, thus leading to the proliferation of unemployment and of social maladies.

Our amendments seek to establish balance between all parts of the country and to eliminate the idea of the beneficiary Morocco and the non-beneficiary Morocco.

We are always in harmony with our principles and our concepts. During the debate on the so-called action plan, we demanded that priority be given to the countryside and to developing the poor provinces.

Moral and Legal Negatives of Bill

We have pointed out the bill's social negatives hurriedly because of the shortness of time. But this shortness will not stop us from expressing our opinions on the negatives that characterize the bill morally and legally.

Some of the articles included in this bill have registered a noticeable retreat from the word and spirit of the 30 September 1976 decree which seeks to loosen the grip of the authority in charge in preparation for abolishing it in the future and of enabling the local governments to enjoy a full independence that is free of any restriction or guardianship by virtue of their being mature governments that are profoundly aware of their interests.

Despite the soundness of the amendments that we proposed in this regard and that fundamentally seek to make the bill move in the direction of the 30 September 1976 decree, the government has insisted on rejecting them, clinging to contradictory interpretations and explanations which are incompatible with the constitution. For example, when we demanded that the provincial council chairman be designated as the individual who determines the rates and tariffs for taxes and fees not included in this bill, we sought to:

First, make the text of article 6 harmonious because the article bestows this power upon the chairmen of local rural or urban governments and to local urban governments on the one hand while, on the other hand, it gives this power to the finance officer, whom the government interprets as the prefect rather than the district or province chairman.

Second, observe the word of the constitution, especially chapter 87 which defines the local governments as the urban and rural prefectures, provinces and local government and any other local government created by law and to also observe chapter 85 which states that prefects in the prefectures and provinces shall execute the resolutions of the councils of the prefectures and provinces.

In these two chapters, the constitution does not make a distinction between local governments and it confines the prefects' powers to executing the councils' resolutions generally.

Third, we have been eager to eliminate the ambiguity or the disagreement in interpretation that may engulf the phrase "finance officer" to which the government clung in the amendment which it proposed as a substitute to our amendment to article 6. Therefore, we emphasize that within the framework of harmony between the provisions of this article and the word of the constitution, what is meant by the "finance officer" is the prefecture or province council chairman, according to the two paragraphs preceding paragraph four in article 6 of the bill itself.

In an effort on our part to deepen this tendency which seeks to entrench and bolster local democracy in word and deed, we proposed amendments that aim to make the local government chairman the main authority to whom to refer appeals instead of referring them to the central authority so that the councils may shoulder their responsibility in full. But the government was careful not to respond and determined to continue its actual direct intervention in managing and solving the local governments' affairs and problems.

Amendment Against Administrative Redtape: Strange Rejection Conflicting With Royal Directive

Out of our awareness of the serious nature of the administrative redtape and of the negatives and work obstruction it entails and in an effort to encourage the administration to act decisively and to make its decisions on the citizens' applications promptly, we deemed it necessary to consider failure to make a decision within the set time limits tantamount to approval of the application so as to guarantee the citizens' rights and to protect them from the damages of procrastination.

The government's and its majority's rejection of this particular amendment is strange and unique because it came only 24 hours after announcement of the sublime royal message addressed to the prime minister, which

says in part: "It is no secret that our economy is inevitably harmed by these actions which move in a direction contrary to the direction in which we wish matters to move.

"This is why we have decided to put an end to this condition and have instructed that any dossier meeting the legal elements and containing an investment project be considered a project approved finally if the administration fails to issue a decision on it within a period of 2 months beginning as of the date of presentation of the dossier to the authorities concerned." (Here ends the text of the royal message)

In light of this sublime royal directive, the government's rejection of the amendment which we proposed in this regard and which is compatible with the sublime royal will lacks all argument and legitimacy. We proposed the amendment to eliminate and put an end to administrative redtape at the various administrative levels and in all the economic and social areas so as to safeguard the citizens' rights which are squandered by administrative laxity and fatal redtape.

We Will Abstain Abstain From Voting

Upon studying any bill or proposed law, our main concern in the Istiqlal group for Unity and Equality is to primarily seek, through the amendments we propose, the best formulas to make the bill or law compatible with our existing political, economic and social reality and responsive to the needs and aspirations of all the citizens.

While underlining the government's promise that it will make efforts, as the minister of interior has announced, to couple the text with a prelude that precedes it and becomes part of it and that incorporates the government's intention to return to the spirit of the 1976 charter and to give voters at all levels the full responsibility of managing their councils' affairs and to give priority to the poor provincial councils when distributing the added-tax revenues;

And out of our eagerness to alleviate the negatives that tarnish this bill, we have submitted to this general session amendments which we have drafted jointly with other opposition factions and parties and which we consider extremely important and a first serious step in providing the local councils with the means they need to perform their full role in the development process.

Despite what may be said about this bill by the government and its majority, we consider the bill to be incapable of meeting the citizens' aspirations and we hold those who will approve the bill in its present form responsible for the material and moral harm it may cause the citizens' interests.

Therefore, my group team will abstain from voting on it.

OMAN

Fisheries Industry Discussed

44040402 Muscat AL-WATAN in Arabic 3 Apr 89 p 3

[Interview with 'Abdallah Ibn-'Ali Ba Kathir, director general of fisheries, by Karam Sinnarah, date and place not specified;

[Text] Any economic plan wants to know the dimensions of three basic elements with all their precise details, so that he may be on solid ground when asked to get the fisheries resource sector to take a prominent position on the map of national income. These elements are the extent of the resources of the existing shores and how best to exploit them, in addition to how successful the office responsible for marketing operations is in performing its task as completely as possible.

[AL-WATAN] But where does the fishing sector in the sultanate stand in relation to these three elements?

[Ba Kathir] A complex question, and the answer must bring together more than one aspect. In spite of that we can say that the sultanate is graced with long coasts rich in many kinds of fish which enjoy tangible acceptance from consumers, both in local and world markets. It must be stressed here that these fish are not subject to factors which would drive them away, as happens at the coasts of other countries, and that is due to two reasons. The first is that the waters at these coasts are in motion and being regenerated, which means that the right environmental habitat exists for various kinds of fish. The second is that these coasts are clean and far from any source of pollution, which provides the right environment for the nurturing and breeding of fish.

[AL-WATAN] But regarding how best to exploit the diverse fisheries resources which these shores contain, it must be mentioned that the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries provides all the faculties and facilitations that are needed to raise production rates, inasmuch as the fishermen get the financing they need from the Oman Bank of Agriculture and Fisheries, that to buy boats and modern fishing machinery, and the fisheries extension office provides the fishermen in the various fishing regions with the guidance and technical recommendations that they need. In addition, it has set up a maritime workshop to offer required technical services.

Regarding how best to exploit the fish resource, we see that there are two other aspects, the first of which is embodied in the rules and regulations which regulate fishing operations, and which see to it that a productive, rewarding return is achieved on the one hand, and that this resource is not depleted on the other hand. Also, the services of the information bank serve this aspect to a great extent; they are currently offered to interested parties through the Center for Marine and Fish Science.

So the question is: what is going on with the last operation in the production process, that of marketing?

New Ways

[Ba Kathir] The answer to this question was the subject of a symposium on the administration of commercial fishing grounds which was attended by representatives of private sector companies at the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries last week. The symposium discussed the marketing process from the standpoint of the availability of information on the currents of supply and demand in the markets locally and abroad, and the concentration on quality control; it also reviewed new ways of preparing the fish. The symposium also turned its attention to the kinds of fish that may be fished and those that are targeted; preliminary quotas and the possibility of future expansion; the regions allocated to traditional fishermen and those for commercial fishing; distance and depth limits according to the type of fishing ground; fishing equipment used; in addition to training Omanis in fishing operations and the levels and programs of replacing foreign seamen.

According to Conditions

(On the significance of the symposium and the representation of private sector fishing companies): Since 1982 many small Omani companies have in the past gotten licenses from the ministry to fish, but have not practiced their trade because they failed to meet the conditions set for them, since the ministry stipulated that these companies must own fishing boats with which to operate, and that the work force on these boats be 80 percent Omani. After stopping as a result of not meeting these conditions, these companies have now responded to the set conditions. The first one was the Oman Marine Company, which bought a boat and has been fishing since 1987. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries has given facilitations to these companies to encourage them to take part in production operations, inasmuch as it has given them the option of buying boats or renting them as a first step, and working on them for a specific period of time.

The Art of Marketing

[AL-WATAN] What about marketing?

[Ba Kathir] We concentrate on marketing to a large extent, not only in this symposium, but constantly as well. It is well known that getting a commodity to the consumer is the last step in the production process, and if this step should fail, this means that the entire production process has failed. Therefore we lay great importance on the marketing process, and we concentrate on the need to get Omani fish to the markets when it is in good condition with respect to specifications, quality, and the way it is packaged and presented. We also stress the importance of cooperation between local and foreign marketing.

(On how the current production of fish stands): Twenty percent of the fish produced is exported to each of the neighboring sister states and other foreign countries. The ministry is working hard at the present time to raise this percentage, thus during the symposium company representatives were given a full explanation on the quality level that ought to exist in Omani fish exported abroad, because the markets which are subject to supply and demand are also fueled by other factors, most important of which are quality and the manner of presentation. In addition, the symposium presented a number of ideas on good quality and modern methods of canning, and how to take advantage of the expertise of advanced nations in the production of fish in the marketing process.

[AL-WATAN] . . ?

[Ba Kathir] It must be stressed that we give priority to the local market in the sense that we make it self sufficient in the amount of fish needed for consumption, then we export the surplus. You should know that the export of high-value kinds of fish is encouraged so as to provide an opportunity for getting a good return in hard currency.

13,000 Fishermen

[AL-WATAN] What about the regions of commercial fishing and those for traditional fishermen?

[Ba Kathir] The symposium discussed how to administer the commercial fishing grounds. To make that clearer, let me say that in the fishing coasts there are no less than 13,000 traditional fishermen, and thus the Ministry is eager to preserve the locations of these fishermen, such that the places where they fish are marked off and not entered by boats. They would also have fishing quotas that the commercial fishing boats could not exceed. In terms of numbers, 75 percent of the total catch is for traditional fishermen. The goal is that they continue to exist as a productive group, and that they continue to live and work in their regions and not think about moving elsewhere in the country, either to the capital or other cities, to look for other jobs.

The ministry is continuing to look after and support these fishermen.

Villages With Complete Services

(On the new projects in the fisheries sector): The ministry is currently preparing a study on building modern villages with complete services for the fishermen, in implementation of the noble directives of His Majesty Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id in this respect. The study consists of a comprehensive survey of the Omani shores in order to estimate what they need in the way of docks for the fishermen.

[AL-WATAN] The connecting factors here?

[Ba Kathir] As is well known, docks are expensive and require a lot of money. Therefore before building a dock we must examine the economic feasibility itself—such as the number of existing fishermen and the economic returns of their work—since it is unreasonable that we should build a dock in a village with 20 or 50 fishermen. The study will clearly show the feasibility of building these docks on the shores of the sultanate.

[AL-WATAN] What about the fish complexes?

[Ba Kathir] At first the fish complexes were entrusted to small companies in the private sector. The purpose to building them was to receive the fishermen's catch and supply them with various services such as ice needed to preserve the fish, and other technical services. But now they are under the Omani Fisheries Company which was recently established.

Scientific Guide

(On the Center for Marine and Fish Science): It serves the fisheries resource sector to a large degree, since it is considered a scientific guide that provides the ministry and interested parties with important information on the life cycles of the fish and the best seasons for fishing, the

effect of changes in the weather, and the relationship between temperature and fish migration. In addition, it gives advice on the places where the fish breed in large numbers.

SUDAN

Committee To Enumerate Banned Party Properties

*EA0608180589 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic
1030 GMT 6 Aug 89*

[Text] The National Salvation Revolutionary Command Council General Secretariat has issued an order to form a higher committee and subcommittees to enumerate party properties and newspaper establishments.

This committee, which will be led by Brigadier General Makki Muhammad Ahmad al-Kinani, chairman of the Enumeration of Party Properties and Newspaper Establishments Committee, will begin by enumerating all the banned party properties—houses, real estate, and mobile properties—immediately upon its formation. The committee includes representatives from the attorney general's office, auditor general's office, and police from the military judiciary branches.

IRAN

Ministry Initiates Distribution of Birth Control Devices

46400095a London KEYHAN in Persian 6 Jul 89 p 4

[Interview with Deputy Minister of Health, Treatment, and Medical Education Dr Malek-Afzali; date and place not specified]

[Text] The Ministry of Health, Treatment, and Medical Education of the Islamic Republic has recently purchased and imported large amounts of IUD's, condoms, birth control pills, and other birth control devices from foreign countries for the purpose of birth control in implementing family planning regulations. The report concerning the import and availability of birth control devices was given to media reporters and representatives by Dr Malek-Afzali, the deputy minister of health, treatment, and medical education. This official, who published the above report less than 1 week after the death of Ayatollah Khomeyni, told a Tehran newspaper reporter: "In order to prevent the uncontrolled growth of the population in the country, based on the prior approval of Ayatollah Khomeyni, under the four conditions of no abortion taking place, the man and woman both consenting, the birth control method not causing sterility and the method not having any major medical consequences, this ministry has purchased sufficient amounts of birth control devices, including IUD's, condoms, and birth control pills.

The deputy minister of health, treatment, and medical education added: "Those who wish to may obtain these devices by going to the health centers throughout the country for this important and decisive matter, to control birth."

Dr Malek-Afzali, who had gone to Khorramabad while visiting various parts of Lorestan, said in a press conference: "Considering the allocation of 700 million toman in funds by the Majles to expand the health networks and centers throughout the country, within the next 3 years, the number of these centers will increase to 13,000 and will serve 90 percent of the national population."

The above-mentioned official added: "Given the success that we have had in offering services to the people, in addition to the support of international agencies and experts, the UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund] organization has provided about \$5 million in aid, providing much of the necessary equipment, such as motorcycles, and the necessary resources for the health centers. In addition, it has recently donated 200 new Japanese-made Mitsubishi cars to the Islamic Republic."

According to a report we have received from Tehran, the Ministry of Health, Treatment, and Medical Education of the Islamic Republic has purchased various birth control devices for men and women from Western countries. This news source added that the responsibility

for buying and importing the birth control devices has been given to Dr. Naser Kalantari, the director general of family health of the schools of the Ministry of Health. That central office has gradually purchased and imported large amounts of IUD's, condoms, and birth control pills, including LD, Teri, Fasik and those containing miniplanur, from foreign countries, especially England, in the past 6 months.

Half of Population Reportedly Lacks Adequate Housing

46400095b London KEYHAN in Persian 6 Jul 89 p 4

[Text] "Fifty percent of the nation's population live in residential units of less than 50 square meters. For this reason, there is no alternative but to build residences on a mass production basis." This statement was made early last week by Serajeddin Kazeruni, the minister of housing and urban development of the Islamic Republic, to the participants of a seminar on the materials for and methods of construction of residential and general buildings. The above-mentioned official pointed out that the protection of agricultural lands is a general strategy of the Islamic regime and said: "In the north and west of the country, agriculturally suitable land is available, which, considering the environment and suitable water and weather, is naturally attractive for housing, and those who are able to work in these areas are inclined to fill these areas."

Addressing the participants of the seminar, the minister of housing and urban development of the Islamic Republic said: "At the present time, there are officially 500 cities in the country. In addition, 194 rural villages with populations of more than 5,000 have passed the requirements for becoming cities and require the creation of an organization for an administrative system. Also, about 32 rural areas have populations of more than 10,000 and must be changed into cities."

IRI Third Supplier of Petroleum to France

46400094b London KEYHAN in Persian 6 Jul 89 p 4

[Text] After Saudi Arabia and Norway, the Islamic Republic is the largest supplier of crude oil needed by France. The statistics concerning the import of large amounts of Iranian crude oil by French companies were published by the French foreign trade statistics sources simultaneous with the news concerning the return of the French ambassador. According to these statistics, the Islamic Republic exported 2.17 million tons of crude oil to France in the first 4 months of this year (January, February, March, and April), and thus ranks third among the countries exporting oil to France during the period in question.

The statistics published by the French customs sources state that in the first 4 months of 1989, Saudi Arabia supplied about 22.5 percent of the oil needed by France.

The oil imports from Norway during the period in question provided 11.2 percent of France's total needs of this substance.

In exchange for purchasing crude oil from the Islamic Republic, France exports significant amounts of consumer goods, foodstuff, cars, semi-industrial machinery, spare parts, and other similar items. At the present time, France is one of seven trade partners of the Islamic Republic among the Western countries with expansive trade relations with Tehran.

Paper Reports Public Mistrust of Banking System
46400094a London KEYHAN in Persian 6 Jul 89 p 4

[Interview with Majid Qasemi, director general of the Central Bank; date and place not specified]

[Text] The banks of the Islamic Republic will pay 6 percent and 8.5 percent interest to those who have had short-term and long-term deposits, respectively, in 1367 [21 March 1988-20 March 1989].

Payment of interest on the people's deposits in the banks at these rates will be made at a time when the rate of inflation—that is, the decline in the value of the rial and its decreased purchasing power—in the opinion of many economic experts has risen more than 250 percent.

Majid Qasemi, the director general of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic, announced in a press conference some time ago that the decision concerning interest at the above rates has been made by the representatives of the financial and banking institutions of the countries that participate in the general assembly of banks. The director general of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic added: "In the recent general assembly of the banks, in the presence of Mir Hoseyn Musavi, the prime minister of the Islamic Republic, decisions were made concerning long-term interest profits with consideration for the profit obtained from the investments of banks through the people's long-term investment deposits, which have taken place in accordance with the law of interest-free banking operations in various economic sectors."

The above-mentioned official added: "Interest payments on short-term investment deposits in 1367 at the rate of 6 percent were ratified and can be paid. Also, interest payments on long-term investment deposits in 1367 at 8.5 percent, which had been announced tentatively, have received final approval and can be paid."

In another part of this interview, Majid Qasemi said: "Concerning the tentative interest on long-term investment deposits which are due in 1368 [21 March 1989-20 March 1990], the tentative rate of 8.5 percent interest was approved."

People Avoid Depositing Money in Banks

According to reports we have received from Iran, in recent years, because of a lack of confidence in the banking system of the Islamic Republic and particularly because of the low interest rates, the rapid decline in the value of the rial, and the decrease in its purchasing power, the people have avoided as much as possible depositing their money in the banks. In this connection, one person with a private business in Tehran who has traveled from Iran on business emphasized that people avoid depositing their money in the banks. He said to our KEYHAN correspondent: "Many of the middle-class people and tradespeople, considering that the value of money is constantly decreasing and the purchasing power of the rial that they have today might be reduced to one-third by next year, prefer to use their extra money to purchase automobiles, land, property, and goods or to change their money to a reliable foreign currency and hide it away for a day when they can exchange it at a higher rate." This same businessman added: "If a person saves 100,000 tomans in a bank in the Islamic Republic at the present time, after a year, he can get at most about 8,000 tomans in interest, which will give him altogether about 108,000 tomans. Now, if that same person had bought dollars last year with his 100,000 tomans on the black market, which would have been about \$1,200 (80 tomans to the dollar), and if he were to sell his \$1,200 after a year, he would make at least 160,000 tomans in cash (135 tomans per dollar). Hence, with such calculations, everybody avoids depositing his money in the banks."

The businessman said: Another factor preventing people from depositing their money in the banks of the Islamic Republic is the likelihood of confiscation of their cash and or taxation of these monies. However, the recent law passed by the Islamic Revolutionary regime, based upon taxing the people's wealth (national cooperative tax for reconstruction), exempts cash deposited in the banks from payment of this tax. Nevertheless, this point has also alarmed many of the businessmen and middle-class individuals, and has intensified their unwillingness to deposit money in the banks.

The businessman added: "The economic officials of the Islamic Republic, who in facing their problems both are disheartened by the financial wheelings and dealings of the leaders of their regime and those affiliated with them, and have lost their ability to make initiatives and to think, know precisely that under the socioeconomic conditions governing the country, ordinary people do not deposit their cash in the banks. This money, along with other monies that the regime has to print because of its deficit, and thus enter into the financial system of the country, help to escalate inflation. This cycle of abundance of money, low interest rate of banks, reluctance to deposit money in banks, and limited supply of goods, contributes to the decline in the value of the rial and the continuous decrease in its purchasing power."

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